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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis analyses how dominant policy approaches to peacebuilding have 
moved away from a single and universalised understanding of peace to be 
achieved through a top-down strategy of democratisation and economic 
liberalisation, prevalent at the beginning of 1990s. Instead, throughout the 
2000s, peacebuilders have increasingly adopted a commitment to cultivating 
a bottom-up and hybrid peacebuilding process that is context-sensitive and 
intended to be more respectful of the needs and values of post-war societies. 
The projects of statebuilding in Kosovo and, to a lesser extent, in Bosnia are 
examined to illustrate the shift. By capturing this shift, I seek to argue that 
contemporary practitioners of peace are sharing the sensibility of the 
theoretical critics of liberalism. These critics have long contended that post-
war societies cannot be governed from ‘above’ and have advocated the 
adoption of a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding. Now, both peace 
practitioners and their critics share the tendency to embrace difference in 
peacebuilding operations, but this shift has failed to address meaningfully 
the problems and concerns of post-conflict societies.  
The conclusion of this research is that, drawing on the assumption that 
these societies are not capable of undertaking sovereign acts because of their 
problematic inter-subjective frames, the discourses of peacebuilding (in 
policy-making and academic critique) have increasingly legitimised an open-
ended role of interference by external agencies, which now operate from 
‘below’. Peacebuilding has turned into a long-term process, in which 
international and local actors engage relationally in the search for ever-more 
emancipatory hybrid outcomes, but in which self-government and self-
determination are constantly deferred. Processes of emphasising difference 
have thus denied the political autonomy of post-war societies and have 
continuously questioned the political and human equality of these 
populations in a hierarchically divided world. 
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Introduction. 
Narrating the face-to-face encounters with 
the Kosovars 
 
While I was preparing to write the proposal for this thesis, at the beginning 
of 2010, I travelled to Kosovo to film together with three other colleagues an 
experimental documentary about the future of three young Kosovars. 1 
During three weeks, in which we visited several cities and villages, I 
interviewed formally and informally over two dozen people, mostly 
between 20 and 35 years old. In these face-to-face encounters, I was curious 
to know more about their political preferences. Three (fairly interrelated) 
issues appeared in almost every conversation. The first was the status of 
Kosovo: this had been the major disagreement during the war and the post-
war period and it still generated anxiety, especially among minority 
communities, in relation to whether Kosovo ought to be a sovereign state or 
whether it ought to be a province of Serbia. The second concern, also related 
to the notion of (internal) sovereignty, was the role and relevance of the 
international mission in Kosovo since the end of the war in 1999.2 The third 
was the deep economic crisis characterised by high levels of unemployment 
and a high rate of inflation. My ignorance regarding economic matters limits 
my focus to the first two. 
a) Status of Kosovo: Kosovo or Serbia. Most of the people I met in Kosovo 
considered that Kosovo was an independent state from Serbia and that there 
was no possible concession on this matter. 3 They contended that they were 
the majority and that the historical and political events of the last decades 
had legitimised them to decide on their sovereignty. Still, those who 
identified themselves as Kosovo-Serbs desired that Kosovo was a province 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  documentary	  ‘3	  Kosovos’	  reflects	  upon	  three	  young	  Kosovars	  and	  their	  struggles	  in	  their	  everyday	  life.	  Miljan	  aims	  at	  improving	  his	  personal	  life.	  Milos	  seeks	  to	  change	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  his	   local	  community.	  Agon	  wishes	   to	  change	  his	  state	  and	  potentially	  the	   world.	   While	   the	   actual	   argument	   of	   the	   documentary	   has	   little	   to	   do	   with	   this	  thesis,	  some	  of	  the	  discussions	  with	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  pre-­‐production	  phase	  were	  useful	  to	  frame	  this	  study.	  2	  UNSC	  (1999a).	  3	  In	  2008,	  the	  Kosovo	  Assembly	  declared	  the	  independence	  of	  Kosovo	  and	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing	   110	   UN	  member	   states	   recognise	   it	   as	   an	   independent	   state.	   Still,	   Kosovo	   is	  supervised	  by	  a	  rule	  of	  law	  mission	  from	  the	  European	  Union	  (hereafter	  EULEX),	  which	  operates	  under	  UN	  resolution	  1244,	  which	  guarantees	   ‘substantial	  autonomy	  and	  self-­‐government	  in	  Kosovo’,	  but	  the	  final	  status	  is	  ‘pending’	  (UNSC	  1999b:	  3,	  EULEX	  2009).	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of Serbia. Not pretending to be representative in any case, the following 
were some of the arguments that Kosovars used to justify their positions. 
Arber, a librarian of the University in Pristina, stated: ‘I wish that Kosovo 
becomes a full-independent state, this has always been my preference, and 
this is what the majority of the people in Kosovo also desire.’ In a similar line 
of reasoning but with a different conclusion, Miljan, who had been 
struggling to find a job in North Mitrovica, said that ‘Kosovo is part of 
Serbia’. He continued: ‘the majority of the people here, in Serbia, agree with 
me’. Alban, an artist, put his views clear to me: ‘Yes, I am an Albanian. But 
independently of the group I belong, I want Kosovo to be a sovereign state. 
There is no way back after the history of repression we suffered under 
Milosevic’. Milos, who worked for a local NGO in Gracanica, had a different 
opinion, but his argument followed a similar logic: ‘I prefer Kosovo to 
remain as part of Serbia, not only because I am a Serb, but because I want 
protection for the Serbian community and the religious and historical 
heritage in Kosovo’.  
From the encounters, it was clear (and predictable) that those who 
identified as Kosovo-Albanians wanted the independence of Kosovo. 
Alternatively, those who identified themselves as Kosovo-Serbs preferred 
Kosovo to be a region within Serbia. There were exceptions, of course. Agon, 
for example, a musician from Gjakova, did not want the success of any 
national cause and defined himself as a citizen of the world. Nevertheless, 
the two dominant positions were unambiguous and they all gave historical, 
political, economic and cultural reasons to justify them. Their argument 
seemed totally intelligible to me: they wished to be sovereign, albeit their 
desired state had a different name. 
b) International mission and self-government. Most Kosovars agreed, to 
greater or lesser extent, that international administrators were corrupt and 
not interested in improving the political and economic situation. I 
demonstrate this with some examples of their views. Agon had a clear 
critical opinion: ‘internationals are only here for their money. They do not 
take us seriously. They do not treat us as humans. They only decide what is 
good for us’. Regardless of their ethnic identification, Kosovars felt that 
internationals were not respecting their demands. Miljan argued that the US 
and Europe had stolen the sovereignty of Kosovo from the Serbian people. 
Alban put it differently: ‘they give concessions to Belgrade all the time, they 
do not care about us’. The negative views against internationals were 
accompanied with a general concern to move on. Milos said that, after many 
years of tensions, it is time to progress: ‘we [Serbian community] can still 
organise our lives here and start again’. Along similar lines, Arber suggested 
that, ‘unless internationals do not leave completely, this will not be a normal 
country’.  
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I found more positive views regarding international assistance, of course. 
Oliveira, who worked for an international organisation in Pristina, said that, 
‘although internationals had failed to protect minorities in 2004, they bring 
security and a sense of calm now’. In short, from these conversations, I 
perceived a clear desire for self-government and a wish to move forward, 
regardless of people’s ethnic identification. For them, the international 
presence seemed a relic of the war period and now they wanted to be 
responsible for their future. 
 
International framing of the same questions 
 
What called my attention about these thoughts and opinions was how these 
were framed and approached by international policy advisors and 
academics in the wide context of peacebuilding. Where I had understood the 
tension over statehood in Kosovo to be a problem of two competing claims 
about sovereignty [a], the Secretary-General of NATO, Javier Solana, for 
example, saw ‘the demons of ethnic intolerance raising their heads again’.4 
The causes of violence appeared to be related to the inter-subjective 
understandings of the Kosovars. Reflecting on the episodes of violence 
perpetrated against minority Serbs and UN members in 2004, the influential 
International Crisis Group explained that Albanian society was ‘damaged 
economically, politically and psychologically.’ The report is worth quoting at 
length to grasp the Think Tank’s interpretation of the ‘problem’ affecting 
Kosovo: ‘It is a society in a lot of trouble, seemingly unable or unwilling to 
protect neighbours, minorities, or even itself from its own extremists and 
criminals’. The report also referred to ‘people still traumatised by their 
experience’ and warned about the ‘secondary traumatisation of children’. It 
continued: ‘state experience, habits and skills are lacking at all levels’. 
‘Pristina’, the capital, is ‘culturally and educationally underpowered’.  ‘Civil 
society is inadequate to absorb and dissipate shocks, instead, such shocks are 
liable to transmit immediately into violence’. One of the conclusions was that 
‘there need to be far-ranging changes and improvements in the media and 
education to give social change a chance for success’.5 
The notion of a socially ‘damaged society’ to which there was the need for 
‘social change’ puzzled me. It seemed a different story to the rational clash of 
interests and hopes for different statehoods that I had interpreted in my field 
experience. As Furedi argues, ‘intolerance is far more likely to be one of the 
many expressions of a particular conflict that its cause’.6 However, rather 
than considering violence the expression of a conflict of interests, most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Solana	  (1998).	  	  5	  ICG	  (2004:	  32–35).	  6	  Furedi	  (2011:	  10).	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academic commentators – alike the ICG and other international 
organisations – identified the source of the problem at the subjective level of 
Kosovo’s society: its intolerance to difference, its ethnic framings, its 
prejudices, its illiteracy, its premodern character or its readiness to embrace 
violence and extremism. 7  Proposals for peace, over and over again, 
contained measures for social improvement. Jene Narten explains that the 
dilemmas constraining the statebuilding process initiated after the war (1999 
– present) ‘could effectively be reduced if we were to invest more in 
educational projects for the general public’.8 
Within these frameworks, it is unsurprising that Kosovars’ demands for 
self-government were viewed with great scepticism [b]. To put it simply, 
while I interpreted the Kosovars requests to govern themselves as the 
willingness to master and own their future, they were seen in the literature 
as potentially catastrophic if they were granted. At best, these claims were 
seen as demands for ‘ethnic sovereignty’, a sovereignty that benefits 
nationalist entrepreneurs and resists and undermines transnationalism and 
pluralism.9 At worst, self-government was seen as an opening the door for 
cleansing minority populations.10  
Furthermore, while I identified rejection, frustration and disdain towards 
international administrators, their role was considered crucial and almost 
undisputable within international problematisations of the statebuilding in 
Kosovo. Proposals varied substantially from more pragmatic approaches 
that sought to achieve peace through land swaps or autonomous 
arrangements, 11  to others which emphasised a process of ‘shared 
governance’ to define peace at the ‘micro-level’, at ‘the social and inter-
subjective setting,’ in order to cultivate ‘pluralism and hybridity’.12 These 
positions will be analysed in more detail in chapter 2. It is sufficient to 
recognise here that, without any intention to belittle the humanitarian crises 
that have affected Kosovo in the post-war period, the notion of shared or 
hybrid projects of peace was, at least, in tension with the views of the 
Kosovars I met. In short, whereas in my field experience I witnessed a 
problem of two competing claims about sovereignty much of the literature 
framed the problem to be situated at the societal and inter-subjective level of 
Kosovar society that had to be remedied with some sort of international 
supervision. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  For	  some	  examples,	  see	  Mearsheimer	  (2000);	  Nikolic	  (2003).	  8	  Narten	  (2009:	  279).	  9	  Devic	  (2006);	  Fawn	  and	  Richmond	  (2009:	  230).	  10	  ICG	  (2004:	  33);	  Narten	  (2009).	  11	  Economides,	  Ker-­‐Lindsay	  and	  Papadimitriou	  (2010).	  	  12	  Fawn	  and	  Richmond	  (2009:	  231–232).	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There is the chance, of course, that I was being naïve. Or that the 
Kosovars I encountered lied to me and they had hidden agendas behind 
their desires for statehood. Or that I only met those who constructed their 
ideas within a political framing, rather than as ethnic objectives whose aim 
was to eliminate the other group. Perhaps. Actually, my intention is not to 
claim that I have reached an objective understanding of politics in Kosovo in 
contrast to other academics who have got it “wrong”. This introduction, the 
apparent misfit between my interpretation of the face-to-face encounters and 
(my interpretation of) the texts about Kosovo’s statebuilding, is useful to 
raise a concern regarding the consistency of these dominant international 
framings  and which seem almost commonsensical in the literature. Still, one 
may wonder, why is this questioning relevant? Why shall one bother about 
this “misfit” that the author identified through unrepresentative interviews 
in such a tiny place at the backdoor of Europe? 
 
Formulating a hypothesis 
 
The encounter with the Kosovars narrated at the beginning of this 
introduction obtains its relevance when juxtaposed in relation to a broader 
discursive shift underpinning dominant discourses of peacebuilding since 
the Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, formulated the 
concept of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ in 1992. 13  It will be argued 
throughout this thesis that this shift, spurred by the alleged crises or failures 
of practices of statebuilding, reveals a tendency to move away from a 
universal basis for peace towards a focus on context-sensitive processes of 
peacebuilding, which seek to respect the needs and priorities of post-conflict 
societies.  
To be sure, an ethical commitment to cultivate a sustainable and lasting 
peace while embracing diversity is at the core of the debates about 
statebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) and Kosovo, as it 
will be argued in chapters 1 and 2. For example, in Kosovo, the aim of the 
UN operation (hereafter UNMIK) was to promote tolerance among 
communities and build a ‘free, pluralist and multi-ethnic society’. 14 
However, academic critics have highlighted that the UNMIK policies to 
decentralise power on the basis of ethnicity have reinforced the divisive lines 
of the war and trumped the goals of building a pluralist and multi-ethnic 
state. Instead, these critical views have emphasised the need to rely on 
bottom-up initiatives that cut across ethnic identifications with the aim of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Boutros-­‐Ghali	  (1992).	  14	  UNSC	  (1999c:	  16).	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enabling a more representative and plural peace.15 Along these lines, since 
2008 the EU mission (hereafter EULEX) has sought to promote ‘total 
ownership’ and enacted a multi-ethnic institutional framing to de-emphasise 
ethnicity at the level of society.16  
More broadly beyond the experiences in the former Yugoslavia, there is 
also a normative effort to shift away from top-down domineering practices 
of state-building, prevalent during the 1990s, towards bottom-up 
approaches. These propose are based on a process of deep reflexivity and 
mutual learning among a conglomerate of international and national actors 
in order to build peace in tune with contextual specificities. This has been 
apparent in recent policy reports, which emphasise the need for building 
peace as resilience, as it will be analysed in chapter 3. The OECD, for 
instance, writes: ‘there is a belief that “the West” should not impose its 
models and norms on the rest of the world and that statebuilding must be 
understood as an endogenously driven process that is both political and 
context-specific’.17  
As it will be argued in chapter 4, critical views have even more forcefully 
attempted to think of peacebuilding processes beyond the ethnocentric 
gazes, by engaging with resistance and local agency, and aspiring to a form 
of peace that is respectful with the everyday and the pluralism of post-war 
societies. Oliver Richmond, whose views will be analyzed in detail 
throughout much of this research, explains his interpretation of an 
emancipatory peace: 
Embracing difference in agonistic relationships within hybrid forms while 
producing political tensions over what it means to be liberal, neoliberal or 
local, holds potential for peace and emancipation in a far more deeply 
democratic manner than the continued privileging of the Enlightenment 
rights systems.18 
The willingness to move away from strong interventionist missions towards 
peace projects driven by diverse local constituencies and constructively 
assisted by international agencies can be seen by focusing on the debate 
about ‘national ownership’, discussed in chapter 5. In the literature, there is a 
strong consensus about the importance that post-war processes are owned 
and led by local actors and gradually more efforts are devoted to enhance a 
more effective national ownership.19 
In short, as they are interpreted in this research, the last two decades of 
‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ reveal a discursive evolution from a universal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  For	   some	  examples	  of	   these	   critical	   views,	   see	  Franks	  and	  Richmond	   (2008);	  Hehir	  (2006);	  Popolo	  (2011),	  Simonsen	  (2005).	  16	  EULEX	  (2009:	  9).	  17	  OECD	  (2011b:	  25).	  18	  Richmond	  and	  Chandler	  (2014:	  10).	  19	  For	  an	  overview,	  see	  Donais	  (2009a).	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model of peace towards processes of peace that are respectful of the needs 
and values of post-conflict societies. It is against this ethical predisposition of 
dominant discourses of peacebuilding that it is important to situate the sense 
of unease expressed by Kosovars during my early encounters with them. 
Indeed, the hypothesis for this thesis is that, the tendency to embrace 
difference seems to have failed to engage meaningfully with post-conflict 
societies and it has done little to resolve the political concerns of these 
populations. Before turning to analyse the argument and the structure of the 
thesis, some methodological clarifications are pertinent. 
 
 
Methodological remarks 
 
My journey to Kosovo in 2010 was useful to obtain an idea about the political 
dilemmas related to statehood, as viewed by several Kosovar citizens, that 
has constantly played back and forth against the theories of international 
peacebuilding. In November 2013, coinciding with municipal elections, I 
returned to Kosovo for a week. My foremost intention was to deepen my 
knowledge of the cause for self-determination and self-government, which 
had increased considerably in the last few years. For example, the former 
social movement, which is now constituted as a political party, Lëvizja 
Vetëvendosje (self-determination), had gradually gained more support 
among Kosovars and they won the elections in Pristina20. 
I did three interviews with members of Vetëvendosje, two of them with 
his leader, Albin Kurti. The party’s openly nationalist views to defend the 
sovereignty of Kosovo are considered deeply problematic for international 
organisations and academic commentators dealing with post-war Kosovo. 
Indeed, that I carried out interviews with the party proved controversial 
with some of my University colleagues and was greeted with suspicion at 
international conferences where I presented my work. Still, academia is 
surely a forum in which we can seek to understand views, political arguments 
and interpretations of events without necessarily agreeing or sympathising 
with them.21 In the interviews and the analysis of the data, I adopt the 
‘cultural sensitivity’ of a ‘social anthropologist’, which ‘entails a serious and 
unprejudiced engagement with local specificity from within, without 
necessarily sympathising with it or becoming its advocate’.22 These are the 
words of the anthropologist Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, whose careful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  In	   the	   municipal	   elections	   of	   2013,	   Vetëvendosje’s	   candidate,	   Shpend	   Ahmeti,	   was	  sworn	  in	  as	  the	  Mayor	  in	  Pristina	  (Vetëvendosje	  2013).	  21	  See	   Hague’s	   reflection	   on	   the	   possibility	   to	   ‘understand’	   –	   without	   legitimising	   –	  suicide	  bombers	  in	  academic	  writing	  (2003:	  65–68).	  22	  Schwandner-­‐Sievers	  (2013:	  109).	  
14	  |	  I N T R O D U C T I O N   
approach to Kosovo and her analyses of Vetëvendosje’s have inspired the 
conceptualisation of the case study of this research. While I was in Kosovo, I 
also interviewed Jolyon Naegele, UNMIK’s Head of Political Affairs, and a 
member of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
who wanted to remain anonymous and did not give the authorisation to 
record our talk or quote it. 23  With these interviews, my idea was to 
investigate further the Kosovars’ demands of self-government. 
But this thesis is not about the concept of ‘self-determination’.24 Indeed, it 
is not even about Kosovo’s post-war process. It is about the international 
discourses of peacebuilding and how they seek to cultivate peace in post-
conflict societies. My analysis thus will carefully analyse these international 
discourses on their own terms – reflecting upon their internal logic and 
vigilantly interpreting their framing questions, assumptions and anxieties – 
beyond the conclusions they consciously pose.25 The Kosovo case and to a 
lesser extent also the case in Bosnia are the ontological projections that are 
referred to, explicitly or implicitly, when investigating these approaches to 
peacebuilding. These projections are relevant to think through these 
different policy and academic frameworks and to problematise their shifts 
and expansions since the end of the Cold War. 
Let me put two examples about how I use some ontological suppositions 
to understand the conceptualisations of leading frameworks of 
peacebuilding. The demands of self-government that are important many 
Bosnians and Kosovars alike may be in conflict with their respective 
statebuilding processes (Ch. 2); with approaches of building resilience 
through reflective conversations between international and local actors (Ch. 
3); with hybrid agonistic approaches that seek to deterritorialise nations (Ch. 
4); or with the debate about promoting ownership without contemplating 
self-determination (Ch. 5). In this case, what matters for this thesis is not an 
assessment of the claims of the people in the former Yugoslavia. Rather, it is 
important to understand the logic of the international framing of these 
claims and to question, for instance, why self-government appears in tension 
with current approaches to peacebuilding. 
The second example has to do with the notion that Kosovo’s statebuilding 
project is unique and eminently difficult to develop. Berend, for example, 
argues that ‘there is no really good exit from the Kosovo trap’.26 Clark refers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  I	   regret	   not	   having	   interviewed	   any	   member	   of	   EULEX,	   which	   will	   be	   carefully	  analysed	   in	   the	   second	   chapter.	   This	   organisation	   only	   became	   important	   to	   my	  research	  after	  my	  return	  from	  Kosovo.	  	  24	  Philpott	  (1995).	  25	  I	   follow	  here	   the	  methodological	   guidance	  proposed	  by	  Chandler	  when	  he	   analyses	  the	  paradigm	  of	  international	  statebuilding	  (2010c:	  10–11).	  26	  Berend	  (2006:	  414).	  See	  also	  Narten	  (2009).	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to the north of Kosovo as an ‘intractable Gordian knot’.27 Diplomats and 
other commentators have continuously pointed to its ‘unique’ character or 
emphasized that it is an ‘exception’, a ‘sui generis case’ or a ‘microcosm’.28 
This overstated emphasis on Kosovo’s difference – which can be either 
positive or negative29 – is indicative of contemporary framings of post-
conflict societies. My point is not to say that Kosovo is like any other state or 
to ignore its historical specificities or cultural distinctions. But I contend that 
the focus on Kosovo’s difference reveals more about “us”, about our 
framings of peacebuilding, than “them”. It is to “us” and how “we” 
understand “them” in processes of peacebuilding that the argument of this 
thesis is about. 
 
 
The argument of this thesis 
 
This thesis interprets how both dominant discourses of international 
peacebuilding (policy and academic frameworks) have moved away from 
universal assumptions of peace and have evolved throughout the 2000s 
towards a commitment to cultivating a hybrid process that is context-
sensitive and respectful of the needs of post-war societies. However, it is 
argued that the tendency to embrace difference in peacebuilding operations 
has failed to meaningfully address the problems and concerns of post-
conflict societies. The conclusion of this research is that, drawing on the 
assumption that these societies are not capable of undertaking sovereign 
acts because of their problematic inter-subjective frames, the discourses of 
peacebuilding have increasingly legitimised an indefinite role of interference 
from external agencies. Peacebuilding has become a process-based effort 
driven by local actors and facilitated by international partners that aims at 
appreciating difference. However, by emphasising difference, these processes 
have denied the political autonomy of post-war societies and have 
continuously questioned the political and human equality of these 
populations in a hierarchically divided world. 
 
Conceptual Clarifications: Discourses and Difference 
 
Before I summarise the argument developed in each chapter, it is important 
to briefly clarify what the discourses or approaches of peacebuilding I am 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Clark	  (2014:	  543).	  28	  See	  Hehir	   for	  an	  assessment	  of	  different	  views	  about	  Kosovo’s	  apparent	  uniqueness	  (2010:	  185–195).	  29	  For	  a	  positive	  look	  at	  Kosovo’s	  uniqueness	  see	  Duijzings	  (2000).	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referring to are and what difference, framed with the lens of culture, means in 
this research. 
‘Post-conflict peacebuilding’ was initially conceptualised at the end of the 
Cold War, broadly as the internationally led missions to prevent conflict 
from reigniting after the peace settlement.30 Since then, this project of global 
governance has expanded and renovated its assumptions and practices by, 
for example, incorporating critiques, adjusting to international conjectures or 
learning the lessons from previous experiences. In this research, I 
heuristically draw out three discourses of international post-conflict 
peacebuilding that will help us to disentangle and think through the 
evolution of peacebuilding operations: liberal peace, building resilience and 
post-liberal peace or hybrid peace. In order to spell out a discursive shift – from 
the liberal peace to critical frameworks like building resilience and post-
liberal peace – I will focus on how these frameworks have conceptualized 
“culture”, which has become the lens to understand human differences. 31  
It is important to add that the use of different names for projects of global 
governance approaches might be misleading. Indeed, both ‘building 
resilience’ and ‘post-liberal peace’ frameworks are purposely not radical 
alternatives to or opposed to the liberal peace. They do not reject liberalism, 
but seek to critically reappraise the central tenets of the liberal peace in order 
to cultivate a lasting peace, which is more respectful with the everyday of 
post-war societies. As Paris argues, ‘despite the disagreements, most share 
‘liberal principles’ and the ‘critical literature is actually espousing variations 
within, rather than alternatives to, liberal peacebuilding’.32 
The term liberal peace was initially introduced by scholars to analyse the 
top-down projects of liberal governance in the context of post-war scenarios 
that were prevalent throughout the 1990s.33 As it will be analysed in chapter 
1 and 2, at the beginning of the decade, there was a widespread universal 
understanding that peacebuilding – informed by the belief that wars are rare 
between democracies – consisted of bringing processes of democratisation 
and economic liberalisations to war-torn societies.34  
However, the difficulties encountered in the initial operations – for 
example, the experience that democratic processes could revive tensions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Boutros-­‐Ghali	  (1992,	  1992/1993).	  31	  I	  am	  not	  interested	  in	  defining	  culture	  in	  this	  research	  (for	  a	  good	  overview	  of	  culture	  in	  peace	  studies,	  see	  Brigg	  2010).	  Rather,	  I	  am	  interested,	  similar	  to	  Brigg	  and	  Muller,	  in	  understanding	   ‘how	  we	  use	   culture	   to	   know	  human	  differences’	   and	  how	   it	   has	   been	  used	   in	   relation	   to	   conflict	   resolution	  and	  peacebuilding	  endeavours	   (2009:	  124).	   See	  also	  Chandler	  (2010b:	  373–377);	  Malik	  (1996:	  128–209).	  32	  Paris	  (2010:	  339);	  see	  also	  Heathershaw	  (2008).	  33	  For	  example,	   see	  Dillon	  and	  Reid	   (2000);	  Duffield	   (2001:	  10–11);	  Mac	  Ginty	   (2008:	  143);	  Paris	  (1997;	  2004);	  Richmond	  (2006:	  291–314).	  34	  Boutros-­‐Ghali	   (1992,	   1992/1993,	   1996);	   Doyle	   (1986);	   Huntington	   (1991);	   Levy	  (1988);	  Rummel	  (1995).	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among groups rather than calm them – led to a questioning of the notion that 
peace is an inevitable outcome of democratisation.35  The apparent ‘limits’ of 
liberal internationalism36 came to be conceptualised and rationalised through 
the acknowledgement that people were culturally different: the inter-
subjective processes or informal constraints of different societies explained 
divergences among them. Initially, ‘culture’ was framed in negative terms: 
these constructed subjective processes made people choose the wrong 
decisions in peace or development contexts.37 On the assumption that post-
conflict societies had problematic mental constructs, peacebuilding was 
increasingly reconsidered so that it included a process of building 
institutions in order to establish the optimal conditions from which 
democracy and peace could later flourish.38 
Since the second half of the 2000s, international organisations have sought 
to radicalise the tenets of the institutionalisation approach in order to 
overcome the limits of top-down and externally driven peace processes. 
These approaches – which I will refer to as building resilience approaches – seek 
to build peace through facilitating resilience, thus picking up the concept 
increasingly used by international policy texts39 and contributing to the 
academic debate on resilience,40 in which the notion of culture has received 
little attention. In the framework of building resilience, culture has a more 
positive meaning: it is understood as a resource for peace that can be 
carefully explored and cultivated through iterative actions by international 
organisations and national actors.41 I will contend in chapter 3 that these 
frameworks increasingly share the sensibilities of critical approaches of the 
liberal peace in academia. 
Increasingly present in academic debates, post-liberal or hybrid peace 
frameworks argue that top-down and universal perspectives of 
peacebuilding have failed to engage with the deep particularism of post-war 
situations. As it will be analysed in chapter 4, these frameworks adopt a 
radically constructivist understanding of difference and contend that it 
would always exceed any attempt to conceptualise or represent it.42 Rather 
than seeking to build peace from an externally driven perspective, these 
frameworks indicate that the tensions, resistances and clashes between 
international and local actors in contemporary post-war situations have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Carothers	  (2002).	  36	  Paris	  (1997).	  37	  Bova	  (1997);	  North	  (1990);	  Harrison	  (1992);	  Harrison	  and	  Huntington	  (2000).	  38	  Ghani	  and	  Lockhart	  (2008);	  Fukuyama	  (2004);	  Paris	  (2004).	  39	  EC	  (2012);	  DFID	  (2011);	  OECD	  (2008);	  UNISDR	  (2012).	  40	  See	   the	   publication	   of	   a	   new	   journal	   devoted	   to	   ‘Resilience’	   Chandler	   2013d.	   Also	  Chandler	  (2014b);	  Joseph	  (2013).	  41	  De	  Carvalho,	  de	  Coning	  and	  Connolly	  (2014);	  UNDP	  (2011);	  UNESCO	  (2010).	  42	  For	  example,	  see	  Campbell	  (1998);	  Connolly	  (1995,	  2002).	  
18	  |	  I N T R O D U C T I O N   
already opened up the possibilities to cultivate a locally engrained and 
inclusive peace.43  
 
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
The argument is developed in the course of five chapters. Chapter 1 
(Governance Failures and the Rise of Culture) explores the shift from peace-through-
democratisation approaches dominant in the early 1990s to a growing 
concern with the need to build institutions in post-war societies towards the 
end of the decade. While the literature has extensively documented this 
shift,44 I seek to explain it by focusing on one of its preconditions: this is the 
notion of a hierarchically divided world between Western liberal 
democracies and states on the receiving end of peace-building interventions. 
At the end of the cold war, there was a widespread assumption amongst the 
international community regarding the universally applicable mutual 
confluence of peace, democracy and development. However, the difficulties 
encountered during the peacebuilding processes in the mid-1990s led to a 
reappraisal of this assumption. In other words, I argue that the failure to 
bring a lasting peace through universal frameworks such as democracy or 
economic liberalisation led to the perception that post-war societies were 
culturally different (for example, they had tribal thoughts, ethnicized politics 
or lacked a tolerant civil society). As a result, international peacebuilders 
found it increasingly necessary to develop institutions that could manage the 
deficient subjective constructs of these societies. The case of Bosnia will be 
used to interpret this policy evolution. It will be demonstrated that, because 
the democratisation process revitalised rather than pacified the nationalist 
feelings of the Bosnians, peacebuilders prolonged their mandate and 
initiated a process of developing appropriate institutional mechanisms to 
stabilise society. 
This shift in the discourse of peacebuilding will be contextualised with a 
focus on the theory of institutions of Douglass North, Nobel Laureate in 
Economics Sciences. Dissatisfied with deceptive results produced by 
orthodox economic development policies in developing Third World 
countries, North argued that the unequal path of economies could be 
explained by the (efficient or deficient) ‘subjective’ or ‘mental models’ that 
govern societies through time.45 For him, the key to economic growth was to 
provide an institutional framework capable of directing and correcting these 
subjective models. North is important for the chapter because, similar to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Belloni	  (2012);	  Brigg	  (2010);	  Mac	  Ginty	  (2010);	  Richmond	  (2010a,	  2011).	  	  44	  For	  example,	  Chandler	  (2000);	  Duffield	  (2001);	  Paris	  (2004).	  45	  North	  (1990:	  37).	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peacebuilders who proposed to create an adequate institutional setting for 
post-conflict societies, his views represented a critical reappraisal of 
universal economic models in order to deal more successfully with a 
culturally divided world. 
Chapter 2 (Reframing Post-Conflict Kosovo: The ethnic Dilemma and the 
Indefinite International supervision) focuses on the state-building process in 
Kosovo since 1999 – as illustrative of an institutionalisation approach to 
peacebuilding. In particular, it asks why the decision over the status of 
Kosovo (whether it will be an independent state or a province of Serbia) has 
been deferred continuously and why attempts have been made to resolve 
tensions between Kosovars through a technical process of crisis 
management.46 It argues that the existence of an “ethnic dilemma” in the 
international framings of Kosovo. This dilemma, that exists both within the 
frameworks of international stakeholders and academic critics of the 
statebuilding operation, can be summarised as follows: what if democracy 
allows Kosovars to actualise their “ethnic” aspirations? The fear that 
democracy would exacerbate ethnic tensions has legitimised further external 
supervision and has ensured that the status of Kosovo has remained in 
limbo.  
In the last section of the chapter I seek to undo this dilemma. I argue that 
international approaches have exaggerated the durability of ethnicity and, 
even if ethnicity is an experienced identification among Kosovars, the point 
that Kosovars think ‘ethnically’ is actually an international framing of the 
problems in Kosovo. Instead, as an exploratory way-out of the dilemma, I 
propose to rethink the tensions in Kosovo as two competing political visions 
of statehood, rather than a clash between ethnic groups. 
Chapter 3 (Realising the Postmodern Dream: Building Resilient Communities 
and the Promise of Peace) is analytically the most ambitious, as it presents the 
three approaches investigated in this research: liberal peace, post-liberal 
peace and building resilience. It investigates the contemporary rise of 
building resilience as a policy strategy to stabilise peace in post-conflict 
societies. The strategy of building resilience is interpreted as a move away 
from the domineering and top-down liberal peace frameworks prevalent in 
cases such as Bosnia or Kosovo. I will capture this shift by focusing on the 
distinct conceptualisation of difference of the two approaches: while liberal 
peace frameworks identified the problem of peace in the subjective models 
of post-conflict societies, building resilience frameworks engage 
affirmatively with the resources found in the everyday of post-war 
scenarios.47 Learning from the little success of previous top-down operations, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46 	  The	   institution-­‐building	   approach	   adopted	   by	   UNMIK	   (UNSC	   1999)	   has	   been	  reinterpreted	   by	   EULEX	   (2009),	  who	   seeks	   to	  manage	   society	   in	   a	   less	   intrusive	   and	  top-­‐down	  form.	  47	  See,	  for	  example,	  OECD	  (2008);	  UNDP	  (2012);	  World	  Bank	  (2014).	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statebuilders are redefining their roles as mere assistants or facilitators of 
post-conflict societies in order to nurture context-sensitive processes of 
peace. 
The chapter argues that resilience approaches are thus increasingly 
sharing the sensibilities of academic critics of the liberal peace. These 
approaches focus on the irreducible particularism of the locals and criticise 
top-down approaches. They propose a hybrid approach of ‘relational 
sensibility’ between internationals and locals,48 which resembles, I argue, the 
sentiments of contemporary policy-makers. In this sense, I conclude that 
David Campbell’s critique of liberalism and his proposal to rethink peace in 
Bosnia as a ‘promise’ that will permanently remain ‘to come’, impossible to 
be finalised, is useful to think of current processes of peace that continuously 
defer politics on the hope of finding better alternatives to appreciate 
difference (e.g. a more inclusive or plural peace). 
Chapter 4 (Hybrid Peace and Difference: Vorarephilia of Critique?) unpacks 
the ethical assumptions of the critique of the liberal peace, which seeks to 
move beyond the limitations of top-down approaches in order to care for the 
local population in their everyday struggles. I use the work of William 
Connolly on pluralism to frame the sensibilities of these approaches. On the 
assumption that any formulation of ethics will be unfaithful to difference, 
Connolly affirms the ambiguous, elusive and contingent experiences of life 
through processes of individual and communal self-reflection. 49 Along these 
lines, the critics of liberal peacebuilding seek to engage with the cultural 
realities and stories of post-conflict areas to develop a hybrid project of 
peace, which eschews both overbearing peacebuilders and potentially 
unrepresentative or violent local actors.50 However, it will be argued, the 
point that difference is not amenable to representation – which is their main 
weapon for critiquing practices of peacebuilding – is also their own 
guillotine. The critics of the critics have highlighted that hybridity still 
contains an essentialist whiff and reproduces a hierarchical dichotomy 
(international - local), which undermines the plurality of societies intervened 
upon. Therefore, the critics of hybridity (the critics of the critics) propose that 
developing a sense of self-reflexivity and obtaining an even deeper 
knowledge of the local is necessary to foster peace and embrace difference 
more genuinely. 51 
The conclusion of this chapter is straightforward: critique has devoured 
itself by highlighting that earlier attempts to build peace have been 
disrespectful of the particularism of post-conflict societies and constantly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Brigg	  (2013:	  12);	  see	  also	  Belloni	  (2012);	  Richmond	  (2011);	  Richmond	  and	  Mac	  Ginty	  (2013).	  	  	  49	  Connolly	  (1995;	  2002;	  2005).	  50	  Richmond	  (2011:	  198).	  51	  Drichel	  (2008);	  Sabaratnam	  (2013).	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pointing to the need to respect more authentically the needs and values of 
these societies. However, I contend that the prioritisation of hybridity and 
the relational sensibility proposed by post-liberal peace perspectives belittles 
the concerns of post-conflict societies, which might, for example, be willing 
to have security, sovereignty or self-government, three concepts which 
hybridity despises. As Friedman succinctly puts it, ‘it may be hybrid-for-us 
but in the street or the village, things are very different’.52 This concern 
moves the research to the last chapter.  
Chapter 5 (Limiting Ownership in Post-Conflict Situations: Protecting Unequal 
Humans?) repacks the analyses of the previous chapters in order to usher the 
argument towards the conclusion of this research: assuming that post-
conflict societies are not capable of undertaking the appropriate decisions on 
their own, an international interference has been prolonged indefinitely. The 
result of a commitment towards embracing difference has belittled the 
political autonomy of post-conflict societies and their equal right to self-
government. While this is the overall conclusion of the research, in the last 
chapter, I will seek to illustrate it with an analysis of how the concept of 
‘national ownership’ has been interpreted in the literature. 
International policy-makers introduced a commitment to ownership 
precisely when there was a prevalent scepticism that post-conflict societies 
could govern themselves without international supervision. This 
contradiction – between willing to grant ownership and at the same time 
fearing complete ownership – has been dodged with a reinterpretation (or 
narrowing) of the meaning of ownership. For the three approaches analysed 
in this thesis, rather than a process that ends up by granting full 
responsibilities to the locals, ownership has come to be understood as 
apprenticeship in a project in which the aim is to improve the relation and 
understanding between multiple actors and where self-government is no 
longer a question. I seek to demonstrate how this process-based 
understanding of peacebuilding that wishes to be respectful of people in 
their everyday contexts is problematic because it fails to meaningfully 
address the political concerns of post-conflict societies. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Friedman	  (2002:	  28).	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Chapter 1.  
Governance Failures and the Rise of Culture: 
From Peace-through-Democratisation to a 
Building Institutions Approach 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Today it is accepted that the heydays of international post-conflict 
peacebuilding are over.1 The optimism of the early days with regard to the 
mutually reinforcing processes of democratisation, economic liberalisation 
and peace, contrasts with the ‘hyper-critical’ views that have become more 
common since the beginning of the 2000s.2 Some of these critiques focus, for 
example, on the harmful empirical consequences that international 
supervision has had in post-conflict societies. Some other commentators 
question, especially after the War on terror, the imperialist or colonialist 
assumptions underpinning a global governance project. Other critical 
analysts reveal the problematic liberal assumptions of universalising 
progress that are imposed on non-liberal others. 3  Among international 
practitioners and policy-oriented work, there is also a willingness to shift 
away from the beliefs sustaining the initial peace missions and there is 
constant renewal of policy practices. 4  Even commentators that seek to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  Secretary	  General	  of	  the	  UN,	  Boutros	  Boutros-­‐Ghali,	   initially	  articulated	  the	  term	  ‘post-­‐conflict	  peacebuilding’	  in	  1992,	  in	  a	  context	  of	  optimism	  regarding	  the	  UN	  peace-­‐keeping	  operations	  launched	  at	  the	  limit	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Peacebuilding	  comprised	  the	  ‘comprehensive	  efforts	  to	  identify	  and	  support	  structures	  which	  will	  tend	  to	  consolidate	  peace	  and	  advance	  a	  sense	  of	  confidence	  and	  well-­‐being	  among	  people’	  (Boutros-­‐Ghali	  1992:	  212).	  2	  For	  an	  historical	  account	  and	  overview	  of	  the	  last	  twenty	  years	  of	  peacebuilding,	  see	  Sabaratnam	   (2011)	   and	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   same	   volume	   written	   by	   Campbell,	  Chandler	  and	  Sabaratnam	  (2011).	  3 	  Recent	   edited	   volumes	   that	   encompass	   these	   different	   critical	   views	   include:	  Campbell,	   Chandler	   and	   Sabaratnam	   (2011);	   Newman,	   Paris	   and	   Richmond	   (2009);	  Paris	  and	  Sisk	  (2009);	  Richmond	  (2010c).	  4	  Paffenholz	  (2014).	  For	  instance,	  see	  chapter	  3	  for	  an	  analyses	  of	  ‘building	  resilience’	  in	  international	  policy	  discourses.	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temper the pessimistic arguments of the critics also criticise the enthusiasm 
for international peacebuilding of the early 1990s.5 
While the rest of the thesis examines some of the critical perspectives in 
the literature on peacebuilding, this initial chapter explores the origins of the 
crisis in post-conflict peacebuilding endeavours which will be interpreted as 
a crisis of universalism. The chapter identifies a shift in the early 1990s in the 
discourses of peacebuilding that marks the commencement of what Cooper 
calls the contemporary ‘crisis of confidence and credibility with 
peacebuilding’. 6 To be sure, the literature has already extensively 
documented this shift: to summarise it here, from universalist rational 
understandings of peacebuilding – i.e. the peace–through–democratisation 
approach, dominant in the early years of 1990s, to frameworks that focused 
on building institutions, which have become more common since the second 
half of the decade.7 In addition to these works, in this chapter I seek to 
investigate the hierarchical cultural divide between Western and non-
Western post-conflict societies that reappeared after the difficulties 
encountered when international administrators sought to implement peace 
through democratic practices. I shall argue that this divide8 posed a limit to 
universal peacebuilding processes – because it rationalized why some 
societies were not amenable to rapid democratic and peaceful change – and 
it was an important precondition for the shift towards the institutionalisation 
of post-war societies. As I read it, therefore, the alleged “crisis” of today is, in 
part, a crisis of confidence regarding the universal assumptions of 
peacebuilding approaches that I seek to trace back to the mid-1990, giving 
special attention to the problems affecting post-conflict Bosnia. 
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I seek to introduce the 
tendency to criticise approaches to peacebuilding that make universal 
assumptions by looking at a neighbouring field: this is the new 
institutionalist economics with a particular focus on Douglass North. I argue 
that North is useful to understand the debates about peacebuilding 
occurring throughout the 1990s because he identified in the subjective 
models of some societies the explanation for the divergent economic growth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5 	  Paris,	   for	   example,	   wishes	   to	   occupy	   a	   middle	   ground	   between	   the	   ‘irrational	  exuberance’	   of	   the	  peace-­‐as-­‐liberalism	  and	   the	   ‘exaggerated	  backlash’	   of	   the	   critics	   of	  the	  field	  (2010:	  339).	  6	  Cooper	  (2007:	  605).	  7	  For	  example,	  Barnett	  (1997);	  Chandler	  (2000;	  2010c);	  Duffield	  (2001);	  Paris	  (2004);	  Pupavac	  (2004).	  8	  In	  the	  first	  chapter	  I	  introduce	  this	  divide	  through	  a	  reading	  of	  Douglass	  North	  theory	  of	   institutional	   change,	   as	   he	   influentially	   focused	   on	   ‘subjective	   models’	   that	   shape	  institutions	  to	  explain	  the	  divergent	  path	  of	  different	  economies	  (1990:	  138).	  In	  peace	  or	  development	  debates,	  this	  divide	  was	  clear	  in	  analyses	  that	  emphasised	  social	  lenses	  to	   account	   for	   the	  unequal	  paths	  of	   societies	   (Fukuyama	  1995;	  Kaplan	  1993;	  Krasner	  2004;	  Harrison	  and	  Huntington	  2000).	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among societies. As a solution, he proposed to build efficient institutions in 
order to guide the decisions that people take. The second section deals with 
the premises of the UN-led initial peacebuilding operations that sought to 
bring peace through processes of democratisation and economic 
liberalisation. It is against this backdrop of euphoria regarding 
universalising assumptions that I introduce the case study of Bosnia. I will 
demonstrate that, after Bosnians elected nationalist leaders and different 
groups remained unwilling to cooperate among themselves, international 
administrators and academic commentators started questioning the 
possibilities to build peace through democratic developments. The third 
section examines the divide between the West and the non-West, which was 
contingent upon culturally derived beliefs and perceptions of societies, that 
emerged to account for the failure of international democratic processes. 
Once the problem of the peace process was located at the level of subjectivity 
– in Bosnia, for example, the main obstacle was considered to be the ethno-
nationalist preferences of its citizens – I argue that peacebuilding was 
reinterpreted as a strategy to build institutions to transform practices and 
understandings. 
 
 
Discovering institutions to rethink Neoclassical Economics 
 
In the decades after World War II, dominant approaches to economic theory9 
felt no need to introduce additional explanatory variables of economic 
behaviour to neoclassical models: imagined rational profit-maximising 
agents with perfect information of potential outcomes were assumed to 
interact in market contexts without transactions costs.10 Even the recognition 
of uncertainty and the fact that individuals or firms cannot always predict 
the outcomes of their actions, economists were confident they could continue 
to explain economic phenomena because, in the long run, only those who 
pursued rational strategies would succeed. As Alchian put it, ‘the economic 
system selects survivors: those who realize positive profits are the survivors; 
those who suffer losses disappear’.11 Social factors such as beliefs, ideas, 
values, shifting preferences or the processes that led individuals to take 
decisions were not relevant for an approach that centred on the behaviour of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Although	   it	   is	   unclear	   when	   the	   neoclassical	   economic	   paradigm	   ended	   (Colander	  2000),	   in	   this	   chapter	   I	   distinguish	   between,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   dominant	   orthodox	  approaches	   that	   follow	   the	   assumptions	   of	   neoclassical	   economics	   and,	   on	   the	   other	  hand,	   the	   new	   institutionalism	   –	  mainly	   through	   the	   work	   of	   Douglass	   North	   –	   that	  represents	  a	  critical	  reappraisal	  of	  the	  orthodox	  perspective.	  10	  Rationality	   refers	   here	   to	   individuals	   finding	   suitable	  means	   (calculating	   costs	   and	  benefits)	  to	  a	  given	  objective.	  	  11	  Alchian	  (1950:	  213);	  see	  also,	  Machina	  (1989).	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given individuals. According to these orthodox economic models, 
institutions (and the determinants of institutions) did not matter as 
independent variables and were viewed through a functionalist lens: it was 
assumed that institutions would arise to achieve specific outcomes in the 
context of rational individuals. For this reason, more efficient institutions 
would replace deficient ones. 
Since the late seventies, though, there has been a trend to critically review 
neoclassical assumptions of individual behaviour along the lines of the ‘old’ 
institutionalist school that emerged in the US during the interwar period.12 
The new institutionalist economics developed under the premises that 
transaction costs did exist, information was incomplete and contracts were 
imperfectly enforced. 13  Dissatisfied with the explanations of human 
behaviour given in a discipline dominated by neoclassical economic models, 
a group of scholars began to explore the autonomy of institutions. 14 
Rediscovering institutions meant that the contextual constraints and social 
constructs that shaped the rationality of individuals were important15 to 
understand patterns of economic and political action.16 Granovetter writes: 
The utilitarian tradition, including classical and neoclassical economics, 
assumes rational, self-interested behaviour affected minimally by social 
relations, thus invoking an idealised state […] At the other extreme lies 
what I call the argument of “embeddedness”: the argument that the 
behaviour and institutions to be analysed are so constrained by 
ongoing social relations that to construe them as independent is a 
grievous misunderstanding.17	   
Although my intention is not to make a contribution to the debate in 
institutional economic theory, in this initial section I analyse the ‘new 
institutionalism’ literature mainly through an examination of Douglass 
North’s critical reappraisal of neoclassical economics, concentrating 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  ‘old’	  institutionalist	  economic	  theory	  and	  its	  comparison	  with	  the	  ‘new’	  approaches,	  see	  Hodgson	  (1989).	  13	  Ménard	  and	  Shirley	  (2014:	  6).	  14	  Ménard	  and	  Shirley	  (2014:	  2–11)	  distinguish	  two	  branches	  that	  mark	  the	  beginning	  and	  further	  development	  of	  new	  institutionalist	  economics:	  one	  that	  is	  represented	  by	  Oliver	  Williamson	  and	  the	  other	  by	  Douglass	  North.	  	  15	  As	   Hodgson	   explains,	   neoclassical	   economists	   also	   admit	   that	   the	   preferences	   and	  wants	   of	   individuals	   are	   affected	   by	   social	   circumstances,	   but	   ‘for	   the	   purpose	   of	  economic	  enquiry’	  they	  take	  them	  as	  given	  (1989:	  251).	  16	  For	   example,	   Granovetter	   (1985);	   March	   and	   Olsen	   (1984;	   1989);	   North	   (1990);	  Hodgson	   (1989);	   Williamson	   (1979).	   The	   analysis	   of	   institutions	   as	   an	   independent	  variable	  needs	  to	  be	  contextualised	  within	  a	  wider	  tendency	  to	  broaden	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  discipline	   of	   economics	  while	  maintaining	   its	   rigor.	   For	   example,	   the	   focus	   on	   ‘social	  interactions’	   or	   ‘social	   capital’	   supersedes	   the	   conceptualisation	   of	   agents	   as	   rational	  decisionmakers	   interacting	   in	   idealised	   competitive	   markets	   (Manski	   2000;	   Guiso,	  Sapienza	  and	  Zingales	  2004).	  17	  Granovetter	  (1985:	  281–282).	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predominantly on his discussion of societies’ ‘informal constraints’.18 His 
work on humanly devised institutions19 contributed to explaining economic 
change in the field of development and, I seek to argue, this is useful to 
understand the shift towards institution-building in peacebuilding 
frameworks of the 1990s. North certainly was not the first in studying 
institutions to critique neoclassical economic models. 20  However, his 
importance resides in that, by winning the Nobel Prize in 1993, he helped to 
revitalise the study of institutions among mainstream economists and 
practitioners to the extent that, at least in development studies, some have 
proclaimed that, ‘we are all institutionalists now’.21 Most importantly for this 
research, as I will argue, North occupies an ambivalent space between the 
optimism and universalism of neoclassical approaches to human 
development and more contemporary development frameworks that seek to 
affect economic change in a bottom-up process. 
The most significant aspect in North’s critical perspective is the challenge 
to the ‘world’ and the ‘man’ that neoclassical economists take for granted as 
universal constructs in their models of analysis of human behaviour. 
Institutions matter, he argues, precisely because we live in a world of 
incomplete information in which it is costly to transact and actors decipher 
the environment and make choices based on subjective perceptions that 
diverge among individuals.22 For North, therefore, the theories that rest on a 
functionalist view of institutions – for example, rational choice theory 
considers institutions as bodies that merely satisfy the needs of rational 
individuals – misrecognise that complex and costly processes pervade in the 
real world and that this is inhabited by social beings with subjectively 
derived models. North’s dual critique of the world (there are transactions 
costs, changes in the environment and uncertainty in a non-ergodic world)23 
and human behaviour (subjective perceptions shape the rationality of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  North	   asks,	   ‘what	   is	   it	   about	   informal	   constraints	   that	   gives	   them	   such	   a	   pervasive	  influence	  upon	  the	  long-­‐run	  character	  of	  economies?	  (1991:	  111).	  See	  also	  his	  chapter	  5,	  titled	  ‘Informal	  constraints’	  (1990:	  36–45).	  	  19	  I	  will	  mainly	   use	   his	  work	  written	   since	   the	   early	   1990s	   (North	   1990,	   1991,	   1994,	  1999,	   2005),	   because	   till	   then,	   as	   he	   has	   himself	   recognised,	   he	   had	   been	   close	   to	  orthodox	  neoclassical	  theory	  (1990:	  7;	  also	  see	  Hodgson	  1989:	  252).	  20	  See,	   for	   example,	   Banfield	   (1958:	   8–9);	   Coase	   (1960);	   Hayek	   (1960:	   24);	   Polanyi	  (2001);	   or	   the	   ‘old’	   institutionalist	   school	   of	   scholars	   like	   Thorstein	   Veblen,	   John	  Commons	  or	  Wesley	  Mitchell	  (Hodgson	  1989).	  	  21	  Roland	  (2004:	  110);	  Portes	  (2006:	  234).	  In	  2005,	  Cambridge	  launched	  the	  Journal	  of	  
Institutional	  Economics.	  His	  editor-­‐in-­‐chief	  proclaimed	  that	  ‘institutions	  have	  become	  a	  central	  topic	  of	  analysis	  for	  economists’	  (Hodgson	  2005:	  1).	  22	  North	  (1990:	  17–26).	  23	  North	   argues	   that	   the	   world	   is	   ‘non-­‐ergodic’	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   there	   is	   no	   ‘stable	  underlying	   structure,	   such	   that	  we	   can	   develop	   theory	   that	   can	   be	   applied	   time	   after	  time,	   consistently’.	   Non–ergodicity	   implies	   that	   humans	   are	   dealing	   with	   a	   changing	  environment	  in	  which	  new	  uncertainties	  might	  constantly	  emerge	  (1999:	  2;	  2005:	  21).	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individuals) leads North to construct a theory of institutions.24 North thinks 
of institutions as ‘the structure of human interaction’, which constrains 
decision-makers in certain directions and shape economic performance.25 
The institutional structure ‘direct us in the mundane activities that dominate 
our lives’ and it is formed by a ‘complex interaction’ between ‘formal rules’ – 
i.e. rules, constitutions, laws – and ‘informal constraints’ – i.e. routines, 
customs, traditions, ideas, ideologies.26 
The central idea is that the interface between formal institutions and their 
informal settings accounts for the way economies evolve through time. The 
analytical framework proposed by North starts with the ‘subjective’ or 
‘mental models’ – informal constraints – that lead individuals to create 
formal institutions to interpret, order and give meaning to the world around 
them.27 These subjective models are filtered by the collective experiences that 
people accumulate through time, transmitted through the ‘culture’ of a 
society. 28  As North puts it, informal constraints ‘come from socially 
transmitted information and are a part of the heritage that we call culture.’29 
Following the research in primitive societies by anthropologists like Colson, 
North relies upon routines, costumes, traditions, believes, tastes and more, to 
justify that mental models govern societies through time.30 ‘Whether we call 
them customs, laws, usages, or normative rules seem of little importance. 
What is important is that communities such as the Tonga do not leave their 
members free to go their own way and explore every possible avenue of 
behavior. They operate with a set of rules or standards which define 
appropriate action under a variety of circumstances.’31 Little matter how 
North and others call it,32 what is important is that the new institutionalists 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  North	  (1990:	  27).	  25 	  North	   (1990:	   3;	   1994:	   359).	   For	   North,	   institutions	   structure	   and	   reduce	   the	  uncertainty	  of	  decision	  makers.	  The	   idea	   is	   that,	   in	  a	  context	   in	  which	   the	  choices	  are	  constrained	  by	  institutions,	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  get	  the	  results	  we	  want.	  For	  the	  same	  token,	  in	  a	  context	  of	  non-­‐effective	  institutions,	  decisions	  are	  generally	  poorer	  (1999:	  8–9).	  This	  point	   is	   crucial	   because,	   as	   I	   will	   be	   explained	   below,	   effective	   and	   non-­‐effective	  institutions	  trace	  the	  difference	  between	  developed	  and	  underdeveloped	  countries.	  	  	  26	  North	  (1990:	  36–53,	  83;	  1994:	  360).	  As	  a	  third	  variable,	  he	  adds	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  ‘enforcement’	   mechanisms,	   but	   this	   is	   not	   the	   focus	   here.	   The	   distinction	   between	  formal	   and	   informal	   could	   also	   be	   framed	   as	   rules	   that	   are	   ‘explicit	   or	  written	   down’	  versus	  rules	  that	  are	  ‘implicit’	  (Kingston	  and	  Caballero	  2009:	  154).	  27	  North	  (1990:	  36).	  28	  North	   (1994:	   364).	   See	   Guiso,	   Sapienza	   and	   Zingales	   (2006)	   for	   an	   analysis	   that	  explains	   how	   ‘culture’	   affects	   ‘beliefs	   and	   preferences’	   and,	   therefore,	   it	   determines	  economic	  outcomes.	  Also,	  Tabellini	  (2010).	  29	  North	  (1990:	  37).	  30	  North	  (1990).	  Chapter	  5	  on	  informal	  constraints	  and	  10	  on	  the	  limits	  to	  change.	  31	  Colson	  quoted	  in	  North	  (1990:	  38).	  32	  This	   research	   is	  not	   interested	   in	   the	  name	  of	   ‘it’.	   For	  North,	   for	   example,	   ‘it’	   is	   the	  ‘subjective	  models’	  that	  are	   ‘culturally	  determined’	  (1990:	  138).	  My	  interest	  resides	  in	  the	   role	   ‘it’	   plays	  within	   the	   analytical	   frameworks	   of	   the	   authors	   analysed	   here.	   For	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focus on the ‘frame’ of the process,33 rather than the rational decisions taken 
by individuals, to account for the different record of societies through time. 
In a nutshell, by analysing how societies frame and structure human 
interaction through the creation of institutions, the new institutionalists 
critically reappraise neoclassical economics theory and ‘further progress in 
the social sciences’.34 
Let me introduce a caveat here to contextualise the thoughts of North. The 
new institutionalist critique of the models that portray rational individuals 
acting in a transparent world is not new. Karl Polanyi, for example, critiqued 
neoclassical economics for wanting to subordinate society to the logic of the 
market, when economies were and ought to be ‘embedded’ in social 
relations. 35  While Polanyi’s influence has been rather marginal among 
economists, other disciplines such as sociology have been dealing with 
institutions and social processes along the twentieth century, as a way to 
contest the linear regularities that dominate orthodox economic thought.36 
As Portes writes, ‘sociology seems to have a different, alternative vocation, 
defined by its sensitivity to the dialectic of things, unexpected turns of 
events, and the rise of alternative countervailing structures’.37 More broadly, 
it can be argued that, since the early 19th century, the aim of interpretivist 
social scientists has been to explore the complexities of social life, which is 
free of the laws and regularities conceptualised by the natural sciences or 
positivist social sciences. The reaction against the belief in linear progress 
and the rational universal ‘man’ of the philosophes of the Enlightenment, 
Finkielkraut explains, led to the foundation of the anti-positivist social 
sciences. This was an ‘epistemological revolution’ that introduced the notion 
of ‘unconscious thought, which worked from within’ in order to explain 
differences among ‘men’.38 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  North,	   for	   example,	   these	   models	   affect	   the	   unequal	   path	   of	   different	   economies.	   He	  writes:	   ‘the	   cultural	   heritage	  provides	   the	   artifactual	   structure	  —	  beliefs,	   institutions,	  tools,	   instruments,	  technology	  —	  which	  not	  only	  plays	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  immediate	  choices	  of	  players	  in	  a	  society	  but	  also	  provides	  us	  with	  clues	  to	  the	  dynamic	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  societies	  through	  time’	  (2005:	  36).	  33	  Simon	  (1986:	  210–212);	  March	  and	  Olsen	  (2005:	  4).	  34	  North	  (1990:	  17).	  35	  Block	  (2001:	  xxiii–xviii).	  36	  For	   an	   overview	   of	   sociological	   perspectives	   dealing	   with	   institutions,	   see	   Portes	  (2000;	  2006).	  37	  Portes	  (2006:	  2–3).	  38	  Finkielkraut	   (1995:	   25).	   The	   notion	   of	   ‘unconscious	   thought’	   is	   relevant	   here.	   For	  Finkielkraut,	   Enlightenment	   philosophers	   (i.e.	   Rosseau,	   Sieyès	   or	   Voltaire)	   defined	  individuals	  by	  their	  universal	  humanity	  and	  nations,	  for	  example,	  were	  a	  contract	  that	  reflected	  the	  free	  will	  of	  individuals.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  critics	  (i.e.	  Burke,	  de	  Maistre	  or	   Herder)	   thought	   that	   each	   people	   (volksgeist)	   were	   governed	   by	   unconscious	  thought,	  an	  intuitive	  spirit,	  the	  soul	  of	  the	  nation	  or	  their	  culture	  who	  got	  them	  together	  across	  generations	  (ibid.	  5–47).	  See	  also,	  Malik	  (1996:	  73–79).	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Establishing a parallelism, for North, the mental models underlying 
institutions represent the ‘unconscious thought’ that shapes the different 
performance of economies through time, thus belying the analytical 
framework of neoclassical economics. This point should be carefully 
elucidated because it is extremely important for the initial framing of this 
thesis. Ethically committed, North was frustrated with the deceptive results 
produced by the application of abstract neoclassical models into polices to 
induce development.39 For instance, if growth can be achieved through the 
increase in capital investment or labour input, as orthodox economists 
predict, why is the performance of many economies still in decay? The 
unequal path of societies was indeed the question investigated by Adam 
Smith when he founded the discipline with the Wealth of Nations in 1776. 
More than two hundred years later, the inconsistency between the pledges to 
progress and the economic stagnation of some societies led North to realise 
that institutions were important: these represented the conditions for 
effective or defective economic growth. 40  Rather than holding the 
constrictive global economic system responsible for the diverse record of 
some societies, North focused on the domestic institutions to rationalise 
inequality among human beings.41 He writes: 
[I]f we are to account for the wide and still widening gap between rich 
and poor countries we must explore the different experiences of 
societies through time and the implications of these different 
experiences for the development of different belief systems that 
produced widely different abilities to confront the problems of the 
human environment.42 
As examples of how different belief systems can explain inequality,43 North 
cites domestic and historical factors which are said to explain differences in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  North	  (1994:	  359).	  At	  a	  fundamental	  level,	  North’s	  theory	  of	  institutions	  develops	  out	  of	  ‘a	  persistent	  tension	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  between	  the	  theories	  we	  construct	  and	  the	  evidence	  we	  compile	  about	  human	  interaction	  in	  the	  world	  around	  us’	  (1990:	  11).	  40 	  North	   argues	   that	   informal	   constraints	   have	   a	   fundamental	   role	   in	   economic	  performance	  by	  acknowledging	  that	  the	  same	  formal	  rules	  produce	  different	  outcomes	  when	  operating	  in	  different	  countries	  (1990:	  36).	  41	  Duffield	  argues	  that	  the	  debate	  to	  explain	  the	  causes	  of	  underdevelopment	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  could	  be	  sketchily	  divided	  between,	  on	   the	  one	  side,	   the	  Socialist	  and	  Third	  World	  views	  that	  blamed	  the	  unequal	  economic	  system	  –	  i.e.	  global	  division	  of	   labour,	  the	   legacy	   of	   colonialism	   or	   the	   consequence	   of	   ideological	   of	   the	   Cold	  War	   –	   for	   the	  disparities	  among	  economies.	  On	   the	  other,	   the	  West	  attributed	  underdevelopment	   to	  the	   internal	   causes	   of	   every	   state	   (2001:	   26–27).	   See	   also	   Pupavac	   (2004:	   383).	   I	  contend	  that	  new	  institutionalist	  economists	  fit	  under	  the	  latter	  framing.	  42	  North	  (2005:	  47).	  43 	  This	   point	   is	   important	   for	   the	   argument	   of	   this	   chapter.	   Frustrated	   because	  neoclassical	  economic	  approaches	  could	  not	  achieve	  equal	  economic	  growth	   for	  every	  country,	  he	  understood	  inequality	  to	  be	  the	  product	  of	  the	  beliefs	  systems	  of	  different	  people.	  Comparably,	  as	  I	  will	  explain	  later,	  the	  failure	  to	  achieve	  peace	  in	  non-­‐western	  post-­‐conflict	   societies	   by	   the	   means	   of	   a	   supposedly	   universal	   approach	   led	   to	   the	  assumption	  that	  culture	  was	  important	  for	  peace.	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economic growth between the UK and Spain, as well as the demise of the 
Soviet Union.44 
If one can explain the persistence of inequality among human beings by 
examining the institutions of every society, the challenge for 
underdeveloped countries (together with international development 
agencies) resides in the capacity to adopt an adequate and efficient 
institutional framework that directs choices in the optimal direction. As 
North remarks: every market ‘has to be structured so that the players 
compete via price and quality or the particular social dimensions by which 
we want them to compete’.45 In this case, if deficient institutions obstruct 
development, the logical solution would seem to modify or replace them. 
But, in North‘s work, one can deduce a sense of unease at the (im)possibility 
to foster meaningful institutional change.46 For him, the problem is that 
informal norms are difficult to correct or command because they might be 
deep-seated in the culture of a society.47 He explains that, ‘while formal 
institutions can be changed by fiat, informal institutions evolve in ways that 
are still far from being completely understood and therefore are not typically 
amenable to deliberate human manipulation’.48 
Indeed, how to shape the subjective models of underdeveloped societies 
appears to be an anxiety that accompanies North’s career.49 It is not a 
coincidence that he has ended his two books on economic change by 
emphasising the importance of informal constraints in determining 
economic performance.50 At both conclusions, he encourages economists to 
further investigate ‘culturally derived norms of behavior and how they 
interact with formal rules’ in order to renovate the discipline. 51  Using 
historical examples, North seeks to prove that a drastic alteration of the 
formal institutions that is inconsistent with informal ones produces a tense 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  North	  (2005:	  127–154).	  45	  North	  (1999:	  11).	  46	  To	  be	   clear,	   for	  North	   the	  disquieting	   aspect	   of	   institutions	   is	   not	   how	   institutional	  change	   occurs.	   He	   understands	   this	   as	   an	   incremental	   process	   of	   individual	   and	  collective	   learning	   that	   reflects	   the	   constraints	   that	   the	   past	   imposes	   on	   the	   present	  (1994:	   361;	   2005:	   49;	   for	   a	   good	   overview	   of	   different	   approaches	   to	   institutional	  change	  in	  the	  literature,	  see	  Kingston	  and	  Caballero,	  2009).	  Rather,	  what	  is	  puzzling	  for	  North	   is	   how	   to	   affect	   institutional	   change.	   This	   question	   situates	   North’s	   approach	  within	   the	   context	   of,	   broadly	   speaking,	   international	   governance	   and,	   as	   I	   seek	   to	  demonstrate	  below,	  this	  is	  relevant	  for	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  liberal	  peace.	  47 	  Their	   perennial	   quality	   tends	   to	   be	   viewed	   as	   a	   problem	   because	   if	   informal	  institutions	  are	  deficient	  or	  inherently	  problematic	  they	  tend	  to	  reproduce	  economic	  or	  politic	  stagnation	  through	  time.	  48	  North	  (2005:	  50).	  49	  For	  example,	  North	  (1990:	  6,	  91;	  2005:	  51).	  50	  North	  (1990:	  140;	  2005:	  169–170;	  also,	  1991:	  111).	  51	  North	  (1990:	  140).	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political instability.52 However, this is the crucial point, even if informal 
constraints evolve very cautiously and they are difficult to change from an 
external perspective, North believes they can be shaped through a 
modification of the formal rules. For example, as he affirms, ‘fundamental 
changes in relative prices will gradually alter norms and ideologies, and the 
lower the costs of information, the more rapid the alterations’. 53  The 
difference between North and other more contemporary new 
institutionalists is that he maintains hope that a top-down approach (that is, 
formal rules directing informal ones) can overcome or modify the informal 
constraints that obstruct successful economic growth.54 In short, his view 
acknowledges that culturally derived subjective models represent a 
hazardous constraint, but one that can be carefully manipulated from 
“above”. 
But North has always been cautious about it. Indeed, he is well conscious 
that, when facing the challenge of shaping problematic beliefs systems, he is 
close to the orthodox economic perspective. Both North and more traditional 
economic theorists argue that improving economic performance depends on 
altering the failing rules or formal institutions of the economies in the hope 
that informal constraints would gradually be transformed.55 Although he is 
aware of the constrictive force of the mental models of some societies, he 
only tempers the neoclassical perspective, as he equally relies on the 
possibility to foster economic growth by restructuring societies with, for 
example, more effective enforcement mechanisms and property rights.56 
This means that North holds an ambivalent position toward affecting 
institutional change. Unlike orthodox economic models, he is cognizant that 
culture matters. He holds, for example, that ‘transferring the formal political 
and economic rules of successful market economies to third-world and 
Eastern European is not a sufficient condition for good economic 
performance’. 57  Also, contrasting the predictable idealised world of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Ibid.	  53	  North	  (1990:	  138).	  54 	  Other	   new	   institutionalists	   and	   development	   theorists	   contend	   that	   informal	  constraints	  cannot	  be	  changed	   from	  above,	  neither	  externally.	  For	   them,	  development	  consists	   in	   a	   bottom-­‐up	   process	   that	   takes	   the	   subjective	   models	   of	   underdeveloped	  societies	  as	  positive	  resources	  to	  achieve	  the	  developmental	  goals.	  For	  example,	  Gérard	  Roland	   writes:	   ‘While	   slow-­‐moving	   [informal]	   institutions	   may	   hamper	   the	   proper	  functioning	   of	   implanted	   fast-­‐moving	   [formal]	   institutions,	   local	   knowledge	   about	   a	  country’s	  slow	  moving	   institutions	   is	  not	  part	  of	   the	  problem	  but	  part	  of	   the	  solution.	  Therefore,	  only	  dialogue	  can	  help	  formulate	  adequate	  development	  policies.	  […]	  Policy	  dialogue	   entails	   not	   just	   a	   dialogue	   with	   governments	   but	   also	   with	   different	  components	   of	   civil	   society	   at	   large’	   (2004:	   127).	   See	   also,	   Evans	   (2004);	   Haggard	  (2004);	  Nussbaum	  (2011);	  Sen	  (2000).	  55	  North	  (1994:	  365–366).	  56	  North	  (1999:	  11)	  57	  North	  (1994:	  366).	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neoclassic economics, he underlines the importance of flexible institutions 
that adapt to future changes in a non-ergodic world.58 However, similar to 
orthodox economic frameworks, he reads the subjective models of 
underdeveloped societies negatively: ‘religious fundamentalism, ethnic 
hatreds, racist stereotypes, superstitions, all shape choices with monotonous 
persistence’.59 For him, similar to orthodox views, these are problems that 
need to be overcome with a top-down approach. That is, North relies upon a 
solution to economic growth that consists in modifying formal institutions so 
that, in the long run, informal constraints could be smoothed over.60 
In conclusion, North criticised the conceptualisation of an unbounded 
“man” interacting in a calculable “world” of orthodox economic frameworks 
by acknowledging that humanly devised institutions mattered decisively in 
a world with transaction costs that is inhabited by social beings. By 
analysing the importance of institutions and the subjective models affecting 
them, he sought to improve the possibility of understanding economic 
change. However, devoting himself to ‘advising third world countries on 
development problems’, he hit upon the difficulty to shape informal 
constraints in failed economies.61 Even if sometimes the shift could take 
decades, he kept a hint of faith in the probability that, by introducing 
modifications in the formal rules, deep-sited cultural constraints could be 
overcome. Bearing North’s framework in mind, the next two sections 
analyse the shift from a rational approach to peacebuilding through 
democratisation to an approach that seeks to fix formal institutions to correct 
the mental constructs of post-war societies. The references to North, 
however, do not mean that the new institutionalism and liberal 
peacebuilding frameworks are equivalent.  
The analogy I am trying to draw out between North’s reinterpretation of 
neoclassical economics and the reinterpretation of the liberal peacebuilding 
is the following: after witnessing the failure of orthodox economic policies to 
reduce international inequality, North criticised its universal assumptions by 
focusing on the informal constraints of developing societies. Similarly, after 
the limited success of liberal peacebuilding missions, the tendency was to 
revise allegedly universal assumptions by acknowledging that post-conflict 
societies had a different and traumatised culture – i.e. ethnic mind-sets, 
intolerant attitudes or nationalist inclinations – that made them unready for 
democracy. Both North and the revisionists of the liberal peace took the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  North	  (1999:	  12).	  59	  North	  (2005:	  156).	  60	  His	  ambivalent	  approach	   is	  also	  palpable	  when,	   for	  example,	  he	  argues	   that,	  even	   if	  Western	   institutions	   cannot	   be	   copied	   or	   transplanted	   to	   other	   societies	   with	   other	  informal	   rules,	   successful	   institutions	   in	   these	   societies	   will	   resemble	   those	   already	  successful	  in	  the	  West	  (North	  2005:	  159).	  61	  North	  (1999:	  4).	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subjective models of the people seriously and sought to manage them 
through institutions in order to build development and peace. The rest of the 
chapter, therefore, analyses, first, the liberal peace and its universal 
normative and methodological basis for peace that is based on implementing 
democratisation and liberalisation. Second, the last section focuses on how 
liberal peacebuilders changed the strategy toward a process of building 
institutions in order to overturn the informal constraints of post-war 
societies. A short account of post-war Bosnia will illustrate the shift. 
 
Rethinking the Liberal Peace after its failures 
 
The end of the Cold War provided renewed impetus for the diffusion of 
liberal democratic ideas that visualised a new world order. In the 
introductory piece of a Special Issue of the Journal of Peace Research dedicated 
to ‘democracy and peace’, the editor, Nils Gleditsch, celebrated the ‘near-
consensus’ in the discipline on the notion that ‘wars are non-existent (or very 
rare) among democracies’.62 For most, from influential policy-makers such as 
Ronald Reagan or Bill Clinton to an extensive number of studies employing 
quantitative research methods or theoretical explanations, the dictum that 
democracies had a pacific interaction among themselves appeared to have 
universal validity.63 A primary example was Michael Doyle who, reading 
Kant, argued that ‘a separate peace existed among liberal states’ because 
they had domestic structures that could impose constitutional restraints on 
predatory practices, they showed moral respect for other liberal states and 
they maintained cooperative and economic relations of interdependence.64 In 
a similar vein, in order to oppose the realist and socialist theories that 
attributed the explosion of wars to competing international interests or 
inequitable economic structures, Jack Levy contended that the causes of war 
could be explained by looking at domestic political factors.65 By ‘domestic’ 
he did not mean cultural or national attributes, but the structure of the 
government: whether this was a democracy or a predatory dictatorship.66 In 
a much-quoted sentence that summarises the wisdom of the time, Levy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Gleditsch	  (1992:	  369).	   It	   is	   important	  to	  note	  that	  all	   the	  contributors	  to	  the	  special	  issue	   –	   even	   a	   former	   author	   of	   the	   realist	   deterrence	   school	   of	   thought	   like	   Erich	  Weede	  –	  agreed	  that	  democracies	  do	  rarely	  go	  to	  war	  against	  each	  other.	  63	  For	  a	  detailed	  overview	  of	  this	  literature,	  see	  Chan	  (1997).	  64 	  Doyle	   (1986:	   1159–1162).	   For	   a	   quantitative	   analysis	   that	   uses	   these	   same	  justifications	  to	  prove	  that	  the	  more	  democratic	  a	  state,	  the	  less	  violence	  against	  its	  own	  population	  it	  commits,	  see	  Rummel	  (1995:	  4,	  25).	  65	  Levy	  (1988:	  653;	  1989:	  213–273).	  66	  Russett	  (1993);	  Levy	  (1988:	  654–658).	  A	  few	  decades	  earlier,	  Babst	  made	  this	  point	  clear:	   ‘what	   is	   important	   is	   the	   form	   of	   government,	   not	   national	   character.	   Many	  nations,	   such	   as	   England	   and	   France,	   fought	   wars	   against	   each	   other	   before	   they	  acquired	  freely	  elected	  governments,	  but	  have	  not	  done	  so	  since’	  (1964:	  14).	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concluded by saying that ‘the absence of war between democracies comes as 
close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations’.67  
The undergoing democratisation processes of Africa, Latin America and 
Eastern Europe, as well as the consolidation of stable governments in south 
European countries, were seen as an historical opportunity for an impending 
international peace. 68  Institutions such as the World Bank or the 
International Monetary Fund were at the forefront of a global economic 
recovery and were accelerating structural adjustments – such as, for 
example, fiscal modifications, liberalisation, market–determined interest 
rates, reduction of public expenditures and privatisation – especially in the 
regions that were in decline such as sub-Saharan Africa.69 The point is not to 
say that scholars and international institutions were particularly naïve, even 
if too cheerful claims of the historical triumph of liberal democracy could be 
interpreted as such. 70  The argument here is that democracy, economic 
growth and peace, and their mutually reinforcing matrices, were 
predominantly seen as universal frameworks that could flourish elsewhere, 
particularly after the support of external institutions.71 
Within these frameworks, the major impediments were often the 
predatory, nationalist or corrupt leaders ruling these societies. Speculating 
about the future of international relations, Huntington, for example, 
observed that large parts of the globe would democratise in a ‘snowballing 
effect’ if authoritarian leaders were removed from government.72 He wrote, 
‘democracy will spread to the extent that those who exercise power in the 
world and in individual countries want it to spread’.73 Another assumption 
was that dictator leaders were provoking domestic unrest. In a study that 
investigated the causes of ‘democide’ – the killing of people by government – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Levy	  (1988:	  622).	  To	  clarify,	  Levy	  –	  like	  Doyle	  (1986)	  –	  does	  not	  suggest	  that	  liberal	  democratic	   states	   are	   not	   involved	   in	   wars	   at	   all	   (this	   is	   the	   so-­‐called	   monadic	  hypothesis),	  but	  that	  they	  do	  not	  fight	  each	  other	  (the	  dyadic	  hypothesis).	  68	  Huntington	  (1991:	  12–13)	  called	  this	  period	  the	  ‘third	  wave’	  of	  democratisation.	  See	  also,	  Diamond	  (1996).	  69	  For	   example,	   World	   Bank	   (1984).	   Although	   initially	   referring	   specifically	   to	   the	  context	   of	   Latin	   America,	   the	   policy	   reforms	   undertaken	   by	   international	   financial	  institutions	   during	   this	   period	   were	   coined	   as	   the	   ‘Washington	   Consensus’	   and	  summarised	  as	  ‘prudent	  macroeconomic	  policies,	  outward	  orientation,	  and	  free-­‐market	  capitalism’	  (Williamson	  1990).	  See	  also,	  Stiglitz	  (1998b).	  70	  For	  example,	  Fukuyama	  (1989).	  71	  For	   instance,	   referring	   to	   the	   democratisation	   process	   of	   Africa,	  McFerson	   explains	  that	   ‘freedom	  of	   the	  media’	   is	  not	  only	  suitable	   to	  European	  states:	   ‘to	  consider	   this	  a	  Eurocentric	   concept	   would	   be	   paternalistic	   (or	   worse)	   vis-­‐a-­‐vis	   Africans,	   who	   are	   as	  entitled	   to	   free	   expression	   and	   as	   capable	   sifting	   through	   competing	   information	   and	  ideas	  as	  any	  other	  people’	  (1992:	  245).	  	  72	  For	  the	  same	  token,	  he	  thought	  that	  if	  a	  democratic	  or	  democratising	  state	  shifted	  to	  an	   authoritarian	   regime	   there	   could	   be	   ‘reverse	   snowballing’.	   For	   him,	   the	   spread	   of	  democracy	  depended	  on	  ‘political	  leadership’	  (Huntington	  1991:	  16).	  73	  Huntington	  (1991:	  34).	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Rummel discarded the variables of ethnicity, culture, religion, racial 
diversity, economics, demography or geography. His investigation tested the 
hypothesis that the singular general explanation of democide was ‘the 
degree to which a regime is totalitarian along a democratic-totalitarian 
scale’.74  
It is in the context of confidence in the universal validity of concepts such 
as democracy, economic liberalisation and the promise of international peace 
that the Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Boutros–Ghali, formulated the 
notion of ‘peacebuilding’ in a requested letter of recommendation to the 
Members of the United Nations in 1992. To the already existing notions of 
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, Boutros–Ghali 
added the idea of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding.’ This new concept was meant 
to strengthen the UN capacity for achieving the objectives of international 
peace, security, justice, human rights and social and economic progress.75 
Originally, peacebuilding was reliant on the success of the process of 
democratisation in post-war situations. Boutros–Ghali wrote that ‘there is an 
obvious connection between democratic practices – such as the rule of law 
and transparency in decision-making – and the achievement of true peace 
and security in any new and stable political order.’76 The parameters set by 
Boutros–Ghali opened up an era of extensive international involvement in 
post-conflict societies.77  
This ‘liberal peace’ governance framework, as it is most commonly 
known, was based on the assumption that holding elections and introducing 
market reforms to accomplish liberalisation could bring post-war societies 
on the road to a durable peace in a reasonably short time frame.78 In the mid-
1990s, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the course of the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia was in the media spotlight and it called the attention of 
international policy-makers.79 The Dayton General Framework Agreement 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Rummel	  (1995:	  21–25).	  Also,	  Rummel	  (1985).	  75	  Boutros-­‐Ghali	  (1992:	  201).	  76	  Ibid.,	  213.	  77	  Boutros–Ghali	  (1992,	  1992/1993,	  1996).	  UN	  (1994).	  78	  In	   this	   thesis,	   I	  mean	   by	   liberal	   peace,	   following	  Duffield’s	   analysis	   (2001:	   11),	   the	  political	   project	   of	   global	   governance	   that	   seeks	   to	   transform	   war-­‐torn	   states	   into	  stable,	   peaceful	   and	   tolerant	   liberal	   democracies	   (See	   also,	   Barnett	   1997;	   Dillon	   and	  Reid	  2000:	  124–128).	  During	  the	  1990s,	  this	  chapter	  argues,	  the	  liberal	  peace	  approach	  shifted	  the	  strategy,	  but	  it	  maintained	  the	  goal	  of	  building	  liberal	  democracies.	  That	  is,	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  decade	  the	  project	  was	  concerned	  with	  the	  democratisation	  and	  liberalisation	  of	  conflict-­‐affected	  societies	  to	  achieve	  their	  stability,	  but	  since	  the	  second	  half	  of	   the	  decade,	   the	  approach	  shifted	   to	   include	   the	  building	  of	   institutions	  and	  the	  management	   of	   populations	   before	   democracy	   and	   liberalism	   could	   flourish	   (Paris	  2004:	  40–51,	  179–211).	  79	  It	   is	   important	   to	   recall	   that	   it	   is	   not	  my	   intention	   to	   address	   the	   conflict	   and	   the	  international	  diplomatic	  negotiations	  and	  military	  intervention	  that	  brought	  the	  war	  to	  an	  end	  in	  1995.	  The	  purpose	  here	  is	  to	  briefly	  focus	  on	  the	  peace	  agreements	  in	  Bosnia	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for Peace (GFA), witnessed by the EU, France, Germany, Russia, Great 
Britain and the US, was signed in Paris on December 14, 1995, by ‘the parties’ 
– the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic or Croatia and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – to bring an end to the conflict and ‘promote 
an enduring peace and stability’.80 The underlying objective was to rapidly 
transform Bosnia into a liberal democracy because, as it was emphasised in 
the preamble of the Constitution, ‘democratic governmental institutions and 
fair procedures best produce peaceful relations within a pluralist society’.81 
Hence, it was deemed necessary to hold general elections, overseen by a 
‘Provisional Electoral Commission’ established by the OSCE, ‘no later than 
nine months’ after the peace settlement.82  Additionally, the intention was ‘to 
promote the general welfare and economic growth through the protection of 
private property and the promotion of market economy’. There was a 
determination to respect ‘humanitarian law’ and a strong commitment to 
‘human rights’ compliance.83 
The year after the GFA went into effect, international agencies vigorously 
focused on the creation of ‘the necessary conditions for the conduct of free 
and fair elections’, for example, by providing ‘equitable access to the media 
for all political parties and candidates’.84 These initial efforts were driven by 
the belief that a lasting peace would follow from the designation of 
representative candidates. However, the results in the first national elections 
in September 1996 favoured the nationalist parties who were more reluctant 
to implement the provisions of the Agreement and were at odds with the 
promotion of inter-ethnic cooperation.85 From this moment – if not earlier, 
when it was clear that nationalist parties had seduced the majority of 
Bosnians86 – international policy-makers started questioning the “peace-
through-democratisation” (or peace-through-liberalisation) strategy 
reminiscent of Boutros-Ghali’s original conception of peacebuilding. 
The ‘dilemma’, as the American diplomat Special Envoy in the Balkans, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  and	  Herzegovina	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  premises	  upon	  which	  the	  liberal	  peace	  was	  based	  in	  this	  mission	  in	  the	  Balkans	  and	  see	  how	  it	  shifted	  as	  soon	  as	  difficulties	  appeared.	  80	  General	  Framework	  Agreement	  (1995).	  The	  literature	  has	  dealt	  extensively	  with	  the	  negotiations	   and	   the	  Dayton	  peace	   settlement.	   For	   example,	   Chandler	   (2000);	   Glenny	  (1996);	  Malcolm	  (1996:	  234–272);	  Woodward	  (1995).	  81	  GFA	  (1995:	  Annex	  4,	  Preamble).	  82	  GFA	  (1995:	  Annex	  3,	  article	  2).	  83	  GFA	  (Annex	  4,	  article	  2).	  84	  PIC	  (1996a).	  85	  The	  assumption	  was	  that	  elections	   ‘confirm[ed]	  the	  effective	  division	  of	   the	  country	  on	  ethnic	  lines’	  (ICG	  1996b:	  1).	  86	  In	  the	  literature,	  calls	  for	  a	  more	  intrusive	  and	  extensive	  international	  presence	  were	  already	  made	  before	   the	   first	   elections	  were	  held.	   For	   example,	   see	   ICG	   (1996a).	   The	  ICG	   recommendation	  was	   to	   postpone	   the	   elections	   because	   the	   conditions	  were	   not	  favourable.	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Richard Holbrooke, put it, is that ‘racists, fascists and separatists’ that 
oppose peace can be elected in ‘free and fair elections’.87 The election of 
nationalist leaders in Bosnia (similar to the experiences in other post-war 
scenarios) led to the observation that democratisation, rather than being the 
solution for peace, was part of the problem. As Zakaria famously concluded, 
democracy outside the West is often giving rise to ‘illiberal democracy’.88 A 
far cry from the universal thesis of the democratic peace of the early 1990s, 
the new accepted wisdom was that ‘it is a mistake to blindly impose voting 
on countries that are unfit for voting’.89 Since Bosnia seemed “unfit” for 
voting, international administrators began to rethink their peacebuilding 
strategy and prolong their mission in order to carefully construct the social 
conditions 90  and institutional mechanisms that would support a stable 
democracy.91 
The shift in the approach to the crisis in Bosnia can be understood by 
looking at the UN’s subtle and gradual reinterpretation of the goals of the 
mission, when it appeared that communities were unwilling to protect 
minority populations. While the Dayton Accords seemed to be originally 
framed in universal terms – ‘dedicated to peace, justice, tolerance and 
reconciliation’ – the aim of peacebuilding was increasingly recast in 
particularist terms, through the lens of “multi–ethnicity”. Only 6 months 
after Dayton, the international administrators declared: 
The fundamental goal of the Peace Agreement is the reestablishment of 
a multi-ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina through the creation and 
strengthening of institutions which respect the rights of all citizens, 
regardless of ethnicity.92 
Even if the text emphasises ‘citizens regardless of ethnicity’ in an apparent 
universalist vocabulary, by setting the goal in multi-ethnic terms (the 
reestablishment of a multi-ethnic Bosnia), the UN started reframing the 
problem as one about “ethnicity” or ethnic rivalries. 
To clarify, the point is not to say that after six months there was a radical 
shift in the international strategy to foster peace in Bosnia. The point is that, 
spurred by the election of nationalist representatives and the lack of 
compromise among parties, the process was increasingly differing from the 
universal approach of building peace-through-democratisation. Rather than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Quoted	  in	  Zakaria	  (1997:	  22).	  88	  Zakaria	  (1997:	  22).	  89	  Sartori	   (2001:	  55).	  See	  also,	  Carothers	   (2002);	  Lipset	   (1994);	  Mansfield	  and	  Snyder	  (1995);	  Snyder	  (2000).	  90	  For	  example,	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  tolerant	  and	  diverse	  civil	  society	  was	  one	  of	  the	  social	  conditions	  for	  the	  advance	  of	  democracy	  (Belloni	  2001:	  164;	  Chandler	  2000:	  135–153).	  91	  For	  critiques	  of	  the	  democratisation	  process	  in	  Bosnia,	  see	  for	  example,	  ICG	  (1996a);	  Paris	  (2004:	  99–107);	  Woodward	  (1999).	  92	  PIC	  (1996b:	  IV).	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locating the problem and solution for Bosnia in the political sphere – for 
example, as one in which authoritarian regimes had to be supplanted by 
representative governments elected in the polls – the emphasis was put on 
the psychosocial sphere,93 on the problematic “ethnic” tensions and difficult 
reconciliation of the Bosnian population.94 For the goal of a multi-ethnic 
tolerant society, a process of democratization seemed insufficient, if not 
counterproductive, and the international presence seemed mandatory.95 As 
Woodward argues: ‘the election of wartime parties and their leaders 
continues the war, albeit with peaceful means as long as NATO troops are 
present’.96 
International administrators gradually adopted a more proactive strategy 
to curve the democratic process.97 Paris analyses the shift in the international 
policy strategy: 
Peacebuilders apparently recognized that “free and fair” elections 
could impede, rather than facilitate, the consolidation of a lasting peace 
in Bosnia, and therefore undertook to intervene in the 1997 entity-level 
elections on the side of candidates who preached moderation but who 
lacked sufficient popular support to gain power through the democratic 
process alone.98 
While the peace process was initially planned to transfer sovereignty to the 
Bosnian people short after the first supervised elections, the nationalist 
preferences of the citizens led international negotiators to successively 
amend their mandates in order to increase and prolong their external 
powers.99 Indeed, during the first three years, every time Bosnians went to 
the polls, international officials thought that the results would quicken 
advances for peace and that the process could finally be handed over the 
people.100 But there was no such a step. As Chandler observes, a decisive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  In	   other	  words,	  what	  matters	   here,	   as	  well	   as	   in	   the	   new	   institutionalist	   literature	  analysed	   earlier,	   is	   the	   individuals’	   ‘frame’	   of	   the	   process,	   rather	   than	   the	   rational	  process	  itself	  (See	  fn.	  33	  and	  38).	  	  94 	  While	   war	   studies	   had	   for	   many	   years	   analysed	   the	   influence	   of	   social	   or	  psychological	  processes	  affecting	  conflict,	   these	  processes	  were	  seen	   traditionally	   less	  relevant	   for	   peace	   studies	   (Pupavac	   2004:	   381;	   Brigg	   2010:	   330–336).	   Since	   the	   late	  eighties,	   the	   focus	  on	  subjective	  perceptions	   influencing	  peace	  became	  more	   frequent.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Avruch	  and	  Black	  (1987);	  Avruch	  (1998).	  The	  point	  therefore	  is	  that,	  in	   Bosnia,	   the	   ethnic	   thinking	   of	   the	   participants	   came	   to	   be	   seen	   not	   only	   as	   a	  determinant	   factor	  of	   the	  war,	  but	  also	  a	  crucial	  element	  to	  take	   it	   into	  account	   in	  the	  process	  of	  peacebuilding.	  95	  Belloni	  (2001:	  164);	  Kaldor	  (1999:	  31–68);	  Zakaria	  (1997).	  96	  Woodward	  (1999:	  7).	  97	  Woodward	   explains	   that	   ‘disqualification	   of	   elected	   officials	   and	   conditionality	   of	  economic	  aid’	  were	  two	  frequently	  adopted	  tools	  (1999:	  8).	  98	  Paris	  (2004:	  105).	  99	  PIC	  (1997a;	  1997b).	  Also,	  see	  Chandler	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  this	  shift	  (2000:	  51–55).	  	  100	  Woodward	  (1999:	  5).	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moment for the international supervision of Bosnia happened in one of the 
Peace Implementation Council meetings in Luxembourg, in June 1998, when 
external administrators acquired further ‘regulative powers’ and the new 
mandates were now ‘indefinite’: ‘international withdrawal and the ceding of 
sovereignty and policy-making powers to Bosnian institutions was now to 
be dependent on a broad range of “benchmarks” to be determined by the 
international institutions themselves’.101 
The introduction of benchmarks and the prolongation of international 
supervisory functions are indicatives of the belief that democracy cannot 
function for all peoples. The next section explores the divide between liberal 
democratic societies and those that are not yet ready for autonomously 
governing themselves. I will argue that, throughout the 1990s, this divide 
was framed through a cultural lens and it was a precondition for the 
reinterpretation of the liberal peace: rather than dedicating resources to the 
preparation of free and fair elections, the efforts were progressively put on 
building institutions to cultivate the social requisites – i.e. a civil society of 
diverse and respectful citizens – necessary to accomplish a stable liberal 
democracy. 
 
 
Building institutions to overcome the cultural divide 
 
The case in Bosnia reflects an upward trend of disenchantment with the 
liberal peace and democratization processes. It seemed that internationally 
driven peace missions, like the ones in Rwanda or Angola, not only failed to 
pacify the warring groups but also contributed to the propagation of tragic 
episodes of violence.102 After these crises, the humanitarian euphoria of the 
early 1990s soon gave way to a pessimistic period of disillusionment and 
lack of confidence with universal political and historical projects.103 It is 
within this context of despair about the universalism of the peace-through-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  Chandler	  (2000:	  55).	  102	  For	   example,	   Snyder	   (2000);	   Aidoo	   (1993:	   705).	   Also,	   Paris	   analyses	   eleven	   cases	  (Angola,	   Bosnia,	   Cambodia,	   Croatia,	   Guatemala,	   El	   Salvador,	   Liberia,	   Mozambique,	  Namibia	   and	  Nicaragua,	   Rwanda)	   to	   test	  whether	   democratisation	   and	  marketization	  have	  created	  the	  conditions	  for	  stable	  peace.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  Croatia	  and	  Namibia	  which	  brought	  peaceful	  outcomes,	  his	  conclusion	  is	  pessimistic	  regarding	  the	  success	  of	  the	  liberalisation	  approach:	  ‘the	  liberalisation	  process	  either	  contributed	  to	  a	  rekindling	  of	   violence	   or	   helped	   to	   recreate	   the	   historic	   sources	   of	   violence	   in	   many	   of	   the	  countries	  that	  have	  hosted	  these	  missions’	  	  (2004:	  78,	  155).	  103 	  To	   clarify,	   the	   pessimism	   was	   related	   to	   universal	   assumptions	   or	   universal	  blueprints	   for	   peace	   that	   led	   to	   the	   gradual	   reinterpretation	   of	   peacebuilding.	   For	   an	  account	   of	   the	   1990s	   shifting	   impulse	   of	   humanitarian	   advocacy,	   see	   Pupavac	   (2006:	  257–258).	  Also,	  for	  a	  contextualisation	  of	  the	  ‘crisis	  of	  confidence	  in	  social	  theory’,	  see	  Joseph	  (2012:	  86).	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democratisation thesis that the notion of difference – a divide between 
peoples – came to the fore as a variable to explain the limits of universal 
discourses. 104  Kenan Malik argues that the concept of race appeared 
throughout the nineteenth century as a means to explain the emerging 
economic inequalities in societies that believed in the equality of the human 
species: ‘the particular forms that capitalist society adopted ensured that 
Enlightenment universalism became degraded in practice. It was through 
this process that the discourse of race developed.’ 105  Analogously, he 
explains that, at the end of the Cold War, the alleged universal discourse of 
liberal democracy encountered difficulties in being applied to Third World 
countries that suffered from intractable civil wars in an increasingly unequal 
world. 106 This time, since race had been morally discarded as a valid 
sociological category for its association with the racial discourse of Nazi 
Germany, difference came to be rationalised through the concept of 
culture.107 
A caveat is important here. The point is that ‘culture’, broadly understood 
here as a framework that explains the divide between Western and non-
Western societies, comes in after the disillusionment related with the failure 
of the international democratisation and economic liberalisation processes to 
achieve development and peace in many regions of the world. As seen in 
North’s work, for example, he was disenchanted with the theoretical 
calculus of neoclassical economic frameworks of universalising development 
when he hit upon the informal constraints of societies to explain that, in 
practice, economies diverged. Similarly, the perception that liberalisation did 
not work for Bosnians, led to the assumption that they were culturally 
different: not ready for democracy and, therefore, dependent upon 
international supervision. To summarise, it has been the impossibility of 
achieving peace and equality through the implementation of universal 
discourses – such as the peace-through-democratisation approach – that has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  For	  instance,	  to	  recall	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  first	  section,	  North’s	  relied	  on	  the	  subjective	  constructs	  culturally	  framed	  of	  societies	  to	  account	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  success	  of	  universal	  models	  of	  orthodox	  economics.	  	  105	  Malik	   (1996:	   69).	  Moreover,	  Malik	   explains	   that	   the	   common-­‐sense	   perspective	   is	  that	   the	   racial	   view	   of	   humanity	   has	   produced	   the	   marginalisation	   of	   some	   races.	  Against	   this	   view,	   he	   argues	   that	   ‘it	   is	   not	   race	   that	   gives	   rise	   to	   inequality,	   but	  inequality	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  race’	  (1996:	  39).	  106	  Increasing	   global	   inequality	   seemed	   to	   confirm	   the	   perception	   that	   people	   were	  different.	  In	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  the	  income	  of	  Western	  Europe	  and	  North	  America	  rose	  substantially.	  In	  comparison,	  the	  Second	  World	  was	  in	  a	  transition	  period	   and	   most	   of	   the	   economies	   in	   the	   Third	  World,	   with	   the	   salient	   exception	   of	  China	  and	  India,	  were	  collapsing	  (Milanovic	  2009:	  7–13).	  107	  Malik	  (1996:	  209–216).	  The	  point	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  culture	  came	  in	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	   It	  had	  replaced	  the	  social	  meaning	  of	  race,	  at	   least	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  However,	  it	  adopted	  its	  hierarchical	  attributes	  more	  explicitly	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  after	  the	  failure	  of	  several	  development	  and	  peace	  endeavours.	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led to the acceptance of the notion of a divided world. Importantly, the 
conceptualisation of culture I have just drawn out here is different to the 
critical approaches of the liberal peace. As I will demonstrate in the next 
three chapters, critical scholars argue that the universalism of the liberal 
peace is responsible for downplaying the needs and interests of other 
societies. Malik emphasises this distinct conceptualisation of difference (race 
and culture): ‘it is the degradation of universalism that has given rise to the 
discourse of race, while poststructuralist and postmodernist theories take 
universalism itself to be the source of racial outlook’.108 I will come back to 
this point in the last chapter of the thesis.  
The tension produced between a commitment to a universal aspiration 
and the persistence of inequality becomes apparent if one takes the example 
of Fukuyama’s work. While he had been convinced of ‘the universalization 
of Western liberal democracy’ due to the ‘unabashed victory of the economic 
and political liberalism’ in 1989,109 he soon identified the limits of this 
discourse in the ‘primacy of culture’. In an article in 1995, after witnessing 
‘the recession of the third wave’ of democratisation, he observed that ‘civil 
society’ and especially ‘culture’ were the most problematic spheres affecting 
the consolidation of democracy in the non-Western world: ‘the real 
difficulties affecting the quality of life in democracies have to do with social 
and cultural pathologies that seem safely beyond the reach of institutional 
solutions’.110  
The view that a hierarchical divide was natural among humans becomes 
even clearer when reading the deterministic accounts that sought to make 
sense of the brutality of the civil wars in the Third World.111 The journalist 
Robert Kaplan, for example, experienced in his travels around the globe that 
‘in places where the Western Enlightenment has not penetrated and where 
there has always been mass poverty, people find liberation in violence’. He 
continues: ‘there is less and less politics today in Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sri Lanka, the Balkans, and the Caucasus, among other places’.112 
Comparably, many commentators identified in the wars in the Balkans a 
bloodthirsty, brutal, irrational, pathologised population, in a region of 
collective madness in which violence was endemic and a history of ancient 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  Malik	  (1996:	  219).	  109	  Fukuyama	  (1989:	  3–4).	  110	  Fukuyama	   (1995:	   9).	   For	   the	   argument	   that	   culture	   is	   one	   of	   the	   key	   factors	   to	  determine	  economic	  prosperity,	  see	  Harrison	  and	  Huntington	  (2000).	  111	  For	  example,	  Huntington	  (1993);	  Mearsheimer	  (1993;	  2000);	  Mearsheimer	  and	  Van	  Evera	  (1995).	  The	  views	  of	  these	  authors	  were	  not	  very	  different	  to	  those	  of	  Fukuyama	  (1995,	  1996).	  Indeed,	  as	  Fukuyama	  has	  recently	  recognised,	  they	  all	  concur	  that	  culture	  has	  a	  prominent	   role.	  The	  disagreement	   lies	   in	   the	  point	   that	  Fukuyama	  believes	   that	  cultural	  constraints	  can	  be	  overcome	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  universal	  values	  may	  be	  agreed	  (2013:	  32).	  112	  Kaplan	  (1994).	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animosities seemed to be repeating.113 In a study that sought to rank human 
rights performances by countries, Bova placed ‘culturally’ Western states on 
top of the list. These were followed by Western ‘hybrid’ cultures, such as 
Latin America or some countries of Eastern Europe, and at the bottom, he 
classified Asia and Africa. Although Bova argued that ‘democracy’ and 
‘economic prosperity’ also influenced human rights performances, his 
conclusion was that ‘the most compelling explanation for the difference is a 
cultural one’.114 Studies like this, as well as many recent accounts of Balkan 
history, could persuasively be labelled as racist if one merely replaces 
‘culture’ or ‘ethnicity’ by ‘race’, as they affirm the inferiority of groups of 
people by relying on historical or biological distinctions. Nevertheless, as 
Malik recalls, arguments about Western cultural and moral superiority to the 
Third World at the end of the Cold War ‘have not only become common 
place, but they have also become acceptable’.115 
Indeed, without a morally and culturally hierarchical understanding of 
different peoples, it is difficult to imagine how international administrators 
could legitimise the erosion of sovereignty to the extent that democracy or 
self-government could be supervised, if not denied.116 The implications of 
interpreting non-Western others as having a different culture, which is 
comparably inferior to the democratic, peaceful and tolerant culture of 
Western democracies, was to think that these people were not capable of 
governing themselves. As I have argued in the previous section in relation to 
post-conflict Bosnia, after war-prone leaders achieved victory in the 
elections, the tendency was to problematise the assumption that peace and 
democracy went together. As Kaplan, rather alarmingly, put it: ‘[T]he 
democracy we are encouraging in many poor parts of the world is an 
integral part of a transformation toward new forms of authoritarianism’.117 
At the end of the 1990s, it became accepted that democracies or 
democratisation processes needed certain ‘social requisites’, such as 
supportive beliefs or traditions, to consolidate and remain stable.118 As soon 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  For	  example,	  Djilas	  (1997);	  Kaplan	  (1993);	  Mearsheimer	  (1993).	  114	  Bova	  (1997:	  120–124).	  115	  Malik	  (1996:	  209).	  116	  See	   Jackson	   for	   an	   argument	   that	   stresses	   the	   need	   to	   treat	   different	   people	  with	  different	   international	   norms:	   ‘societal	   and	   cultural	   differences	   among	   nations	   and	  peoples	   are	   to	   be	   expected	   and	   should	   be	   recognised	   and	   reflected	   in	   specifically	  adapted	  rules	  and	  institutions.	  Thus,	  in	  a	  post-­‐colonial	  but	  highly	  unequal	  world	  such	  as	  ours,	   there	   ought	   to	   be	   various	   international	   statuses	   ranging	   from	   outright	  independence	   to	   associate	   statehood	   to	   international	   trusteeship’	   (1990:	   200).	   Also,	  Krasner	  (2004;	  2005).	  117	  Kaplan	  (1997:	  56).	  118	  Lipset	  (1994);	  Carothers	  (2002:	  16).	  Analysing	  the	  democratic	  theorists	  of	  the	  time,	  Chandler	   observes	   that	   through	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘consolidation’,	   ‘democratisation	  progressively	   involved	  deeper	   concerns	   that	   relate	   to	   the	   sustainability	  of	  democratic	  institutions	  rather	  than	  their	  establishment	  and	  operation’	  (2000:	  8).	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as scholars and practitioners reached a broad consensus on the importance of 
taking culture into account for undertaking successful peace and 
development processes,119 the main challenge became one of ‘how’ deficient 
cultures could be transformed.120  
At this moment it is important to recall how Douglass North explained 
divergent economic growth through his theory of institutions. As I have read 
it in the first section, he acknowledged that the subjective models – the 
informal constraints – that informed peoples’ decisions were negatively 
affecting the growth of underdeveloped societies (i.e. reproducing deficient 
non-rational institutions). Therefore, North, like analysts dealing with 
questions of peacebuilding, emphasises that differences among peoples can 
be drawn at the sphere of beliefs and perceptions, filtered by what can be 
broadly labelled as culture. This means that underdevelopment, like war, 
takes place in the minds of the people that make wrong decisions. 
Committed to reduce international inequality, North strongly recommended 
studying the vicissitudes of societies’ mental constraints. While he always 
evoked that it was a difficult venture to affect them, he concluded with the 
certainty that changes in the formal rules of societies could sooner or later fix 
poor informal constraints. This point is crucial because North’s concluding 
remark echoes the tendency to focus on the institutionalisation of societies to 
affect the cultural deficit of post-war societies. 
For example, when analysing why the liberalisation endeavours failed in 
the peacebuilding processes of the 1990s, Paris argues that these societies 
had ‘ineffective political institutions’ and lacked ‘the existence of a tradition, 
or culture, of peaceful dispute resolution’.121 In other words, they required 
more efficient formal institutions and more positive informal constraints. 
The framework Paris proposes to achieve a successful process is 
‘constructing the foundations of effective political and economic institutions 
before the introduction of electoral democracy and market-oriented 
adjustment policies’. For Paris, the aim is still to ‘transform war-shattered 
states into liberal market democracies’, what changes is the international 
policy-makers strategy, which he succinctly calls: ‘institutionalisation before 
liberalisation’.122 Paris framework is useful to understand the predisposition 
to focus on formal institutions by international institutions such as the World 
Bank. For example, from the ‘fiscal crisis’ or ‘the collapse of economies’ in 
the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe to ‘the explosion in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  119	  For	  a	  genealogy	  of	  the	  inclusion	  of	  culture	  in	  peace	  studies,	  see	  Brigg	  (2010).	  	  120	  Klitgaard	  (1994:	  76).	  See	  also,	  Harrison	  (1992);	  Harrison	  and	  Huntington	  (2000).	  121	  Paris	  (2004:	  169–175).	  122	  Paris	   (2004:	   179)	   [Emphasis	   in	   the	   original].	   This	   is	   important	   because	   Paris,	   like	  North,	   does	   not	   seek	   to	   find	   an	   alternative	   to	   the	   liberal	   peace	   (or	   to	   neoclassical	  economics),	   but	   to	   find	   better	   means	   to	   achieve	   the	   goal	   of	   building	   stable	   liberal	  democracies.	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humanitarian emergencies in several parts of the world’, the World Bank 
observed that the problem was ‘the lawlessness syndrome’. As a solution the 
organisation recommended that ‘an effective state is vital for the provision of 
the goods and services – and the rules and institutions – that allow markets 
to flourish and people to lead healthier happier lives’.123 For the liberal peace 
framework, the focus on strengthening state institutions to build peace and 
stability has implied the conflation between peace and statebuilding from 
the late 1990s onwards.124 
The shift to statebuilding is clearly apparent in the Balkans, especially 
since the initial focus on elections did not bring the expected cooperation 
among groups. Examining the case of Bosnia, Chandler notes that nearly all 
academic analysts and policy-makers highlight the problem of ‘nationalism 
and ethnic rivalry’ to explain the conflict and the tensions after the peace 
settlement. These conceptualisations of the Bosnian war help to confirm the 
‘divide’ between the ‘democratic culture’ reflected in the civil society of the 
West and the ‘backward’, ‘irrational’ and ‘ethnic culture’ of Eastern 
Europe.125 Chandler argues that once this ‘division’ at the level of culture is 
settled, an international regulatory framework is legitimated to fix ‘societal 
values and attitudes rather than political processes’.126 In a comparable 
analysis of international governance in Bosnia, Vanessa Pupavac argues that, 
‘by locating the source of conflict and injustice in the social psychology of the 
population’, international peacebuilders legitimise a ‘therapeutic peace’ 
approach that supervises ‘inter-ethnic’ tensions and even ‘emotional 
communication and interpersonal relations’.127 Both Chandler and Pupavac 
concur that this international approach denies the self-government 
aspirations of conflict-affected populations and deprioritizes material 
development.128  
This ‘therapeutic governance’ 129  approach to peacebuilding, which 
focuses on a deep institutionalisation and social regulation of societies to 
build a stable liberal peace, will be analysed in greater detail in the next 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  World	  Bank	  (1997:	  1,	  4)	  124	  For	   example,	   see	   Carothers	   (2002:	   17);	   Chesterman	   (2004);	   Ghani,	   Lockhart	   and	  Carnahan	  (2005);	  Paris	  and	  Sisk	  (2009).	  125	  Chandler	   (2000:	   22–28).	   In	   the	   next	   chapter	   I	   will	   discuss	   how	   this	   divide	   was	  reinforced	  through	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘new	  wars’.	  126	  Chandler	  (2000:	  28).	  Similarly,	  in	  the	  field	  of	  development,	  Duffield	  argued	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  development	  had	  shifted	  from	  ‘promoting	  economic	  growth	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  development	   will	   follow’	   to	   ‘a	   series	   of	   projects	   and	   strategies	   to	   change	   indigenous	  values	  and	  modes	  of	  organisation	  and	  replace	  them	  with	  liberal	  ones’	  (2001:	  42).	  127	  Pupavac	  (2004:	  391).	  128	  Chandler	  (2000:	  195–196).	  Pupavac	  (2004:	  391–394;	  2001:	  369).	  129 	  Pupavac	   (2001:	   358)	   coins	   ‘therapeutic	   governance’	   the	   form	   of	   international	  governance	  based	  on	  a	  ‘psycho-­‐social	  intervention’	  and	  ‘social	  risk	  management’	  (2001:	  358).	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chapter in relation to post-conflict Kosovo. I will argue that, by focusing on 
the “ethnic” proclivities of the Kosovars, the conflict has become irresolvable 
on the eyes of international administrators and, in consequence, further 
international engagement to fix the social sphere has been considered 
indispensable. For now, in this first chapter, suffice is to say that a 
framework that seeks to build institutions to manage the subjective models 
of the population in an indefinite supervision process is different from the 
initial intentions to grant self-government to the Bosnian people after the 
first democratic elections. As I have demonstrated, a precondition for this 
shift has been the perception among academics and policy-makers of 
divergent world societies that has been rationalised by looking at institutions 
and, more fundamentally, scrutinising the subjective models affecting these 
institutions. As a conclusion, therefore, I contend that the failures of the early 
democratisation processes have been interpreted through the lens of culture, 
which divides different peoples and societies. After the crises of 
democratisation, external interference has been considered increasingly 
essential to build institutions and transform fragile and intolerant societies 
that are not yet ready to face the conflictive nature of democracy and 
economic competitiveness. 
Before I turn to analyse the statebuilding process in Kosovo, it is 
important to make a last remark on the conception of culture within 
peacebuilding frameworks. The increasing recognition that post-conflict 
societies were culturally different contained an ambivalent meaning: on the 
one hand, difference was cast in negative terms, it explained and legitimised 
why some societies were poor or war-prone and it presented them as having 
a pre-modern or barbarous condition. For policy-makers and scholars 
dealing with post-war populations, other cultures were (and ought to be) 
subordinated to the ideal of liberal democracy.130 The challenge was, so to 
speak, to overcome the informal constraints in order that democracy, peace 
and economic growth could flourish. However, on the other hand, the 
recognition that culture mattered was accompanied by a predisposition to 
question the validity and imposition of universal constructs. Indeed, as I 
have explained, the fact that North and Paris argued that institutions were 
important for the success of processes of development or peace, for example, 
represented a critical reading of the universal applicability of forms of 
liberalism. By so doing, they opened up the possibility of appreciating other 
ways of living. 
While this ‘openness’ to difference had an important value in 
constructivist and poststructuralist frameworks,131 it could also be seen as 
positive within policymaking discourses. Already in 1989, the World Bank 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  This	  point	  will	  be	  further	  developed	  in	  chapter	  3.	  131	  For	  example,	  see	  discussion	  about	  Campbell	  (1998;	  1999)	  in	  chapter	  3	  and	  Connolly	  (1995;	  2002;	  2005)	  in	  chapter	  4.	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argued that Africa’s countries should pursue their development in their own 
ways: 
Africa will need to search for the models that best fit its culture. Thus 
moving from words to action requires a favourable institutional 
context. It must emerge from, and at the same time support, political 
consensus. Each country will have to wrestle with this problem in its 
own way. The most that external agencies can do is to support the 
search for that consensus (1989:	  193).  
The credence that Africans could find models that best fit their culture 
means that difference can also be framed in much more affirmative terms. As 
Chesterman succinctly puts it, ‘any foreign involvement must therefore be 
sensitive to the particularities of that population both at the level of form and 
of substance’.132 This contentious line (to repeat, the fact that culture may be 
used, on the one hand, to legitimise inequality, and, on the other hand, to 
protect and celebrate human difference)133 is at the core of contemporary 
discourses of peacebuilding. While I have made clear that liberal peace 
frameworks still maintained a very negative understanding of the culture of 
other societies, in the following chapters I will argue that the ethical 
sensitivity underpinning the rise of culture has motivated the critical 
reassessments of the liberal peace: most clearly within post-liberal peace and 
resilience approaches. It is this ambivalent meaning of culture in relation to 
peacebuilding strategies that ushers this research. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This initial chapter has explored the shift from a peace-through-
democratisation approach prevalent during the beginning of the 1990s to an 
increasing concern with the fixing of institutions in post-conflict societies 
more dominant from the second half of the decade onwards. At the 
beginning, I have contextualised and introduced this shift by interpreting 
Douglass North’s work on development economics. The Nobel Laureate’s 
views are important for this chapter because, wanting to improve the 
insufficient results that orthodox development policies produced on Third 
World countries, he insisted on analysing the role of institutions. For him, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  132	  Chesterman	  (2007:	  3).	  	  133	  For	  Furedi,	  this	  is	  the	  ambivalence	  that	  has	  characterised	  the	  discourse	  of	  race	  and	  culture:	   ‘Relativism	   could	   be	   read	   as	   a	   plea	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   noble	   savage.	   It	  could	  also	  be	  interpreted	  to	  mean	  that	  the	  native	  was	  not	  ready	  for	  modern	  life’	  (1998:	  100).	   For	   instance,	   the	   discourse	   of	   apartheid	  was	   possible	   and	   it	   lasted	   for	   decades	  because	  it	  made	  this	  ambiguity	  its	  strength:	  racial	  division	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  unequal	  system	   for	  discriminating	   some	  groups	  or	   a	   project	   of	   freedom	   in	  which	   every	   group	  could	  protect	  their	  culture	  (Norval	  1996:	  73).	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institutions – from norms and rules to beliefs and perceptions – formed the 
structure that guides people’s decisions and he noticed that impoverished 
developing countries lacked efficient institutions. North argued that the key 
obstacle for achieving economic growth was the culturally informed 
subjective perceptions and beliefs that affected institutions and were difficult 
to correct. Ultimately, his recommendation for developing Third World 
countries was to fix formal institutions in the hope that, in the long run, 
constrictive subjective models could also be modified. 
The tendency to focus on building institutions in the theory and practice 
of peacebuilding has similarly been motivated by the failure to achieve 
societal stability and democratic consolidation in the peace-through-
democratisation processes of the mid-1990s. As Carothers conclusively put 
it, ‘the transition paradigm was a product of a certain time – the heady early 
days of the third wave – and that time has now passed. It is necessary for 
democracy activists to move on to new frameworks, new debates, and 
perhaps eventually a new paradigm of political change’. 134  The new 
paradigm of ‘institutionalisation before liberalisation,’ to use Paris words, 
has been illustrated in this chapter through the case of post-conflict Bosnia. I 
have argued that, while the initial efforts focused on organising elections, the 
election of nationalist leaders who blocked the implementation of peace 
agreements led international administrators to rethink their strategy. They 
opted to prolong their mandate and gradually focused on the social 
requisites necessary to consolidate democracy and peace.  
While this shift (to clarify, from peace–through–democratisation to 
building institutions) has been extensively analysed in the literature, I have 
sought to theorise one of the preconditions that made it possible. This was 
the recognition among academics and policy-makers that conflict-affected 
people were different: dysfunctional, lacking a liberal democratic culture 
and incapable of coping with sovereign acts. The notion of a human 
hierarchical divide appeared most explicitly after the failures to apply 
universalised frameworks such as democracy or economic liberalisation to 
post-conflict non-Western societies. The demise of universalism gave rise to 
the focus on subjective perceptions to explain differences among societies. 
As Hughes and Pupavac argue, ‘[post-conflict] societies are viewed as 
formed of violated and violating individuals, whose actions spring in 
hopeless cycle of conflict from psychological process rather than from 
political beliefs or economic needs’. 135  My conclusion is that culture – 
subjectively derived differences among societies – came to explain why some 
people could not rule themselves and it was an important prerequisite for 
the reinterpretation of peacebuilding. At the end of the 1990s, international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  Carothers	  (2002:	  20).	  135	  Hughes	  and	  Pupavac	  (2005:	  874).	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policy-makers were developing an institution-building framework that 
sought to carefully manage the erratic subjective processes of post-war 
populations. It is this new framework that I intend to analyse in the next 
chapter in relation to the statebuilding project in Kosovo. 
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Chapter 2.  
Reframing Post-Conflict Kosovo: 
The “Ethnic Dilemma” and the Indefinite 
International Supervision 
 
 
Preface 
 
Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (self-determination) is in the limelight of Kosovo’s 
politics. Having its origins in the student movements of the 1990s, it was 
founded as a social movement in 2005 to reclaim Kosovo’s self-
determination through innovative non-violent protests and acts of resistance 
against the international supervision of the country.1 In 2010, Vetëvendosje 
was constituted as a political party for the national elections in which it 
became the third force in the Assembly. The rise of the movement reached a 
high point last December, when Vetëvendosje’s candidate Shpend Ahmeti 
won the municipal elections in the capital Pristina and was sworn in as the 
new Mayor.2 The party’s political views are based on defending the citizens 
of Kosovo whose will, they argue, should be consulted through direct forms 
of democracy. By the same token, the party is opposed to the current 
international administration because it is considered unaccountable and 
undemocratic.3  
While Vetëvendosje is gaining popularity among the people and it is 
influencing public opinion, 4  its policies are viewed with suspicion by 
international organizations, the media and scholars alike. Since its inception 
Vetëvendosje has been labelled as a ‘radical’ organization and a ‘cause for 
concern’ for the UN Mission in Kosovo5 and it is usually linked to ‘civil 
unrest’ and ‘violence’. 6  Some delegitimize Vetëvendosje’s proposals by 
focusing on the ‘shameful vandalism and extreme unjustifiable intolerance 
on the other’.7 Others go as far as to accuse Vetëvendosje of being a ‘terrorist’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Schwandner-­‐Sievers	  (2013:	  98–99)	  2	  Vetëvendosje	  (2013).	  3	  Schwandner-­‐Sievers	  (2013:	  97).	  4	  IndexKosova	  (2013).	  5	  UNSC	  (2007a:	  3).	  6	  OSAC	  (2013).	  7	  Hoxha	  (2013).	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group.8 Even if only few remain as categorical, most analysts argue that it is 
a ‘genuine threat’ to the other parties and international organizations for its 
‘hard-line nationalist stance’.9 This stance is evident, for example, in its 
rejection of programs of decentralization to benefit minorities and the party’s 
proposal to consult Kosovars on whether to join Albania.10  
Despite these criticisms and severe accusations, as a social scientist, I still 
was motivated with the possibility of understanding the demands of self-
governance openly voiced by Vetëvendosje11 and defended by an increasing 
number of people in Kosovo.12 It is important to say that, by trying to 
‘understand’ their arguments, I am not legitimizing or giving support to a 
political cause.13 Indeed, my concern is not directly the rise of Vetëvendosje 
neither examining Kosovo’s domestic matters. Rather than judging their 
specific claims, I am more interested in placing them in relation to dominant 
discourses of peacebuilding. In the previous chapter, I have analysed the 
shift in the discourse of peacebuilding from a process of democratisation 
towards a focus on building institutions that is intended to fix the deficient 
mental constructs of post-war societies before the actual process of 
democracy can be enacted. It is this institutionalisation approach to 
peacebuilding, 14  and how it has evolved into a perpetual deferral of 
democracy or self-government for the Kosovars, that is at the centre of this 
chapter.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Oschlies	  (2006).	  9	  McKinna	  (2012a).	  10	  Clark (2014: 542).	  11	  Although	  this	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  the	  international	  framings	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  Kosovo,	  I	  visited	   Kosovo	   during	   the	   last	   municipal	   elections	   and	   conduced	   interviews	   with	  several	  members	  from	  Vetëvendosje,	  including	  its	  leader,	  Albin	  Kurti,	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  interrogating	  about	  their	  proposals	  of	  self-­‐determination.	  3,	  4	  and	  8	  November	  2013.	  For	   the	   same	   purpose,	   I	   also	   interviewed	   UNMIK’s	   Head	   of	   Political	   Affairs,	   Jolyon	  Naegele,	  and	  a	  member	  of	  the	  OSCE	  who	  preferred	  to	  remain	  anonymous.	  12	  See	   the	   introduction	   of	   this	   research	   and	   the	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   encounters	   with	   the	  Kosovars.	  	  13	  For	  instance,	  in	  a	  much	  more	  morally	  sensitive	  argument,	  see	  Hage’s	  reflection	  on	  the	  possibility	   to	  understand	  and	  explain	  suicide	  bombers	   in	  academic	  discussions	  (2003:	  65–68).	   Also,	   see	   Zizek’s	   discussion	   about	   defending	   Lenin’s	   thoughts	   in	   academia	  (2002:	  1).	  In	  the	  context	  of	  investigating	  Albanian	  nationalism,	  see	  Schwandner-­‐Sievers	  (2013:	  109).	  14	  In	   this	   chapter	   I	   will	   use	   ‘statebuilding’	   instead	   of	   peacebuilding	   to	   indicate	   the	  evolution	  of	  peacebuilding	  towards	  a	  concern	  with	  building	  institutions	  (i.e.	  state)	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This chapter seeks to understand why international policy-makers and many 
scholars seem reluctant to respond to Kosovars’ demands for a sovereign 
state. In particular, it investigates why fifteen years after the peace settlement 
that ended the war in Kosovo international organizations are still indecisive 
regarding the status of the territory and have maintained administrative 
structures while deferring self-government.15 Although in 2008 the Kosovo 
Assembly declared the independence of Kosovo from Serbia, the European 
Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) continues with the monitoring of its institutions 
without admitting the sovereignty of the territory.16 
In the literature, most scholars have explained that it has been difficult to 
find a solution over the status because this is the most delicate and 
conflictive issue of all: within the international community and within 
Kosovar public opinion there are two diametrically opposed positions 
regarding the independence or non-independence of Kosovo from Serbia.17 
While the interpretation of a meticulous and dangerous negotiation of the 
process is somewhat accurate, it is incomplete.18 For instance, it tells little 
about why international state-builders have sought to resolve the status 
disputes by deferring self-government and adopting an increasingly 
technical and managerial approach to transform the social behaviours of the 
population. For example, UNMIK and the rule-of-law mission, EULEX, have 
developed civil society, human resources capacity-building, minorities’ 
decentralization, the training of civilian administrators and promoted 
reconciliation among ethnic groups. The point here is not to tell that these 
technical mechanisms are not important or necessary, but to problematise 
why ‘political’ issues19 like the sovereign status and the possibility of self-
government have been addressed through a managerial process to improve 
the standards of Kosovo’s society. 
This chapter focuses on dominant international framings of post-conflict 
Kosovo to address this question. It is argued that both international policy-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Although	  it	  centres	  on	  the	  debates	  about	  the	  “status”	  of	  Kosovo,	  this	  chapter	  does	  not	  address	   the	   literature	   on	   recognition	   theory	   or	   discussions	   on	   international	   law	   (i.e.	  Ker-­‐Lindsay	   2011).	   Instead,	   it	   focuses	   on	   “status”	   as	   indicative	   of	   (non)granting	   self-­‐government	   to	   the	   local	   population.	   For	   a	   similar	   framing	   of	   the	   question	   on	   self-­‐government	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  societies,	  see	  Hughes	  and	  Pupavac	  (2005).	  16	  Council	   EU	   (2010);	   EULEX	   (2009).	   It	   is	   important	   to	   remark	   that	   the	   UN	   initial	  intention	   of	   transferring	   its	   ‘interim	   administrative	   responsibilities’	   to	   the	   ‘local	  institutions’	  and	   ‘facilitating	  a	  political	  process	  designed	  to	  determine	  Kosovo’s	   future	  status’	   (UNSC	  1999b:	  3–4)	   is,	  at	   least,	   in	   tension	  with	  today’s	  continuing	   international	  presence	  in	  Kosovo.	  	  17	  For	  example,	  for	  this	  argument	  see	  Knudsen	  (2006:	  160);	  Weller	  (2008:	  80–94).	  18	  I	  am	  not	  seeking	  to	  contradict	  the	  interpretation	  that	  international	  state-­‐builders	  had	  international	  and	  domestic	  pressures	  in	  the	  status	  negotiations,	  but	  to	  complete	  it	  with	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  international	  framing	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  Kosovo.	  19	  The	  UN	  recognised	  that	  these	  were	  political	  issues	  (UNSC	  1999a;	  1999c).	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makers and the critics of statebuilding20 have problematised Kosovo in a 
similar way. For them, the problem of transferring self-government is that 
either Kosovo-Serbs or Kosovo-Albanians could bring to fruition their 
“ethnic” desires to dominate the other group. This is what I will call here the 
“ethnic dilemma”: the fear of what would happen if democracy allows 
Kosovars to actualise their “ethnic” aspirations? 21  As a solution, 
international administrators and their critics are increasingly sharing a 
commitment to reduce the salience of ethnicity in order to achieve a more 
inclusive peace. The conclusion of the chapter is that the framing of Kosovo 
as an ethnic dispute legitimises both a permanent ambiguity regarding the 
status issue and additional administrative and technical efforts of institution 
building. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section explores the 
negotiations for the status of Kosovo that had to decide between two 
opposed principles: self-determination or state territorial unity. It then 
identifies the widespread assumption in the literature that the status of 
Kosovo has not been resolved due to strong international and domestic 
constraints. While I do not intend to contradict these views, my aim is to 
investigate the question of Kosovo’s self-government away from geopolitical 
or legal explanations. In order to do so, the second section analyses the 
critique of the statebuilding process. The critics signal that international 
administrators have failed to build intercommunal peace because they have 
institutionalised ethnicity, the most divisive category during the war. In 
particular, they focus on the UN decentralization policy that seeks to remedy 
the problems associated with nationalism and the intolerance to non-
majority communities. Their suggested alternatives indicate that efforts 
should be directed to diminish the salience of ethnicity. However, the third 
section demonstrates that international administrators are gradually seeking 
to de-emphasise ethnicity through a technical institution building endeavour 
that echoes the viewpoint of the academic critics. Finally, the last section 
acknowledges that policy-makers and their critics have very similar 
conclusions – a need to move away from the locals’ “ethnic” objectives. This 
chapter ends with an attempt to demystify the ethnic dilemma, which in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  There	  are	  many	  critics	  of	   the	   international	  administration	   in	  Kosovo.	  However,	   this	  chapter	   focuses	   on	   international	   scholars	  wanting	   to	   critically	   reappraise	   the	   current	  state-­‐building	  theory	  and	  practice	  (i.e.	  Devic	  2006;	  Franks	  and	  Richmond	  2008;	  Hehir	  2006,	  2007;	  Lehti	  2014;	  Simonsen	  2005;	  Popolo	  2011;	  Richmond	  2009b).	  21	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter,	  I	  use	  ‘dilemma’	  to	  denote	  the	  difficult	  choice	  between	  pursuing	  two	  objectives	  that	  seem	  mutually	  exclusive	  (Narten	  2009:	  255).	  In	  short,	  this	  is	   the	   dilemma	   faced	   by	   the	   international	   administrators:	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   more	  responsibilities	  to	  the	  locals	  cannot	  be	  granted	  unless	  there	  is	  an	  improvement	  of	  inter-­‐ethnic	   relations.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   episodes	   of	   violence	   against	   minorities	   have	  occurred	   precisely	   because	   questions	   of	   sovereignty	   have	   not	   been	   resolved	   (Hehir	  2007:	  254).	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having no possible terminus facilitates international interference and 
jeopardises the preferences of the Kosovars.  
 
 
Independence if there is tolerance towards the minorities 
 
The negotiations about the sovereign status of Kosovo were initially 
adjourned conveniently to prevent the destabilization of the Balkans and to 
avoid discussing the most traumatic discrepancy of the two participants in 
the war. 22  Belgrade and Pristina defended two fundamentally opposed 
positions: territorial sovereignty vs. self-determination.23  In March 2004, 
frustrated by the international immobility over the status resolution, 
extremist Kosovo-Albanians led an anti-Serb and anti-UN rioting that left 19 
dead, nearly 900 injured and destroyed homes, churches and monasteries.24 
In order to avoid another outburst of violence, one of the most influential 
think tanks in the Balkans, the International Crisis Group (ICG), advised 
internationals and local politicians to combat ‘extremist and intolerant 
pathologies’ and to ‘renovate the politically, economically and 
psychologically damaged Albanian society’. 25  Additionally, it explicitly 
suggested as a policy recommendation that ‘it would be wrong to reward the 
violence of March 17-18 by moving straight into negotiations on final 
status’.26 For the ICG, the solution resided in working on an inter-ethnic 
dialogue ‘on the means of coexistence, taking the Council of Europe 
decentralization plan as a starting point’.27  
International institutions drew similar conclusions from these tragic 
events. For UNMIK, the EU and the Government of Serbia decentralization 
and the accommodation of the Serb community in Kosovo became the 
foremost priority and almost a non-negotiable option.28 From Kai Eide and 
Martti Ahtisaari to the present EULEX approach, the framework proposed 
for the internal accommodation of Kosovo was the establishment of a model 
of decentralization to support the non-majority communities.29 Even if the 
conversations on the status initiated in October 2005, the strategy to navigate 
between two unbridgeable aspirations (Kosovo: province of Serbia or 
independent state), as Weller observes, was to discuss the internal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Weller	  (2008:	  17).	  23	  ICG	  (2004);	  UNSC	  (2005).	  24	  ICG	  (2004).	  25	  ICG	  (2004:	  32).	  26	  ICG	  (2004:	  42).	  27	  ICG	  (2004:	  iii).	  28	  Kallaba	  (2010:	  17).	  29	  Kallaba	  (2010:	  21);	  ICG	  (2007,	  2009).	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decentralization of Kosovo rather than its final status. 30 That is, Kosovo-
Albanians had to give concessions relating to minority rights and power 
sharing, on the hope that the status issue would be determined in their 
favour. The protection of minorities and the assurance of their participation 
became the condition for the gradual transference of assets to the Kosovars.31  
In 2007, after two years of negotiations in which the parties ‘reaffirmed 
their categorical, fundamentally opposed positions’ and taking into account 
Kosovo’s ‘recent history’ and ‘realities of today’, the UN Special Envoy for 
future status process, Martti Ahtisaari, recommended that ‘the only viable 
option for Kosovo is independence, to be supervised by an initial period by 
the international community’. 32  Together with this option, his 
Comprehensive proposal for the Status Settlement was committed to a 
defense of Kosovo’s ‘multi-ethnic society’ and ‘the promotion and protection 
of the rights and contributions of all its Communities and their members’.33 
In fact, the first seven articles referred in some way or another to the 
protection of non-majority communities, thus emphasizing ‘community 
rights’, ‘reconciliation’, ‘decentralization’ and the protection of ‘religious and 
cultural heritage’ and the ‘internally displaced persons’.34 In an effort to 
ensure the participation of all the inhabitants in Kosovo, the plan was to 
devolve territorial autonomy to Serb-dominated municipalities and allow 
them to get connected with Serbia without interference from the central state 
unit.35  
When the Assembly of Kosovo declared the independence of Kosovo 
from Serbia on February 17, 2008, it adopted a Constitution with strong 
protection for communities and their members following the 
recommendations of the UN Special Envoy. 36  While the declaration of 
independence could be seen as the definitive step in the process, the EU 
launched the EULEX mission to extend the international presence and 
dominion over Kosovo’s statebuilding process.37 In 2011, Kosovo and Serbia 
began further EU-facilitated negotiations – ‘without prejudice to positions on 
status’ – in order to normalise relations and prepare the possibility of access 
to the EU.38 In short, what this brief analysis tells is that the violence and 
tensions between Kosovars were interpreted by international state-builders 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Weller	  (2008:	  34–38).	  31	  UNSC	  (2007c).	  32	  UNSC	  (2007c:	  2).	  33	  UNSC	  (2007c:	  2).	  34	  UNSC	  (2007c:	  2–5).	  35	  UNSC	  (2007b:	  Art.	  6	  and	  10).	  36	  UNSC	  (2007b:	  Art.	  57).	  37	  Weller	  (2008:	  74).	  38	  ICG	  (2013:	  2).	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as motives for extending international interference, rather than as signs to 
resolve the status (which was the cause of the tensions). 
The existing literature usually emphasises both domestic obstacles – 
mainly the polarised starting points of Pristina and Belgrade – as well as a 
divided international community to explain the slow progress in regard to 
the decision on Kosovo’s sovereignty. For example, focusing specifically on 
the failure to decide on the status before 2008, Weller concludes that Kosovo 
was the most ‘difficult and dangerous aspect of the Yugoslav crisis’ because 
neither Belgrade nor Pristina were willing to adjust their initial opinions. He 
also attributes the lack of success in the conversations to the international 
disagreement on the question: within the Contact Group and the five 
permanent members of the Security Council – the UK, the US and France 
favouring independence and Russia and China supporting Serbia’s 
territorial unity – and within Europe – with 5 members having not 
recognised Kosovo yet.39 These diplomatic divisions can also give account to 
the fact that since 2008 EULEX operates under a status neutral framework 
with limited capabilities and an ambiguous mandate.40 After the declaration 
of independence, the situation has not become clearer. Since international 
law stands in a permanent contradiction – while some scholars express 
doubts about Kosovo’s right to self-determination,41 the International Court 
of Justice Tribunal declared that its independence did not violate the 
principles of general international law42 – power politics seem to reign over 
any procedure.43 One commentator has explained Kosovo’s failure to achieve 
wider recognition by looking at Russia’s hard-liner position, justified by its 
confrontational attitude versus NATO, its Slavic solidarity and the 
willingness to avoid setting a precedent.44 Another analyst has argued that, 
to this day, official discrepancies even among states that initially recognised 
Kosovo as an independent state continue to block its sovereignty.45  
While the “geopolitical” and “diplomatic” explanations of the process are 
somewhat accurate, these are very often incomplete. In order to contribute to 
this debate I will focus the attention to the taken-for-granted assumptions 
embedded in the framings of post-conflict Kosovo. This reading starts by re-
engaging with the interpretation of the riots of March 2004. What it is 
intriguing is that the international mission, as well as the ICG, interpreted 
the episodes of violence as a psychological or social malaise that had to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Weller	  (2008:	  80–94).	  40	  Papadimitriou	  and	  Petrov	  (2012:	  758);	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treated therapeutically,46 rather than as the consequence of a disallowed 
political desire, such as the request to become independent from Serbia.47 
Rather than taking a decision over the status or let the people in Kosovo 
decide over their sovereignty, for example, the efforts were placed into 
‘capacity-building’ and the organization of communities in separated 
municipalities. 48  That is, while the literature partially responds to the 
hesitancy to define Kosovo’s final status, it does not focus on why this 
political question has been addressed through a technical and managerial 
statebuilding process that seeks to build a tolerant multi-ethnic society in 
which the status resolution is no longer relevant.49 The rest of the chapter 
thus addresses this question, which has been overlooked in the literature, by 
focusing on the persistence of an “ethnic dilemma” within international 
framings of post-conflict Kosovo. The next section commences with an 
analysis of the critics of statebuilding, who have identified the failure of 
building intercommunal peace in the policies that favoured ethnic 
identifications. 
 
 
The international critique of Kosovo’s statebuilding50 
 
From all the policies, strategies or plans for international statebuilding in 
Kosovo, the one that has generated the biggest controversy in the literature 
is the decentralization policy brought in by the UN Special Envoy, Marthi 
Ahtisaari.51 The criticisms focus mostly on two problematic and interrelated 
aspects: territory and ethnicity. Firstly, the critics sustain that the territorial 
mapping of the Ahtisaari Plan fails to deliver on its promise of promoting a 
diverse society. For Kallaba, ‘the Comprehensive Proposal for Status 
Settlement presents the irony of being in contradiction with its own goals of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  ICG	  (2004:	  32–36).	  47	  Hughes	  and	  Pupavac	  (2005:	  874).	  48	  Hehir	  (2007:	  249).	  49	  EULEX	   (2009);	   UNSC	   (2007c).	   When	   analysing	   the	   shifting	   discourses	   of	   state-­‐building,	  David	  Chandler	  placed	  a	  similar	  question:	  ‘What	  is	  it	  that	  leads	  Western	  states	  and	  international	   institutions	  to	  reinterpret	  economic,	  social	  and	  political	  problems	  in	  other	   parts	   of	   the	   world	   as	   questions	   which	   are	   largely	   amenable	   to	   technical	  administrative	   solutions?	  How	   can	   it	   be	   that	   today	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   answer	   to	   every	  problem	   from	   security	   threats	   to	   human	   rights	   to	   development	   is	   now	   that	   of	   global	  governance	  and	  the	  export	  of	  external	  advisors	  and	  capacity	  builders?’	  (2006:	  7).	  50	  While	  there	  is	  a	  huge	  body	  of	  domestic	  (and	  regional)	  critiques	  of	  Ahtisaari’s	  policies,	  this	   chapter	   mainly	   focuses	   on	   the	   international	   critics	   within	   the	   discipline	   of	  international	  relations.	  See	  fn.	  20.	  51	  A	   form	   of	   local	   decentralisation	   was	   already	   in	   place	   at	   least	   since	   2002	   (CoEDM	  2003).	   But	   the	   point	   to	   make	   here	   is	   that	   it	   adopted	   a	   stronger	   determinism	   after	  Ahtisaari’s	  recommendations.	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building a multi-ethnic democratic cohesive state in Kosovo’ because ‘this 
model of decentralization may deepen further internal territorial divisions’ 
and ‘lead to an uncontrolled partition’.52 That is, in the name of multi-
ethnicity, the solution projected by Ahtisaari resembles the “partition” 
option proposed by those who think of reconciliation as impossible and who 
would even do land-swaps or transfers of population to solve the crisis in 
Kosovo.53  While it is only a ‘de facto partition’ – avoiding the creation of two 
states – Ahtisaari’s Plan seems to perpetuate the conflict because it ‘has 
ensured the electoral success of nationalist parties and policies […] creating a 
climate of extreme insecurity for ethnic minorities residing in the ‘wrong’ 
territory’. 54  Even if the counter-argument provided by UNMIK and its 
supporters is that they only provided rights to an already segregated 
society55 or that decentralization is the pragmatic option of last-resort,56 the 
map of Kosovo split into ethnic municipalities also dissatisfies the local 
population. For the Kosovo-Albanian majority, this policy has fomented 
ethnic-division, curtailed the minorities’ integration and it has usurped the 
sovereignty of the territory because Belgrade controls the Serb 
municipalities.57 For the non-majority Kosovo-Serbs, decentralization is the 
price to pay for losing Serbia.58  
Secondly, the international critics concur that the territorial mechanisms 
of the Ahtisaari plan is in the end a problem of reinforcing ethnicity, the most 
contentious identification of the war. Of course nobody ignores the fact that 
Kosovo was already divided before UNMIK was launched. Yet the critics 
suggest that UNMIK’s institutionalization of ethnicity as the only valid 
political category has made intercommunal peace impossible. This is mainly 
because, by relying upon ethnic homogeneous groups (namely ‘groupism’),59 
internationals administrators have strengthened the ethnic division and 
undermined communal projects or hybrid forms of identification.60 As Devic 
observes, ethno-multiculturalism ‘neglects the local realities that preceded 
the violence and alternative practices of inter-ethnic relations’.61  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Kallaba	  (2010:	  6–7).	  53 	  Kaufmann	   (1996);	   Economides,	   Ker-­‐Lindsay	   and	   Papadimitriou	   (2010:	   112);	  Mearsheimer	  (2000).	  54	  Jenne	  (2009:	  285).	  55	  Jolyon	  Naegele,	  Head	  of	  Political	  Affairs	  UNMIK,	  interview	  with	  the	  author	  in	  Pristina,	  November	  6,	  2013.	  56	  ICG	  (2007)	  57	  McKinna	  (2012b:	  14);	  Vetëvendosje	  (2012).	  58	  Ivanji	  (2007).	  59	  Brubaker	  (2004:	  35).	  60	  Constantinou	  (2007);	  Hehir	  (2006:	  205–207).	  61	  Devic	  (2006:	  268).	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Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the essentialism of aligning 
ethnicity and territory has strengthened the probability of ‘apartheid politics’ 
and fuelled the ‘nationalist imaginary’. 62  That is, the critics argue that 
Ahtisaari’s framework is perilous not only because it favours the nationalist 
agenda to create homogenous territories visible during the war, 63  but 
because some nationalist local elites or ethnic-entrepreneurs have utilised the 
decentralization process and other “ethnic” institutions for their own 
strategic and exclusivist purposes: 
‘Liberal peace-building, for all of its claims of top-down governance 
and institutionalization, can be co-opted by those it is being applied to 
who may utilise even the very limited agency they may have for 
objectives that may fit uncomfortably with the pluralism that is at the 
center of the international community’s desire for a liberal peace’.64 
For the critics, there is a contradiction between the multi-ethnic goal and the 
means to realise it, as the strategy of designing an ethnic map and promoting 
ethnic institutions has been ‘play[ed]’ by the locals to achieve their 
‘ethnicised objectives’.65 In this regard, Franks and Richmond go as far as to 
blame democracy for the crisis in Kosovo: ‘in acting to develop democratic 
principles and accountability, UNMIK effectively has reinforced the claim of 
the Kosovo Albanians for a separate state within which to locate democratic 
institutions’. This is because, again, in a ‘highly politicised environment’, 
institutions are used or ‘monopolised’ to serve the goal of an ethnic-Albanian 
dominated state.66 In similar lines Devic argues that the success of ethnic 
entrepreneurs in Kosovo has depended on the international tendency to 
support democracy.67 Although in most of the critiques this is developed 
implicitly, it is the fear of democracy – that is, the risk that in post-war 
elections or representative institutions the population would continue to 
choose violent or nationalist options – that is considered to be the 
fundamental difficulty to be corrected.68 
True, not all the commentators have this open “aversion” to democracy. 
Hehir, for example, seems to argue the opposite since he initially criticises 
UNMIK’s rule over the population and its willingness to ‘re-educate the 
people of Kosovo in western democratic ways’ in a system where the 
international administration is unaccountable and the status disagreement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  For	  this	  point	  made	  in	  the	  context	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  Bosnia,	  see	  Campbell	  (1999,	  405).	  63	  IICK	  (2000:	  33–67).	  64	  Franks	  and	  Richmond	  (2008:	  82).	  65	  Franks	  and	  Richmond	  (2008:	  90).	  66	  Franks	  and	  Richmond	  (2008:	  91–94).	  67	  Devic	  (2006:	  269).	  68	  For	   instance,	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   we	   have	   already	   seen	   this	   aversion	   toward	  democracy	  (Brancati	  and	  Snyder	  2013;	  Donais	  2009a:	  13;	  Paris	  2004,	  235).	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cannot be disentangled.69 However, there is a difficult question that Hehir 
astutely evades: what if Kosovars democratically still choose the so-called 
‘ethnicised objectives’? Hehir identifies the problem in Kosovo in the ‘ethnic 
polarization’, which is the product of ‘the insecurity situation’, the politicians 
who ‘exploit ethnicity and foment fear of ‘the other’’ and UNMIK’s adoption 
of the ‘existing ethnic categorizations as legitimate political cleavages’.70 So, 
it is the preferences of the local actors – even if these are influenced by 
nationalist leaders or fatally aggravated by UNMIK’s policies – which 
become the problem in need of a solution. Similar to Franks and Richmond, 
Hehir is suspicious of the demands or interests of the Kosovars after 
ethnicity has been cemented in the political system and general public in 
Kosovo. The underlying assumption is that “ethnic” thinking betrays 
democratic values or that democracy leads to menacing scenarios if 
participants adamantly think in ethnic categories.71  
What is the alternative to statebuilding in Kosovo? The critics understand 
ethnicity and any other form of identification to be fluid and heterogeneous, 
unsuitable for organizing it within enclaves. Influentially, Roger Brubaker 
recommends ‘shifting attention from groups to groupness, and treating 
groupness as variable and contingent rather than fixed and given’,72 as a way 
of undermining the divisive and potentially violent categories of two clear-
cut ethnic groups. Following similar views on ethnicity,73 most critics argue 
that peace and reconciliation reside in de-emphasizing ethnicity and 
reducing its salience as the only meaningful feature of Kosovar society.74 
This would mean to pursue an opposite strategy to UNMIK’s over-
ethnicised approach and therefore to contest the nationalistic and 
reductionist views that clashed during the war. As Simonsen holds:  
Ethnic divisions must be addressed, but attempts should be made to 
reduce their salience. This may be achieved through the creation of 
institutions that, while providing for proportional ethnic representation 
in the immediate post-conflict setting, do not fixate the accentuation on 
ethnicity in politics or counteract achievements towards a de-
ethnicization in other sectors of society. Moreover, each institution 
should ideally contribute towards a long-term de-ethnicization of 
politics, by encouraging contacts and trust-building across ethnic 
boundaries.75  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Hehir	  (2006:	  203).	  70	  Hehir	  (2006:	  209–210).	  71	  Lehning	  (1998:	  8–10).	  72	  Brubaker	  (2004:	  38).	  73	  While	   most	   of	   the	   critics	   have	   a	   ‘constructivist’	   notion	   of	   ethnicity,	   they	   accuse	  international	  state-­‐builders	  of	  having	  a	  ‘primordialist’	  view	  (Campbell	  1998:	  88–92).	  74	  Hehir	  (2006:	  207);	  Simonsen	  (2005:	  306).	  75	  Simonsen	  (2005:	  298).	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Most of the alternatives call for overcoming the ethnic divide by 
destabilizing ethnicity or the notion of two opposed groups. The proposals 
vary, but they maintain a similar rationale. For example, some recommend 
the building of ‘trans-ethnic’ or ‘cross-decentralised’ institutions76 or ‘policies 
of reintegration’ to reverse the ethnic cleansing that occurred during the 
conflict and its aftermath.77 Others strive for a more bottom-up-oriented 
approach, ‘dealing with the issues of everyday life’, in order to challenge the 
mono-ethnic versions of peace78 or to open-up ‘venues for alternative or 
oppositional political mobilization’. 79  Popolo uses a complex epistemic 
perspective to confront both the narratives of the war and international 
policy frameworks and ends up defending new ways of thinking, more 
intuitive, speculative and contingent, in order to reinvent Kosovo.80 
In sum, any emancipatory alternative, as put forward in academic circles, 
resides in the pluralization – rather than institutionalization – of the 
identities of the Kosovars. In other words, the resolution resides in 
challenging UNMIK’s ‘apartheid cartography’ and ‘remapping’ Kosovo – 
acknowledging that any other map would also have to be problematised – 
by ‘foster[ing] the pluralization of the possibilities of being on the same 
territory’.81 After reading the critics and their proposals to imagine a ‘new’ 
Kosovo, it is time to rethink the international administrators’ approach, 
which is evolving along the same lines. The next section argues that policy-
makers, most notoriously since 2008, are progressively adopting a strategy of 
pluralizing the ethnic divide. 
 
 
International statebuilders and their critics: Two sides of the same coin 
 
In 2008 Sherrill Stroschein wrote an article to criticise territorially divided 
and hierarchically administered states for their incapacity to deal with 
complex post-conflict situations and divided societies. After discarding 
consociationalist alternatives, she proposed a ‘dispersed control model’ 
based on ‘non-territorial autonomy and functional governance’ to transcend 
the shortcomings of traditional Weberian state models.82 Curiously, her case 
study to defend her ‘creative design for states that move beyond territory 
and hierarchy’ was Kosovo and, in particular, the Ahtisaari 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Monteux	  (2006:	  180).	  77	  Jenne	  (2009:	  286).	  78	  Franks	  and	  Richmond	  (2008:	  98)	  79	  Devic	  (2006:	  270).	  80	  Popolo	  (2011).	  81	  Campbell	  (1999:	  430).	  82	  Stroschein	  (2008:	  660–661).	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recommendations adopted in the Constitution. 83  Exalting Ahtisaari, 
Stroschein defends the ambivalent formula of providing representation to 
minorities in the Parliament with reserved quotas and yet, at the same time, 
impeding them to have veto on majority decisions. Likewise, with regard to 
decentralization she celebrates that, on the one hand, there are delegated 
competences to municipalities and even the option of cross-border 
cooperation to help minorities; and, on the other hand, there is an explicit 
denial of territorial autonomy to avoid division and potential secession.84 
In short, it is the ‘dispersed’, ‘complex’ and ‘non-territorial’ institutional 
setting of Ahtisaari’s plan that is adequate for the governance of a ‘complex 
society’ like Kosovo.85 I have not chosen to examine Stroschein’s article 
because she defends UNMIK ambiguous approach, nor because she admits 
that there have been some productive results, as opposed to the other critics 
discussed earlier. She is relevant for this chapter because her analysis 
questions the notion that the international administrative mission in Kosovo 
has a deterministically thin and reductionist framework that aligns territory 
and ethnicity and that reproduces ethnic differences. The study of Stroschein 
thus signposts a possible communion between the critics who propose a 
non-territorial arrangement to avoid reinforcing the ethnic divide and the 
innovative institutional setting proposed by Ahtisaari. In other words, if 
Stroschein analysis of the ambivalent formula presented by UNMIK is 
somewhat accurate, then the demands for de-emphasizing ethnicity made by 
the critics are very similar to the intentions of international policy-makers. In 
order to explore further this initial observation, it is convenient to look more 
carefully at the most contemporary developments of statebuilding in 
Kosovo. 
EULEX, the EU’s largest crisis management operation, replaced UNMIK 
and initiated its full capabilities on December 9, 2008. The aim of the mission 
was the following: 
Assist Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement 
agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability and 
in further developing and strengthening an independent multi-ethnic 
justice system and multi-ethnic police and customs service, ensuring 
that these institutions are free from political interference and adhering 
to internationally recognised standards and European best practices.86  
From its initial statement, EULEX has expunged ‘multi-ethnicity’ from the 
goals of the mission. Perhaps more precisely, EULEX focuses on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Stroschein	  (2008:	  655).	  84	  Stroschein	   (2008:	   662).	   Wolff	   also	   classifies	   the	   institutional	   design	   of	   Kosovo	   as	  different	   from	   the	   clearly	   demarcated	   territories	   that	   exist	   in	   Bosnia,	   Sudan	   or	   Iraq	  (2009:	  33).	  85	  Stroschein	  (2008:	  665).	  86	  Council	  of	  the	  EU	  (2008:	  Article	  2).	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promotion of multi-ethnicity at the Rule of Law institutions, but it refuses to 
explicitly settle goals about multi-ethnicity at the societal level.87 Of course 
that EULEX ambitions are in accordance with multi-ethnic promises – it 
maintains the framework of the UN Resolution 1244 which explicitly aims 
for building a plural society – but its strategy reveals a shift in its means to 
achieve them.88 
For example, in all the EULEX annual reports, ‘multi-ethnicity’ simply 
appears in relation to the police, the judiciary or the customs system, as a 
desirable standard to be accomplished only at the level of these institutions.89 
For instance, the purpose of reaching ‘ethnical balance among the judges’ in 
the divided city of Mitrovica90 or creating a ‘multi-ethnic crowd and riot 
control unit’91 is to deal with ‘ethnically motivated crimes’.92 At the core of 
this strategy is the desire to build institutions ‘freed from political 
interference’. 93  Hence, EULEX develops technical measures in order to 
prevent or censure cases of ethnic violence. As if they had learnt from the 
critics’ plea, 94  international administrators explicitly aim at separating 
ethnicity from politics through a careful restructuring of Kosovo’s 
institutions. In order to avoid the risk that ethnicity becomes the only 
meaningful category in the political system, the EULEX reports have 
relocated ethnicity and, for example, today setting up a multi-ethnic 
judiciary is as important as abiding it with the principles of gender 
equality.95 It seems that ethnicity has run out of steam with the intention to 
foster a diverse society. It has even ceased to be the priority: ‘corruption and 
organised crime appears as more urgent than dealing with war-related 
crimes or interethnic reconciliation’.96  
The key to understand the EULEX framework is to see that it focuses 
primarily on institutions and administrative adjustments in order to improve 
local ownership and accountability. 97  Simultaneously, it avoids the 
conundrum of addressing political – possibly divisive and conflictive – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  EULEX	  (2009:	  133).	  88	  The	   shift	   could	   be	   expressed	   in	   these	   terms:	   from	   governing	   a	  multi-­‐ethnic	   society	  (UNMIK),	   in	   which	   there	   is	   decentralisation,	   to	   the	   multi-­‐ethnic	   administration	   of	  society	   (EULEX)	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   blurring	   the	   divisive	   lines	   of	   society	   rather	   than	  reinforcing	   them.	   I	   would	   like	   to	   thank	   Jessica	   Schmidt	   for	   her	   valuable	   help	   in	  discussing	  this	  point.	  89	  EULEX	  (2009,	  2010,	  2011,	  2012).	  90	  EULEX	  (2010:	  32).	  91	  EULEX	  (2012:	  23).	  92	  EULEX	  (2009:	  26).	  93	  EULEX	  (2009:	  7).	  94	  Devic	  (2006);	  Hehir	  (2007);	  Monteux	  (2006).	  95	  EULEX	  (2012:	  32).	  96	  EULEX	  (2009:	  18).	  97	  Greiçevci	  (2012:	  298).	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affairs and has adopted ‘a commitment to cultural sensitivity in order to 
avoid UNMIK’s previous mistakes of alienating considerable parts of the 
local population’.98 So, instead of letting people choose democratically and 
potentially fulfil their nationalistic demands, EULEX works through a 
careful and sensitive ‘institutionalization’ of Kosovo, as critics have 
forcefully recommended.99 Arguably, Kosovo’s statebuilding project can be 
read in these terms at least since the implementation of ‘standards before 
status’ policy.100 Under UNMIK rule, this measure aimed at making progress 
in the social sphere – the functioning of institutions, rule of law, minority 
rights, freedom of movement, economy, property rights, relations with 
Belgrade and improving the Kosovo Protection Corps – and was a sine qua 
non condition to the negotiation of status. 
It appears to be that EULEX has pushed the ‘institutionalization’ strategy 
and avoided decisive steps toward granting self-government to the Kosovars 
beyond UNMIK’s earlier intentions. Indeed, even if it was the UN Envoy 
Ahtisaari who proposed substituting the UN mandate for a EU Mission, 
EULEX does not recognise the Constitution of Kosovo – designed in 
accordance with Ahtisaari’s recommendations. Instead, it has diminished all 
the progress made during the negotiations for status and has given a step 
back.101 Now it operates under the status-neutral framework settled by the 
UN in 1999.102  Of course, I am not contesting the fact that the status issue 
contained a delicate geopolitical impasse for the EU because some member 
states have not accepted the independence of Kosovo and there were specific 
pressures from Russia and Serbia.103  
Nonetheless EULEX also justifies that it is ‘status-neutral’ because it is 
‘technical in nature’.104 According to some supporters, it is the status-neutral 
and non-political character of the mission that allows EULEX to mediate 
between the opposed views of Serbs and Albanians. For example, Cadier 
focuses on EULEX ‘constructive ambiguity’ to explain the success in building 
sustainable institutions.105 Vrbetic, who also tells that ‘ambiguity’ can be 
positive to solve differences among groups, goes a step further to argue that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Schwandner-­‐Sievers	  (2013:	  108).	  99	  Paris	   (2004).	   At	   this	   point	   of	   the	   argument,	   a	   caveat	   is	   important.	   The	   ‘critics’	   of	  Kosovo’s	   state-­‐building	   I	   am	   referring	   to	   are	   those	   analysed	   in	   the	   previous	   section.	  These	  contest	  the	  ‘ethnicization	  of	  Kosovo’	  and	  a	  ‘top-­‐down’	  and	  ‘reductionist’	  approach	  allegedly	   conducted	   by	   international	   administrators.	   From	   another	   perspective	   there	  are	   other	   critics	   who,	   for	   example,	   assert	   that	   EULEX	   has	   failed	   for	   not	   being	  interventionist	  enough	  (i.e.	  Radin	  2014:	  190–191).	  100	  UNSC	  (2004).	  101	  Greiçevci	  (2012:	  294).	  102	  Grevi	  (2009:	  359).	  103	  Greiçevci	  (2012:	  293);	  Grevi	  (2009:	  358-­‐359);	  Papadimitriou	  and	  Petrov	  (2012).	  	  104	  Balkaninsight	  (2008).	  105	  Cadier	  (2011:	  7).	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the problem has been the unilateral declaration of independence of 2008, 
rather than the international reluctance to decide on status.106 EULEX avoids 
any final decision on sovereignty and therefore it is able to effectively advise 
and monitor Kosovo’s institutions. The solution for the crisis is that Kosovo 
will never be Kosovo or Serbia. This was already decided in 2005 when the 
International Commission on the Balkans foresaw that the last stage of 
Kosovo’s transition to independence would be ‘the absorption of Kosovo 
into the EU and its adoption of shared sovereignty’.107 So, like the rest of the 
states in the Balkans, Kosovo might have a European future where, as Hehir 
puts it, ‘the desire for outright independence will evaporate’.108  
Certainly, the international institutions eager to ‘evaporate the desires’ of 
the Kosovars resembles the critics’ call for pluralizing the identities of the 
people in Kosovo.109 The horizon of the EU represents a future in which 
nationalist discourses about ethnicity would be transcended. Rather than 
reproducing the apartheid discourse of nationalists, aligning territory and 
ethnicity,110 the EU aims at making questions about territory, status or 
citizenship irrelevant. In fact, EULEX has already started to deconstruct 
territorial arrangements and dichotomous ethnic identifications. For 
example, in none of its annual reports, EULEX mentions ‘ethnic-Albanians’ 
or ‘ethnic-Serbs’ and it refers to ‘border’ or ‘boundaries’ of Kosovo 
indistinctively.111  
In conclusion, what this section presents is that international state-
builders have increasingly adopted managerial strategies and maintained an 
ambiguous opinion over the status to de-emphasise ethnicity and overcome 
polarised political positions and thus be more respectful with the aim of 
pluralism. However, despite the signs that indicate that state-builders share 
similar sensitivities with their critics,112 one might be tempted to ask: why do 
scholars still manage to criticise and point to the failures of building 
intercommunal peace in Kosovo? The answer to this question ushers us to 
address what I call here the “ethnic dilemma”. I will argue that precisely 
because Kosovars are adamant to pursue “ethnic” agendas, any international 
program or policy seems to reinforce ethnicity. Even if there is some 
progress of coexistence or tolerance among groups in Kosovo, every episode 
of violence signals that there are still enormous challenges lying ahead.113 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  Vrbetic	  (2013:	  309-­‐310).	  107	  International	  Commission	  on	  the	  Balkans	  (2005:	  23).	  108	  Hehir	  (2007:	  252).	  109	  Devic	  (2006);	  Franks	  and	  Richmond	  (2008);	  Popolo	  (2011).	  110	  Campbell	  (1999).	  111	  EULEX	  (2009,	  2010,	  2011,	  2012).	  112	  Chandler	  (2010c:	  23).	  113	  Clark	  (2014:	  543).	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Regardless of whether peace is pursued by the ethos of pluralization,114 
exploring the everyday alternatives of the locals115 or deconstructing the 
Kosovars nationalist demands within the EU framework, as EULEX 
proposes, any effort to build peace appears to be incomplete. The aim of de-
emphasising ethnicity to appreciate diversity has an undefined end. 
 
 
Rethinking the ethnic dilemma 
 
After investigating the possible communion between the international 
administrators and their (non)critics, it is time to address again the status 
question and understand why it has been addressed by the means of a 
technical approach. In this regard, Hehir disentangles a crucial quandary at 
the core of the statebuilding process: 
There can be no increase in political independence for the local 
institutions unless there is a demonstrable reduction in inter-ethnic 
tension yet while the Kosovo Albanians lack real power they become 
increasingly frustrated and periodically lash out at both the 
international presence and the Serb minority thereby making the 
granting of further competencies less likely. This quandary has 
complicated all international efforts to resolve the status issue.116  
From the international perspective, the locals are not free to make decisions 
until there is an improvement in the tolerance of minorities. In opposition, 
from the local perspective, the status settlement is non-negotiable and 
violence has been periodically applied against the minorities due to the 
frustration with the non-resolution of Kosovo’s status. However, perhaps 
because internationals hold sway over the process, the difficulty that Hehir 
presents has been addressed according to the international framing: the 
transfer of institutions to the locals has been deferred as a means to prevent 
further ethnic confrontations. That is, as I have demonstrated in the previous 
sections, rather than understanding the violence in Kosovo as the 
consequence of a political impasse in need of some sort of compromise (this 
would be the local framing), it has been interpreted as a sign of 
psychological and social malaise to be cured with further external 
intervention and technical adjustments.117 The suspension of democracy and 
the ambivalence over the status therefore is justified by an ever-present 
implicit dilemma: what if Kosovars democratically choose the so-called 
“ethnic” objectives? In other words, what if an independent Kosovo becomes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  For	  example,	  see	  Connolly	  (1995);	  Campbell	  and	  Schoolman	  (2008).	  115	  For	  instance,	  Devic	  (2006);	  Franks	  and	  Richmond	  (2008).	  116	  Hehir	  (2007:	  254).	  117	  ICG	  (2004).	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an Albanian state in which some groups are expelled or even killed? This 
question prevents the locals from taking the lead and legitimises the 
continuous international involvement in the politics of Kosovo. 
It is at this point of the argument when it is necessary to recall the 
demands of self-determination introduced at the beginning of the chapter 
that are defended by the majority of the Kosovars and recently promoted by 
Vetëvendosje. Not wishing to advocate the pro-independence agenda, I use 
the claims for self-governance here to reflect upon the international 
dominant framings about peace in Kosovo. In this regard, in an interview I 
conducted, Albin Kurti, leader of Vetëvendosje, opposed the accusations of 
‘ethnic-politics’ very often identified in representations of Kosovo: 
Under Tito’s rule, we were nations or nationalities. We became ethnic 
especially after episodes of violence, after the ethnic cleansing of the 
1990s. Now, every political desire or position is framed by 
internationals as ethnic, as if we could not think independently from 
our ethnicity.118 
Kurti highlights that ethnicity is the lens through which international 
administrators recognise the politics of Kosovo. 119  Indeed, as analysed 
earlier, both international policy-makers and the critics of statebuilding 
understand that Kosovars have a problem across their ethnic lines and the 
solution therefore happens to be to reduce their salience. Possibly, when 
Kurti speaks the reader raises an eyebrow.120 However, for the purpose of 
analytical discussion, let’s introduce a caveat in the narration and take the 
assertions of self-determination in Kosovo seriously. It is possible 
thenceforth to think of Kosovars as people, the majority of who wish self-
government and sovereignty over their future, rather than ethnic beings with 
ethnic aspirations. The point, of course, is not to deny that ethnic identities 
are ‘experienced’ or ‘real’ in Kosovo, but to highlight that international 
framings might have ‘exaggerate[d] the durability of such identities’ in 
relation to the contemporary political preferences of the Kosovars.121 Or to 
notice that, as anthropologists suggest also in the case of Kosovo, culture is 
not a causal explanation of nationalist factors.122 In other words, this is to 
recognise that perhaps ethnicity is an internationally led framing of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  Author’s	  interview	  with	  Albin	  Kurti,	  Pristina.	  November	  8,	  2013.	  119	  Kurti	  (2011:	  91).	  120	  Perhaps,	  more	  scientifically,	  one	  could	  also	  relate	  Kurti’s	  claim	  with	  interpretations	  of	  ethnicity	  as	  an	  historical	  production	  or	  creation	  	  (Campbell	  1998,	  92;	  Comaroff	  1991,	  667),	   even	   if	   he	   uses	   this	   take	   on	   ethnicity	   to	   justify	   his	   political	   preferences	   for	  statehood.	  121	  See	  Comaroff	  (1991:	  669).	  122	  Schwandner-­‐Sievers	  (2013:	  109).	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problem, rather than an existing framing hold by the Kosovars.123 In this 
sense, the disagreements between Kosovo-Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians 
could be reinterpreted as two competing political visions of statehood 
(potentially universal), rather than a ‘pathological’ ethnic dispute 
(irremediably particularistic).124  
Nevertheless, even if one frames Kosovo as demos, rather than ethnos,125 
how would one distinguish between legitimate national causes from 
dangerous ones? Alain Finkielkraut, while defending the self-determination 
of Croatia in 1992, replied to the question: 
Democracy is precisely the criterion. Nationalism’s destructive force 
should not make us lose sight of the fact that a nation is also the 
framework in which the experience of democracy has been able to 
thrive. Since the mode of the city state no longer holds and that of 
empire is undemocratic, the nation — until this can be disproved — 
and only the nation allows for full participation in political life. Don’t 
fear the nations!126  
Finkielkraut does not say here that any national cause, and Kosovo in 
particular, faces the challenge of dealing with divergences from non-majority 
groups and the appearance of anti-democratic nationalisms. This is an 
anxiety that is present in any other democratic state as well – and this needs 
to be constantly interrogated, as Clark, for example, does in the context of 
Kosovo.127 However, what is important to see is that Finkielkraut’s defence 
of ‘the people’ and ‘the democratic nation’ is anathema to the contemporary 
framings of Kosovo as an ethnic conflict. Indeed, it is possible that by 
looking at Kosovo’s statebuilding through Finkielkraut’s lens, one could 
undo the “ethnic dilemma”. That is, the dilemma of “what if they choose 
ethnicised preferences or what if they choose to create an ethnic exclusivist 
state” is very likely to be the result of not framing Kosovo within a national-
democratic framework: as people who discuss and disagree and whose 
majority today want to be independent from Serbia. 
The purpose of introducing this caveat, though, is not to make any 
empirical statement about the resolution of Kosovo’s status, for example. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  This	   point	   is	   important	   at	   least	   to	  make	   the	   observation	   that	   while	   the	   literature	  justifies	   the	   position	   of	   Russia,	   the	   EU	   or	   the	   US	   regarding	   the	   status	   of	   Kosovo	   in	  geopolitical	  terms,	  it	  explains	  Kosovo	  as	  an	  ethnic	  dispute.	  124	  For	   instance,	   the	  Bosnian	  author	  Miljenko	   Jergovic	   explains	   the	   ‘pathologization	  of	  the	   Balkan	  wars	   in	   his	   account	   of	   a	   hero	  who	   is	   declared	   insane	   even	   though,	   as	   the	  narrator	   comments,	   his	   behavior	   is	   no	   different	   from	   anybody	   else’s	   in	   the	   world’	  (Hughes	  and	  Pupavac,	  2010:	  886).	  125	  The	   majority	   of	   scholars	   consider	   Kosovo	   as	   an	   ‘ethnos’	   (i.e.	   Clark,	   2014:	   539).	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  rethink	  ‘our’	  assumptions	  about	  Kosovo,	  let	  us	  think	  of	  Kosovo	  as	  a	  ‘demos’.	  Arguably,	  this	  is	  not	  only	  an	  abstract	  exercise,	  but	  it	  is	  explicit	  in	  the	  Kosovars	  claims	  of	  self-­‐determination	  (Kurti,	  2011).	  126	  Finkielkraut	  (1992:	  23).	  127	  Clark	  (2014).	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This caveat is significant to understand that both internationals and their 
(non)critics are trapped within a specific (ethnic) framing of the people of 
Kosovo that legitimises permanent international interference.128 In lieu of a 
conclusion, therefore, it is the fear of the autonomy of the Kosovars, the 
suspicion that democracy can go wrong (as they will always choose “ethnic” 
options), that has provoked an unwillingness to transfer responsibilities or 
take – or let people take – final decisions over the status of Kosovo. It is not 
my intention to imply that autonomy or sovereignty cannot be 
problematic. 129  Instead, the conclusion is to draw out that instead of 
resolving a political question politically, international state-builders have 
formulated the problem as an “ethnic” one. The search for a solution has led 
to a technical and programmatic long-term process for avoiding, de-
emphasizing and even deconstructing the Kosovars’ statehood preferences. 
As Chandler observes, today statebuilding ‘is understood as a mechanism of 
ongoing relationship management which is capable of ameliorating the 
problems of autonomy, or of government, through the extension of 
internationalised mechanisms of governance'. 130  In order to understand 
further this conclusion, it might be necessary to look at EULEX approach one 
last time. 
Currently, EULEX defines itself as having a ‘systematic approach, much 
like the work of a conductor of a large orchestra’, and continues, ‘EULEX 
would have to translate the broad musical theme into a coherent 
symphony’.131 With purely technical means, as a conductor of an orchestra, 
EULEX pretends to remove politics from any rule of law institution and to 
dissolve the preferences of the Kosovars within an EU future.132 The current 
EU-led dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade is not about status any more, 
but about technical and practical arrangements. 133 The fear of people’s 
decision-making has led EULEX to undertake a minimal process of 
permanent procedural management in which divisive political questions 
remain unresolved. There seems to be no end to this process and the 
underlying risk is that EULEX might be undermining the interests and 
preferences of the Kosovars. 
Furthermore, the international (non)critics perspective does not 
contribute to reverse the situation and, perhaps unwittingly, it supports the 
international administrators’ vigilant management of Kosovo’s institutions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  128	  I	  am	  not	  trying	  to	  say	  that	  international	  interference	  has	  not	  been	  important	  to	  tame	  violence	   in	   Kosovo,	   but	   I	   argue	   that	   this	   has	   been	   legitimised	   and	   considered	  indispensible	  through	  the	  framing	  of	  Kosovo	  as	  ethnos.	  129	  Jones	  (2011:	  236);	  Weller	  (2005:	  27).	  130	  Chandler	  (2010:	  2).	  131	  EULEX	  (2009:	  8).	  See	  also	  Radin	  (2014:	  188).	  132	  EULEX	  (2009:	  7).	  133	  ICG	  (2013).	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and society. This is because the critics contend that holding elections or a 
referendum on divisive questions might renew the fight among participants 
in the war.134 For Richmond, for example, ‘in Kosovo, ethnic violence is a 
regular occurrence and ethnic difference looks set to be the basis for the state 
that will emerge from the recent declaration of independence’.135 Precisely 
because ‘sovereignty may reproduce a state dominated by one ethnic 
group’,136 he is afraid of conceding autonomy to the locals. Like international 
policy-makers, Richmond refuses to frame Kosovars in any other terms than 
people that think ethnically and, as a result, he legitimises further external 
supervision. Violence is not framed as a political expression or as an 
alternative act to achieve what it was not possible to bring into fruition 
democratically.137 In its place, every episode of violence or every “ethnic” or 
‘nationalist’ demand is interpreted as a warning sign of the need to intensify 
institution building – from education to the promotion of civil society – and 
the protection of minorities. With the aim of ‘search[ing] for the roots of the 
Balkan peace’ the (non)critics dig dip into the locals’ secretive possibilities,138 
but they are unable to respond to the existing concerns with statehood. The 
status of the province seems not a question to be decided upon. Even if they 
firmly criticise the EULEX ambition to Europeanise Kosovo, the intention of 
‘remapping’ or ‘de-balkanising the Balkans’ to find an alternative indigenous 
Balkan peace might also be an approach that belittles the political 
preferences of the participants.139  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that the existence of an “ethnic dilemma” in the 
international framing of Kosovo has legitimised further supervision and the 
maintenance of its status in limbo. Today, the EULEX mission pursues 
stability through a technical approach that de-emphasises ethnicity and frees 
institutions from political interference. This perspective, as it has been 
demonstrated, is increasingly adopting the sensibilities of critical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  Brancati	  and	  Snyder	  (2013);	  Devic	  (2006).	  135	  Richmond	  (2009b:	  62).	  136	  Richmond	  (2009b:	  72).	  137 For	   example,	   Scwandner-­‐Sievers	   (2013,	   109)	   observes	   that	   international	  administrators	   have	   misunderstood	   Albanian	   nationalism:	   ‘while,	   in	   the	   Western	  international	  view,	  nationalism	  has	  been	  seen	  as	  the	  root	  of	  all	  evil	  in	  the	  Balkans	  and	  has	   therefore	  been	  rejected	  outright,	   to	  an	   internal	  Albanian	  understanding,	  based	  on	  living	  memory,	   it	   has	  means	  modernization	   and	   emancipation,	   civil	   solidarity	   beyond	  the	  family,	  a	  promise	  of	  salvation	  and	  liberation.	  	  138	  Lehti	  (2014:	  101).	  139	  Campbell	  (1999);	  Lehti	  (2014:	  125–127).	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understandings of statebuilding. It is important to note that this analysis has 
not contested the geopolitical interpretations of the status negotiations that 
highlight the ever-existing international and domestic constraints. But it has 
directed the attention to a perpetual anxiety regarding the autonomy of the 
Kosovars. The fear that democracy might reinforce ‘ethnicised objectives’ is a 
valid concern regarding the recent history of Kosovo, but it is also the 
product of accusing the Kosovars to think ethnically.  
In the last section, using the current demands of self-government, I have 
tried to frame Kosovo differently. For example, instead of thinking of it as a 
problem with an ethnic dispute, one could understand the options of self-
determination or territorial unity with Serbia as two contending aspirations 
that could be addressed politically. The intuition is that by putting the ethnic 
framing aside, more questions would emerge that have been so far taken for 
granted. For instance, is the international administrators’ programmatic 
approach adequate to solve a political disagreement? Or even, is it necessary 
the continuation of an external mission that supervises Kosovo? 
Furthermore, there is the risk that the ethnic framing of Kosovo is 
undermining the international capacity to comprehend and respond to the 
demands and preferences placed by the Kosovars – regardless of their ethnic 
identification. For international administrators and academic scholars, the 
remaining challenge would be to take their claims seriously140 and avoid 
treating their discourses as ethnic by-products or pathological demands in 
need of technical monitoring. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  140	  Furedi	  (2011).	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Chapter 3. 
Realising the ‘Postmodern’ Dream: 
Building Resilient Communities and the 
Promise of Peace 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2008, the World Bank warned of new forms of violence thwarting the 
growth and development of peoples that were different from the large-scale 
civil wars that prevailed until the late 1990s. In order to reverse the spread of 
this ‘common violence’ the World Bank recommended a new ‘conceptual 
framework’, which consisted of ‘strengthening the resilience of societies to 
violence’.1 In recent years, other international institutions have similarly 
used the framework of ‘building resilience’2 to overcome the limitations of 
earlier peace endeavours and successfully manage today’s more complex, 
unpredictable and globally interlinked conflicts.3 Although resilience has 
been theorised from a variety of disciplinary perspectives over the last few 
decades,4 the focus here is the framework of resilience as interpreted in 
peacebuilding policy documents.  
In academic debates, the contemporary burgeoning concern with 
resilience is usually related to the proliferation of neoliberal governance.5 
Joseph explains that ‘resilience fits with a social ontology that urges us to 
turn from a concern with the outside world to a concern with our own 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  World	  Bank	  (2008:	  1–3).	  2	  Although	  definitions	  and	  usages	  of	  resilience	  vary	  among	  institutions,	  see	  for	  example	  the	   OECD	   (Organisation	   for	   Economic	   Co-­‐operation	   and	   Development)	   definition	   of	  resilience	  in	  relation	  to	  conflict-­‐affected	  environments:	  ‘Resilient	  states,	  in	  contrast	  [to	  states	  that	  suffer	  from	  fragility],	  are	  capable	  of	  absorbing	  shocks	  and	  transforming	  and	  channelling	   radical	   change	   or	   challenges	   while	   maintaining	   political	   stability	   and	  preventing	  violence’	  OECD	  (2008:	  78).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  add	  that,	  it	  is	  not	  only	  ‘states’	  that	  move	  along	  the	  continuum	  of	   fragility/resilience	  in	  the	  documents	  analyzed	  here,	  but	  also	  people,	  communities,	  individuals	  or	  cities.	  3	  For	  example,	  see	  EC	  (2012);	  UNDP	  (2012);	  World	  Bank	  (2011:	  51–68);	  (2014).	  4	  Borbeau	  (2013:	  4–10).	  5	  See,	   for	   example,	   Dillon	   (2007:	   14);	   Joseph	   (2013);	   Haldrup	   and	   Rosén	   (2013).	  Chandler,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   interprets	   resilience	   as	   marking	   a	   departure	   from	  neoliberal	  governance	  approaches	  (2013a).	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subjectivity, our adaptability, our reflexive understanding’ and this is 
‘consistent with neoliberal practices of governance’.6 This chapter seeks to 
contribute to this understanding by drawing attention to an ethico-political 
sensibility at the core of resilience approaches, which has been 
underexplored in the literature. 7 This is a sensibility to care for the needs 
and values of the local population through a long-term process of 
peacebuilding that consists on enhancing reflective processes of mutual 
learning and iterative actions between internationals and locals. The 
identification of this sensibility serves to indicate that international 
organisations are willing to leave behind the domineering attitudes and top-
down frameworks of previous approaches to peacebuilding whose 
successes, for example in the cases of Bosnia or Kosovo, are widely 
understood as questionable. In so doing, I argue that building resilience 
frameworks are increasingly sharing the sensitivities of critical perspectives 
of the liberal peace.  
It is important to observe these series of similarities between 
contemporary policy texts and academic critics of the liberal peace for two 
reasons. First, it is essential to understand more accurately the hidden 
assumptions of contemporary policy-making in the context of peacebuilding 
missions, which have sought, along the lines of academic critical 
frameworks, to move away from the errors of previous top-down 
interventions. Second, these similarities imply the possibility that critique is 
unwittingly reproducing the policy strategies it opposes. This second point 
will be the focus of the next chapter (4): I will investigate further the nature 
of “critique” in peace studies, which is increasingly becoming sterile in its 
failure to issue a radical challenge to the flaws of current policies. 
Here, then, I focus more specifically on tracing the similarities between 
contemporary policy frameworks developed by international institutions 
and academic critics of the liberal peace. Still, this chapter is analytically the 
most ambitious of all, as it presents and compares the three approaches 
drawn out throughout this research: the liberal peace, critical 
understandings of the liberal peace (post-liberal or hybrid peace) and 
building resilience approaches. A case might be made that the terminology 
used to designate the three approaches (“liberal”, “post-liberal” and 
“resilience”) is somewhat tenuous. Indeed, all these frameworks can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Joseph	  (2013:	  40).	  7 	  The	   OECD	   (2008:	   11)	   argues	   that	   building	   state	   resilience	   has	   the	   goal	   of	  ‘development’,	   ‘human	   security’	   and	   ‘international	   order’.	   While	   the	   literature	   on	  resilience	  mostly	  centres	  on	  the	  later	  goal	  specified	  by	  the	  OECD	  (‘international	  order’)	  and	   concludes	   that	   resilience	   is	   a	   neoliberal	   governance	   tool,	   this	   article	   focuses	   on	  resilience	   as	   a	   strategy	   ethically	   devoted	   to	   developing	   other	   societies	   and	   securing	  humans	  –	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ‘peacebuilding’	  operations.	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considered to be variations or expansions within liberalism. 8  However, the 
aim here is to emphasize the evolution of policy frameworks and, in this 
sense, there is good reason to use a name that points to the “new” (as is the 
case with the term ‘resilience’, which, for instance, did not appear in policy 
reports in the context of peace studies during the 1990s). 
The shift I am drawing out can be summarized as follows: from a top-
down and universal understanding of peace (liberal), prevalent throughout 
the 1990s and early 2000s, towards more bottom-up, context-sensitive and 
reflective understandings of peacebuilding (resilience), established since the 
second half of the 2000s. These contemporary policy frameworks, in an echo 
of the sensibilities of academic critiques of the liberal peace (post-liberal or 
hybrid), constitute an attempt by policy-makers to “catch up” with the 
alleged emancipatory promises of hybrid peace proposals. In order to 
illustrate this policy shift from the liberal peace to building resilience, I will 
focus on how these frameworks have distinctly conceptualized “culture”, 
which appears to have become the lens through which human differences 
are conceptualised.9 It will be argued that, while the particularisms of post-
conflict societies were considered obstacles for a lasting peace throughout 
the 1990s, they came to be understood as positive resources to be embraced 
by the end of the 2000s.  
These three approaches are examined in turn in this chapter. The first 
section analyses the liberal peace approach in relation to the civil wars of the 
1990s. It argues that, at a time when dominant worldviews were increasingly 
convinced that “culture” was a useful and normatively valuable category to 
understand war and promote peace, civil wars fought along ethnic lines 
posed a difficult dilemma: should diversity be safeguarded if (international) 
peace is at stake? In the frameworks of the liberal peace, as I will 
demonstrate, the defence of difference had to be subordinated to the 
cultivation of an ideal. The second section deals with the critique of the 
liberal peace. In particular, it focuses on David Campbell’s work in Bosnia,10 
which presciently criticised the reductionist interpretations made by 
international policy-makers and academics of his time by highlighting the 
complex conditions of Bosnian life. As my analysis will suggest, the 
reinterpretation of culture within such critique has served both to identify 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Heathershaw	  (2008);	  Paris	  (2010).	  The	  term	  ‘liberal	  peace’	   is	   frequently	  used	  by	  the	  scholars	  to	  designate	  the	  top-­‐down	  projects	  of	  global	  governance	  in	  the	  context	  of	  post-­‐war	   scenarios	   (Dillon	   and	   Reid	   2000;	   Duffield	   2001:	   10–11;	   Paris	   2004;	   Richmond	  2006:	   291–314).	  While	   resilience	   approaches	   are	   part	   of	   the	   same	   projects	   of	   global	  governance,	  I	  contend	  that	  the	  rationalities	  of	  governance	  are	  changing.	  9 	  Rather	   than	   defining	   culture,	   I	   am	   interested,	   similar	   to	   Brigg	   and	   Muller,	   in	  understanding	   ‘how	  we	  use	  culture	   to	  know	  human	  differences’	   in	   relation	   to	   conflict	  resolution	  and	  peacebuilding	  endeavours	  (2009:	  124).	  See	  also	  Chandler	  (2010b:	  373–377);	  Malik	  (1996:	  128–209).	  10	  Campbell	  (1998).	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the limits of any hegemonic discourse and, at the same time, to open-up new 
possibilities for peace devoted to the affirmation of diversity. The third 
section rethinks the framework of resilience as a contemporary policy 
discourse that overcomes the limits of the liberal peace by professing a 
commitment to local ownership and fostering an inclusive peace. I argue that 
resilience approaches, building on critical frameworks of the liberal peace, 
have reinterpreted peacebuilding as a ‘promise’ to which there will always 
remain work to be done. 
 
 
The liberal peace and the dilemma of promoting peace in a diverse world 
 
The end of the Cold War emboldened Western states and international 
organisations to lead a new humanitarian order by pursuing economic, 
political and military interventions in developing countries.11 International 
and multilateral peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions were deployed to 
stabilise and bring peace to conflict-ridden societies. In the early 1990s, these 
approaches had a clear transnational applicability. The eruption of wars and 
other crises in the Global South could be addressed with the promotion of 
democratisation, the rule of law, human rights and economic market reforms 
in an effort to transplant successful models of rules and institutions.12 The 
successful democratisation processes in Latin America or Southern and 
Eastern Europe provided democratic peace scholars and practitioners with 
self-confidence and hubris. This was the heyday of what has been later called 
the ‘liberal peace’.13 
However, the universal applicability of the liberal peace started to be 
questioned both conceptually and empirically after scholars and 
practitioners had engaged with the violent civil wars of the 1990s. 
Conceptually, the wars in the former Yugoslavia, in the South Caucusus and 
in Africa – particularly Somalia, Rwanda and Congo – seemed to have a 
‘new’ or ‘uncivil’ rationale, with less clear ideological motivations than the 
earlier wars fought in Europe throughout the twentieth century.14 Mary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  See,	   for	   example,	   the	   ‘moral’	   statements	   pronounced	   by	  Ronald	  Reagan,	   Tony	  Blair	  and	  Bill	  Clinton	  during	  the	  1990s	  (Hammond	  2000:	  30–33).	  	  12	  Boutros-­‐Ghali	  (1992:	  201;	  1992/1993;	  1996);	  Diamond	  (1995);	  Russett	  (1993).	  For	  an	   overview	   and	   critique	   of	   the	   core	   assumptions	   of	   this	   paradigm,	   see	   Carothers	  (2002:	  6–9).	  	  13	  Gleditsch	  (1992);	  Huntington	  (1991);	  Paris	  (2004:	  40–54);	  Rummel	  (1995).	  14	  The	   assumption	   of	   a	   hierarchical	   distinction	   between	   the	   first	   and	   the	   third	  world	  was	  prevalent	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  too,	  although	  it	  was	  not	  publicly	  articulated	  (Furedi	  1998).	  	  However,	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  an	  implicitly	  assumed	  supremacy	  of	  the	  West	  and	  the	   inferiority	   of	   the	   rest,	  when	  measured	   in	   cultural	   terms,	   became	  habitual	   both	   in	  academic	   circles	   (Buzan	  1991:	  451)	   and	   in	   the	   foreign	  offices	  of	   the	  Western	   capitals	  (Malik	  1996:	  210–212).	  Furthermore,	  the	  West/non-­‐West	  discursive	  divide	  was	  fuelled	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Kaldor expressed succinctly what appeared to be a revolution in the patterns 
of warfare: ‘The politics of ideas is about forward-looking projects. […] In 
contrast, identity politics tend to be fragmentative, backward looking and 
exclusive. [These] tend to be movements of nostalgia, based on the 
reconstruction of an heroic past, the memory of injustices, real or imagined, 
and of famous battles, won or lost’.15 Furthermore, journalistic accounts of 
the wars emphasised barbaric episodes, civilian victims, looting, ethnicity, 
religion, clans, displacements, paramilitaries, greediness, legends or ghosts 
and helped to confirm that the nature of violence had changed.16 At the 
empirical level, when international organisations engaged with these cases, 
the confidence in the liberal peace withered. The difficulties in building 
stable societies and strong political systems after the wars prompted 
academic commentators to dismiss confidence with democratisation 
processes and universal assumptions.17 Since policy-makers also realised that 
elite-bargaining processes, state-level negotiations or economic-led 
approaches of stabilisation were not sufficient to grasp the core of the 
problem, there was a push for new types of experiments in building 
institutions better able to deal with the informal constraints of different 
societies.18 
It was in the midst of the debates assessing the failure to build peace in 
the aftermath of the civil wars in the global south that the concept of culture 
came to the fore as an explanatory variable for these failures.19 Rather than 
defining culture in a broader sense, though, this chapter seeks to understand 
how culture has been used in relation to the enterprise of building peace.20 In 
studies of peace, many scholars and practitioners recognised, reflecting upon 
these wars, that culture – in terms of the views and perceptions of a local 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  by	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  ‘new	  wars’	  and	  their	  difficult	  statebuilding	  processes	  (Kaldor	  1999;	  Snow	  1996).	  15	  Kaldor	  (1999:	  77–78).	  16	  Kaplan	  (1994:	  44–76).	  However,	  a	  caveat	  is	  important	  here.	  Some	  analysts	  of	  the	  new	  wars	  debate	  have	  denied	  that	  there	  was	  a	  clear-­‐cut	  distinction	  between	  the	  old	  and	  the	  new	   forms	   of	   conflict.	   Instead,	   they	   argue,	   what	   substantially	   varied	   was	   that	  international	  observers,	  from	  academics	  and	  policy	  makers	  to	  the	  media,	  had	  a	  fixation	  with	   the	   social	   reality	   of	   the	   new	   wars	   due	   to	   the	   lack	   of	   political	   categories	   and	  classificatory	   devices	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   Cold	  War	   (Kalyvas	   2001:	   117;	  Newman	  2004:	  179).	  As	  Pupavac	  argues:	  ‘Without	  the	  Cold	  War	  framework,	  policy-­‐makers	  have	  been	   more	   disposed	   to	   regard	   the	   so-­‐called	   new	   wars	   as	   irrational	   conflicts	   whose	  origins	   lie	   internally	   in	   the	   dysfunctional	   culture	   and	   personality	   of	   their	   societies	  rather	  than	  in	  external	  causes’	  (2004:	  380).	  17	  Cooper	  (2007:	  613).	  18	  Carothers	  (2002);	  North	  (1990);	  Paris	  (2004).	  19	  The	   focus	   on	   culture	   in	   peace	   studies	   correlates	  with	   a	   broader	   trend	   in	   the	   social	  sciences	  at	  the	  time	  towards	  the	  investigation	  of	  how	  culture	  affected	  social	  relations	  –	  ‘the	  cultural	  turn’	  (i.e.	  Geertz	  1973;	  Lapid	  and	  Kratochwil	  1997;	  North	  1990;	  Steinmetz	  1999;	  Portes	  2000).	  20	  See	  fn.	  9.	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population, their ‘complex psychological attributes’21– was constitutive of 
conflict and, even more importantly, that it could not be ignored in the 
processes of peace.22 Billings, for example, compared two Guinean societies 
with different cultures and concluded that they required diametrically 
opposed solutions to their conflicts. 23  However, it is in the context of 
accepting the value of culture as a powerful analytical category, which also 
holds a strong normative commitment to honour diverse forms of being, that 
a dilemma surfaced in the theory and practice of peace. When Western 
analysts and practitioners were valorising the multiplicity of cultures at 
home,24 and increasingly abroad, and thus both celebrating difference and 
seeking to empower underprivileged groups, non-western peoples were 
fighting across the axis of identity and difference: nationalist leaders were 
‘using’ culture rhetorically (ethnicity)25 as a legitimate and strategic resource 
to fight against another group.26 In short, for the proponents of a global 
peace, nationalism and barbarism reintroduced an old liberal dilemma: 
should diversity be safeguarded if (international) peace is at stake?27  
The difficult choice between wanting to respect culture but only to a 
certain extent (that is, insofar as it does not violate international peace) is 
explicitly identified in the work of Kevin Avruch. An anthropologist 
interested in conflict analysis, Avruch criticised the peacebuilding strategies 
undertaken throughout the Cold War. ‘Undervaluing culture’, he suggested, 
was the ‘first type of error’ in the practice of conflict resolution, identifying 
this as the main problem in early approaches that only focused on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Avruch	  and	  Black	  (1991:	  32)	  22	  Avruch	   (1998);	   Avruch	   and	   Black	   (1987);	   Eriksen	   (1991);	   Lederach	   (1995:	   3–23);	  Miall,	  Ramsbotham	  and	  Woodhouse	  (1999).	  23	  Billings	  (1991:	  250).	  24	  For	  a	  reflection	  on	  the	  increasing	  appreciation	  of	  multiculturalism,	  see	  Glazer	  (1997).	  	  25	  The	   concept	   of	   ethnicity	   can	   be	   read	   as	   the	   instrumentalisation	   of	   culture	   for	   a	  specific	   struggle	   (Eller	   1999:	   42),	   and	   as	   such	   became	   a	   decisive	   element	   in	   the	  academic	   and	   policy	   explanations	   of	   the	   civil	   wars	   of	   the	   1990s.	   The	   literature	   on	  ethnicity	   and	   ethnic	   conflict	   can	   be	   loosely	   divided	   between	   ‘essentialist’	   accounts	   in	  which	   ethnicity	   is	   a	   fact	   or	   phenomena	   (Connor	   2004)	   and	   ‘instrumental’	   or	  ‘constructivist’	  accounts	  in	  which	  ethnicity	  is	  socially	  constructed	  (Eller	  1999).	  26	  Eller	  (1999:	  47–48),	  for	  example,	  differentiates	  between	  defending	  culture	  or	  cultural	  rights	  legitimately	  and	  ‘using’	  culture	  as	  a	  ‘weapon’	  to	  achieve	  particular	  interests.	  This	  second	   perspective	   refers	   to	   the	   civil	  wars	   in	  which	   culture	   evolved	   into	   ethnicity	   in	  order	  to	  create	  clear-­‐cut	  opposing	  groups.	  Eller’s	  distinction,	  therefore,	  illuminates	  the	  challenge	  facing	  policy-­‐makers	  and	  academic	  commentators	  of	   the	  time:	  how	  is	  one	  to	  pursue	  peace,	   if	  culture	  is	  a	  necessary	  and	  productive	  analytical	   lens	  to	  overcome	  war	  and	  yet,	  at	   the	  same	  time,	   it	  has	  become	  the	  most	  divisive	  element	   for	  participants	   in	  the	   conflict?	   I	   contend	   that	   the	   way	   this	   question	   is	   answered	  marks	   a	   fundamental	  division	   between	   liberal	   peace,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   the	   post-­‐liberal	   and	   building	  resilience	  approaches,	  on	  the	  other.	  27	  Benedict	  (1989).	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negotiation between the representatives of disputing parties. 28  But an 
obverse ‘second type of error’ became apparent in the process of trying to 
overcome the first error. In deeply rooted ethnic conflicts, in which 
participants used culture to pursue their goals strategically against another 
group, there was the risk of ‘overvaluing culture’. That is, by putting too 
much emphasis in the contentious lines of ethnicity, religion or race, 
practices of peace would ‘reify culture’, ‘homogenise groups’ and 
‘essentialise cultural and racial differences’.29 This second ‘error’ represented 
a challenge to the approaches that were inclined to include the views of the 
participants. That is, if culture - as ethnicity - was the problematic category, 
it could not be reinforced or romanticised. The solution had to be found 
elsewhere. 
Remarkably, Avruch demands that, in the most difficult cases, third 
parties should take a more scientific ‘experience-distant’ conception of 
culture, different from the exclusivist ‘experience-near’ version around 
which violence is deployed on the ground.30 Avruch cleverly navigates 
between the problem of not considering culture, characteristic of earlier 
approaches to peace, and the problem that its overemphasis has come to be 
seen as potentially risky in the light of the ‘cultural turn’. Avruch’s point is 
interesting because his approach is sensitive to the symbolic worlds of others 
and yet aware of the possibility of reinforcing difference in delicate 
environments. In the hardest cases – the conflicts in which groups are 
divided along identity/difference lines – he admits that focusing on culture 
is a constraint to peace and supports a more technical framing of the conflict 
resolution processes. It is at this point of the argument that Avruch 
epitomises the liberal sensitivity in conflict-affected scenarios: initially 
defending the uniqueness of the participants, but subordinating their 
difference to universal values.31 In short, Avruch places emphasis on the 
need to understand how the social construction of wars differs among 
societies, but his final appeal to a scientific judgment of the conflict indicates 
that he still perceives culture to be a barrier to peace.32 
This ambivalent position of privileging local cultures while still 
acknowledging the drawbacks of doing so, characterised the internationally 
led peace processes of the former Yugoslavia. These wars had developed as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Avruch	  (2003:	  362–364).	  29	  Avruch	  (2003:	  367).	  30	  Avruch	  (2003:	  355);	  see	  also	  Eriksen	  (1991:	  276).	  31	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  liberal	  sensitivity,	  see	  Shannon	  (1995:	  674).	  See	  also	  UNESCO	  (1995).	  For	  a	  critique	  of	  UNESCO’s	  reports	  that	  highlights	  the	  ambivalence	  between	  an	  essentialist	  notion	  of	  culture	  and	  the	  longing	  for	  global	  ethics,	  see	  Eriksen	  (2001).	  32	  To	   borrow	   Furedi’s	   words,	   one	   could	   say	   that	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   liberal	  peace	   tolerance	  was	  valorised	  up	  to	  a	  certain	  point;	   this	  point	  was	   that	  one	  could	  not	  tolerate	  the	  intolerants	  (2011).	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conspicuous cases in which participants used culture rhetorically to divide, 
expel and even kill other people.33 International administrators respected the 
sovereign borders of the country and were committed to democratisation 
and multi-ethnicity, but opposed the (nationalist) preferences of Bosnian 
citizens and adopted invasive institutional measures to curb the electoral 
processes. In other words, the international negotiators were committed to 
multi-ethnicity under the same state and created two separated territorial 
entities in which different ethnic groups could develop their autonomy, but 
they rejected the more extremist demands of some participants. 34  The 
inclination to respect diversity, on the one hand, and the demonization of 
those who allegedly undermine it, on the other, was also clear in the context 
of the international intervention to stop the war in Kosovo.35 In Resolution 
1244, the international representatives revealed an explicit respect for 
pluralism. 36  However, the divisive questions of statehood or territorial 
disputes were continually deferred and were subordinated to the 
achievement of international standards and the ideal of building a multi-
ethnic and plural society. 37  For the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 
transferring sovereignty to the people could only be undertaken if Kosovars 
demonstrated that they could achieve European standards of cultural 
coexistence.38 
These policy debates of power sharing in Bosnia and Kosovo mimic the 
dilemmas at the core of liberal multiculturalism. For example, Kymlicka, 
who firmly supports multiculturalism in the Western states, suggests that in 
order to deal with ‘illiberal’ minorities in non-Western states, it is necessary 
firstly to adopt democratic standards and foster tolerance at both state and 
substate levels and only secondly to grant autonomy to the minorities.39 
Otherwise, unless accompanied by a cultivation of personal respect and 
democratic values, decentralization or deterritorialisation of power to 
illiberal groups can only perpetuate the problem, as they will treat their 
minorities violently.40 
Even the academic critics in the 1990s maintained an interpretation of 
culture as a constrictive category in relation to a global covenant. Mary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Hayden	   analyses	   how	   extreme	   nationalism	   in	   the	   Balkans	   has	   used	   ‘culture	   as	  ideology’	  –	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  ‘culture	  as	  lived’	  that	  exists	  on	  the	  ground	  –	  to	  produce	  the	  ‘myth’	   of	   essentialist	   communities	   and	   make	   ‘real’	   heterogeneous	   communities	   no	  longer	  appear	  feasible	  (1996:	  783–801).	  34	  GFA	  (1995:	  Annex	  2).	  35	  Blair	  (1999).	  36	  UNSC	  (1999a;	  1999b;	  1999c).	  37	  Weller	  (2008).	  See	  further	  chapter	  2.	  38	  UNSC	  (2007c).	  39	  Kymlicka	  (2001:	  355).	  40	  Varady	  (2001:	  143).	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Kaldor identified a threat to peace and cooperation in the politics of 
particularistic identities, ubiquitous in the ‘new wars’. For Kaldor, the 
problem in Bosnia was that, on the one hand, nationalist leaders used culture 
for strategic reasons – identity politics – and fought for power against the 
civilian population and, on the other hand, international negotiators 
legitimised the nationalist views with the strategy of partitioning the 
territory along ethnic lines.41 As a supposed alternative, which is in essence 
not dissimilar to the willingness of peace practitioners to build a stable 
liberal society through the design of efficient institutions, Kaldor developed 
a cosmopolitan approach.42  This consisted on removing the nationalist 
leaders and liberating the cosmopolitan ethics intrinsic in the multicultural 
society of Bosnia. Kaldor believed in the universality of the human subject – 
trusting in international organisations, networks, transnational NGOs and 
social movements – and the possibility of finding commonalities among 
different peoples of the world.43 
In conclusion, Kaldor, just like the peacebuilders of her times, 
recommended to cultivate universal values to solve what was considered the 
endemic problem of the Balkans: the violent use of culture to achieve specific 
goals to the detriment of another group. Like other liberal scholars, Kaldor 
had an ambivalent sensitivity of defending culture, but only if this was in 
agreement with some international ethical standards. However, as the next 
section points out, the belief in worldwide solutions or advantage 
viewpoints – democratisation and liberalisation, scientific detachment of 
ones’ values, European standards of ethnic tolerance or cosmopolitanism, 
advocated by the authors above – did not survive the persistent crises of 
peacebuilding projects. Every failure in the stabilisation of post-conflict 
societies has been interpreted as a shortcoming of universal blueprints. 
Subsequently, the tendency has been to carefully delve into the human 
relationships and social practices of the everyday life to search for key 
answers in the context of a particular society.44 As the anxiety of the dispute 
across ethnic lines could not be resolved by appealing to universal moral 
judgements, the next two sections demonstrate how the search for solutions 
has turned instead towards the radical celebration of difference. 
 
 	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Kaldor	  (1999:	  58).	  42	  Kaldor	  (1999:	  112–137).	  43	  Kaldor	  (2003:	  78–80).	  44	  Lederach	  (1997);	  Paffenholz	  (2014:	  11–27).	  
80	  |	  C H .  3 :  R E A L I S I N G  T H E  ‘ P O S T M O D E R N ’  D R E A M  
The critique: ‘Writing against culture’ to save culture(s) and peace(s) 
 
Culture became popular in most disciplines precisely when it lost its 
momentum in anthropology. During the eighties the rise of non-Western 
anthropological studies was accompanied by a normative predisposition to 
criticise the reductionism of earlier Western attempts to interpret other forms 
of life.45 However, the alternative to a Western-led anthropology – which 
had designed a hierarchical division of the globe – could not be another 
linear model of interpreting culture as a stable system, even if this was to 
celebrate what others had previously discredited. 46  The ensuing 
development of an anthropology more attuned to the particularism of other 
cultures adopted the radical approach of ‘writing against culture’ or 
‘disturb[ing] the concept of culture’ as such, as a strategy to defy 
‘homogeneity, coherence and timelessness’. 47  Because cultures were not 
closed systems of symbols amenable to generalisations, conceptual 
comparisons or governmental rationality, anthropologists were increasingly 
adopting narratives of the particular that reconceptualised culture as ‘a 
practice, resistance or tool-kit’.48 In essence, these approaches assumed that it 
was impossible to reduce or understand cultures completely in order to 
embrace cultures more genuinely. This notion of culture – as a sphere of 
contingency and emergence that resists any attempt of being described or 
interpreted, but that, at the same time, it can be explored and used as a 
resource for opening up new possibilities – and the idea of developing 
‘ethnographies of the particular’ to approach other cultures more 
sensitively49 have permeated into critical understandings of the liberal peace 
that have gained prevalence in recent years. 
The initial insight into the transformation of the concept of culture in 
anthropology helps to introduce the critique of the liberal interventionist 
frameworks. This section argues that the view of culture as a ‘tool-kit’ 
facilitates a critique of the liberal understandings of conflict and peace, 
thereby cultivating an alternative that reinterprets peacebuilding into a 
context-informed and process-based approach. For this it is useful to focus 
initially on David Campbell’s work in Bosnia, which presciently criticised 
the ‘problematisations’ of the war made by local nationalist leaders, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Sewell	  (1999:	  37–38).	  46	  Abu-­‐Lughod	   contends	   that	   the	   alternative	   to	   orientalist	   studies	   cannot	   be	   ‘reverse	  orientalism’	  (1991:	  145,	  157).	  For	  a	  similar	  point,	  see	  Bhabha	  (1990:	  4);	  Bhabha	  (1994:	  35).	  	  47	  Abu-­‐Lughod	  (1991:	  152).	  48	  Sewell	  (1999:	  44);	  see	  also,	  Bhabha	  (1994:	  2);	  Swidler	  (1986:	  273–286).	  49	  Abu-­‐Lughod	  demands	  to	  explore	   ‘ethnographies	  of	  the	  particular’,	  as	   instruments	  to	  foster	  what	  she	  calls	  ‘tactical	  humanism’	  (1991:	  138).	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international policy-makers and academics of the time. 50  According to 
Campbell, these discourses and their simplistic representations of a clash 
between clear-cut ethnic groups contributed to the ‘ethnicisation of the 
political field’ that reduced Bosnia into an intractable tragedy.51 The Dayton 
Agreements, for example, divided the sovereign state in two ethnically 
separated enclaves because, as Campbell reads, ‘culture is regarded as a 
naturalized property such that differences are inherently conflictual or 
threatening and apartheid is legitimized as an antiracist solution’.52 In other 
words, after culture is taken as a fixed and immutable category, the only 
solution for peace seems to be to align identity groups in different 
territories.53 For Campbell, the problem of the peace accords is that they 
dangerously reproduce the nationalist imaginary of communities dwelling 
in homogeneous territories – thus legitimising, for example, population 
transfers – and curtail the myriad possibilities of being that exist and might 
exist in the future.54 Campbell relies on his face-to-face encounters with the 
Bosnian population to question this international policy approach and 
strives for a non-nationalist option that could be found in ‘the complex and 
contested nature of Bosnian life’.55  
At this point of Campbell’s argument, one might expect that his critical 
take on the international approach as reductionist would be followed by a 
cosmopolitan solution, such as that provided by Kaldor.56 Instead, however, 
Campbell argues that cosmopolitanism or any other liberalism are forms of 
dominance and power because they seek to order the totality of life and 
oversimplify complexity. For him, these discourses must be equally 
confronted because by having a transcendental objective they fail to be 
respectful towards difference.57 The lesson to be drawn from Campbell is 
that any attempt to capture, manage or be faithful to diversity is in itself 
unavoidably reductionist and denies the plurality of life and of new forms of 
existence. Following the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, Campbell argues 
that the ultimate problem – and these are the philosophical roots of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Following	  Foucault,	  Campbell	  means	  by	  problematisation	   the	   thinking	  of	  something	  in	   terms	   of	   problem	   and	   solution.	  One	   of	   the	   aims	   of	   his	   book	   is	   to	   problematise	   the	  problematisations	  that	  reduce	  Bosnia	  into	  an	  ethnic	  problem-­‐solution	  (1998:	  x).	  51	  Campbell	   (1998:	   xi).	   For	   a	   critique	   of	   the	   views	   that	   framed	   the	   Balkans	   as	   an	  unavoidable	  tragedy,	  see	  Booth	  (2001:	  5).	  52	  Campbell	  (1998:	  161–162);	  see	  also,	  Campbell	  (1999:	  400).	  For	  a	  similar	  analysis	  in	  the	  case	  of	  South	  Africa,	  see	  Norval	  (1996).	  53	  Norval	  (1996:	  80).	  54	  For	  a	  similar	  critique,	  see	  Vaughan-­‐Williams	  (2006:	  513–526).	  55	  Campbell	  (1998:	  114).	  56	  Kaldor	  (1999:	  44–45).	  57	  Campbell	  (1998:	  205).	  See	  also	  Connolly’s	  work	  on	  pluralism	  and	  in	  particular	  what	  he	   calls	   ‘the	   paradox	   of	   ethicality’.	   This	   is	   the	   point	   that	  while	  we	   need	   standards	   of	  ethics,	  no	  standards	  can	  truly	  embrace	  difference	  (2002:	  12).	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critique of the liberal peace – resides in one of ‘ontological totalitarianism’.58 
In other words, it is the ‘totalities’ of contemporary discourses that Campbell 
wishes to resist and therefore prophetically proposes the invention of ‘better 
political responses attuned to the relationship to the other’.59  
In defence of the other, Campbell identifies and rejects the spectre of 
totalitarianism haunting both the international community’s narrow 
conceptualisation of peace and other alternatives that ‘efface, erase, or 
suppress alterity’.60 Unlike proposals of the liberal peace analysed in the 
previous section, Campbell resists seeing difference as problematic. That is, 
according to this viewpoint, culture and peace have reversed their relation: 
the constraint is not culture, but a hubristic project of peace, which fails to be 
faithful to the elusive dimension of culture. The alternative therefore cannot 
be another peace settlement for Bosnia based on universal values. Instead, 
Campbell aspires to ‘ethical communities’ that remain open-ended, as a 
strategy to refute the totalitarianism of final representations and identity 
formations and ensure responsibility for the other.61 As he puts it,  
Justice, democracy and emancipation are not conditions to be achieved 
but ambitions to be strived for; they are promises the impossibility of 
which ensures their possibility; they are ideals that to remain practical 
must always be still to come.62 
As a critique of the violence implicated in the myth of coherent borders, 
truth representations or hegemonic identity claims, Campbell proposes that 
peace in Bosnia might be rethought as a ‘promise’ - in the Derridean sense - 
which remains yet still ‘to come’; something which can never be 
‘institutionalized’, but which symbolizes the ‘ad infinitum of nomadic 
movements’.63 This iterative approach without ultimate end seeks to avoid 
the violence implicit in a linear plan with a final settlement. In so doing, it 
opens up the possibility of developing peace initiatives as never-ending 
processes of contestation dedicated to affirm difference – or ‘différance’.64 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Campbell	  (1998:	  172).	  59	  Campbell	  (1998:	  xi).	  60	  Campbell	  (1998:	  206).	  61	  Campbell	  (1998:	  208).	  62	  Campbell	  (1998:	  207	  [emphasis	  in	  original]).	  63	  Campbell	  (1998:	  202).	  Notice	  that	  Campbell	  (1998)	  does	  not	  use	  “peace	  initiative”	  or	  “peacebuilding”	  in	  his	  ethos	  of	  affirmation	  because	  he	  wishes	  to	  avoid	  the	  ‘totalitarian’	  risk	  entailed	  in	  the	  design	  of	  any	  plan	  for	  peace.	  Rather,	  he	  uses	  ‘justice’	  as	  an	  aspiration	  that	  is	  infinite,	  unrepresentable.	  64 	  Derrida’s	   notion	   of	   ‘différance’	   is	   relevant	   to	   understand	   the	   philosophical	  underpinnings	  of	  the	  inclination	  to	  subvert	  any	  hegemonic	  discourse	  in	  the	  process	  of	  exploring	  difference.	  Derrida	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  action	  of	  ‘differing’	  and	  ‘deferring’	  –	  différance	  –	  that	  is	  prior	  to	  difference	  and	  which	  cannot	  be	  appropriated,	  construed	  or	  named	  (1982:	  26).	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Today, Campbell’s ethico-political sensibility – that is, a responsibility to 
embrace difference which calls for the problematisation of the totalities of 
existing discourses65 – pervades critical understandings of the liberal peace 
(or post-liberal peace).66 These approaches discard the universalistic, statist 
and domineering nature of the liberal peace by pointing at the limitations of 
governing post-war societies from an external (Western) perspective. 67  On 
this assumption, these scholars have critically interpreted what they see as 
top-down and intrusive approaches of statebuilding in the former 
Yugoslavia and the Middle East.68 For them, unlike Avruch, Kymlicka or 
Kaldor, as analysed in the previous section, there is no superior, scientific or 
neutral viewpoint that can take Solomonic judgments in practices of war 
resolution or peacebuilding initiatives. For example, Brigg and Muller 
highlight the weakness of Avruch’s tendency to appeal to universal 
standards to make judgements regarding conflicts in which culture has been 
mobilised for strategic and violent purposes: ‘Avruch is correct to note that 
the use of culture is (sometimes) strategic, but by doing so he risks 
delegitimising the arguments and culture of the ‘players’ while prioritising 
the frameworks and (social science) approaches of the (Western) conflict 
resolution academic and analyst’.69 For Brigg and Muller, there is no position 
from which to privilege one way of interpreting a dispute over another. The 
risks of doing so, they argue, is to impose a perilous hierarchical relation 
between the West and other cultures, as well as to ignore alternative 
frameworks for making peace.70 
The crucial point to make is that post-liberal perspectives focus on the 
irreducible particularism of the local to indicate the shortcomings of the 
liberal peace. However, this does not imply a romantic defence of all the 
norms or values that emanate from the local.71 As Richmond recommends, 
‘culture should not be re-essentialised nor necessarily perceived as a benign 
site of agency’. 72  When analysing peace initiatives in the Balkans, for 
example, these critical approaches do not give an automatic support to local 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Campbell	  (1998:	  4);	  see	  also	  Campbell	  and	  Schoolman	  (2008).	  66	  Richmond	  (2011).	  67	  For	   instance,	   the	   journal	   Peacebuilding	   has	   been	   launched	   with	   the	   ambition	   to	  contribute	  to	  peacebuilding	  beyond	  ‘the	  Western	  modernisation	  and	  state	  framework’.	  Richmond	  and	  MacGinty	  (2013:	  1).	  68	  These	  approaches	  will	  be	  carefully	  analysed	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	  For	  now,	  see	  the	  critical	   essays	   in	   the	   following	   volumes:	   Newman,	   Paris	   and	   Richmond	   (2009);	  Richmond	  (2010c);	  Campbell,	  Chandler	  and	  Sabaratnam	  (2011).	  69	  Brigg	  and	  Muller	  (2009:	  129).	  70	  Brigg	  and	  Muller	  (2009:	  131).	  71 	  Mac	   Ginty	   (2008:	   149).	   For	   a	   discussion	   about	   the	   necessity	   to	   go	   beyond	  universalism	   and	   particularism	   in	   post-­‐conflict	   situations,	   see	   Campbell	   (1998:	   196–207).	  72	  Richmond	  (2011:	  184).	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nationalist agendas,73 despite the accusation of some counter-critics.74 For 
them, since peace can neither be designed from a solid Archimedean point 
nor from the locals in an unreflective manner, the way forward is to open 
situations up to difference in a never-ending ‘iterative’ and process-oriented 
endeavour, which disarticulates static and thereby hierarchical positions.75 
As Drichel explains, ‘iterability – as the temporal logic upon which hybridity 
relies – has an immediate ethical appeal’ because ‘it offers the possibility to 
reintroduce, quite literally, the sense of alterity that has been disavowed in 
the stereotype as a fixed form of otherness’. 76 It is the anti-essentialist 
process, the repetitive practice or as Duffield puts it, ‘the unscripted 
conservation’ of internationals and locals what matters here. 77  Hybrid 
formulations, as the dynamic interaction between local and international 
actors, are thus seen as strategies to pursue an emancipatory version of peace 
that is more respectful of difference. 78  In these readings, it is 
counterproductive to plan peace in advance or out of context. This is because 
practices and experiences of the everyday become an unlimited resource to 
be explored repetitively, rather than a problem to be overcome externally, as 
in frameworks of the liberal peace.79 Abu-Nimer, in a study of inter-religious 
conflictive scenarios paradigmatic of a reinterpretation of the use of culture, 
observes that, ‘religion can also bring social, moral, and spiritual resources to 
the peacebuilding process’.80 For these approaches, cultural and societal 
elements of the everyday become toolkits to develop long-term processes of 
peace. 
To sum-up this section, critical understandings of the liberal peace contest 
hegemonic discourses emanating from the international and the local 
spheres on the basis that no representation can exhaust the rich diversity of 
human life. Following anthropological insights, they reinterpret culture as a 
sphere that resists external interpretation or governance and, at the same 
time, opens up new possibilities for peace. For these approaches, culture 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Franks	  and	  Richmond	  (2008:	  81–103);	  Devic	  (2006:	  257–273).	  74	  For	   instance,	   David	   Chandler	   accuses	   these	   approaches	   of	   falling	   into	   the	   trap	   of	  either	  defending	  ‘universal	  values’	  or	  ‘cultural	  relativism’	  (2014a:	  2).	  75	  Brigg	   and	  Muller	   (2009:	   137).	   Following	   Derrida,	   Campbell	   also	   puts	   emphasis	   on	  using	   the	   strategy	   of	   ‘iteration’	   because,	   as	   he	   argues,	   ‘the	   repetition	   of	   iterability	   is	  always	  linked	  to	  alterity’	  (1998:	  200).	  	  76	  Drichel	  (2008:	  601–602).	  As	  a	  note	  of	  clarification,	  by	  stereotypes	  Drichel	  means	  the	  form	  in	  which	  ‘the	  other’	  has	  been	  constructed	  and	  fixed	  by	  the	  colonial	  gaze.	  77	  Duffield	  (2007:	  234).	  78	  For	  example,	  see	  Mac	  Ginty	  (2010:	  392);	  Peterson	  (2012:	  9–22);	  Richmond	  (2009a:	  565;	  2010a:	  685–686).	  79 	  It	   is	   crucial	   to	   note	   the	   difference	   between	   iterative	   processes	   (fn.	   64)	   and	  externalised	   strategies	   pursued	   by	   practitioners	   and	   policy-­‐makers.	   For	   a	   critical	  analysis	  of	  these	  strategies	  see	  Richmond	  (2011:	  27–30).	  80	  Abu-­‐Nimer	  (2001:	  686).	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becomes a resource or tool-kit to be drawn upon, rather than a problem that 
needs to be governed or solved from an outside intervention, as within 
liberal peace frameworks. However, culture is a resource to be both 
embraced and contested, both celebrated and pluralised. This is the radical 
promise of peace: a joint endeavour to care for the other (difference) that is, 
at the same time, alert to the violence implicated in any advance to defend 
this other.81 In this regard, this is a ‘promise’ to do justice to the other that 
can never be fulfilled; a ‘promise’ to which every attempt to reach it, or even 
name it, becomes a betrayal to it.82 This is a form of ‘writing against culture’ 
– of affirming difference without representing it – and it has become a 
deliberate move to save culture(s) and peace(s). 
Although it might seem difficult to translate these abstract reflections into 
concrete strategies for peace, policy-makers are recently undertaking a 
comparable transformation of the practice of peacebuilding. In this sense, 
whereas Campbell criticized the limits of liberal forms of intervention in the 
1990s, international institutions – EU, OECD, UNDP and World Bank – have 
lately incorporated some of his sensibilities in the practice of peace 
undertaken in the Balkans and other conflict-affected scenarios, as analysed 
in the next section. It will be argued that the approach of ‘building resilience’ 
rejects the hegemony of previous liberal endeavours in search of a process-
oriented and hybrid form of peacebuilding attuned to the particularism of 
every people. It is central to recognise this shift because it compromises 
critical understandings of the liberal peace which are still fixated on 
critiquing the liberal peace top-down models executed in earlier 
interventions.83 
 
 
The coming community: Building resilience and the promise of peace 
 
According to international institutions, in the 21st century, while inter- and 
intra-state wars are in decline, multiple forms of contemporary violence – 
gang related violence, organized crime or local conflicts – thwart the most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Campbell	  makes	  this	  point	  when	  he	  explains	  his	  two	  main	  contributions:	  ‘the	  ethos	  of	  deconstruction	   thought	   can	   appreciate	   the	   contradictions,	   paradoxes	   and	   silences	   of	  political	   problems	   in	   a	   complex	   world’,	   [but	   at	   the	   same	   time]	   ‘calls	   for	   an	   ongoing	  political	  process	  of	  critique	  and	  invention	  that	  is	  never	  satisfied	  that	  a	  lasting	  solution	  can	  or	  has	  been	  reached’	  (1998:	  242).	  82	  In	  these	  critical	  understandings,	  having	  no	  end	  is	  increasingly	  viewed	  as	  positive.	  As	  Connolly	  asserts,	  our	  ‘sickness’	  resides	  in	  a	  ‘quest	  to	  reach	  the	  end	  of	  a	  trial	  which	  has	  no	  terminus’.	  Connolly	  (1993:	  138).	  83	  See	  further	  Chandler	  (2010a:	  138).	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fragile and conflict-affected environments.84 These contemporary conflicts 
have become more diffuse, complex and are increasingly linked to natural 
disasters or climate change.85 As the World Bank observes, violence is 
unpredictable and globally interlinked: ‘many religious and ideological 
grievances in one part of the world are grafted onto a local conflict in some 
faraway place’.86 What is important is that the logic of conflict is perceived to 
have shifted from the ‘politically motivated’ civil wars that prevailed in the 
1990s to the ‘less visible, but widespread forms of common violence and 
occasional outbursts of collective violence’ of the new millennia.87 It is in 
response to contemporary forms of violence that the World Bank 
contemplates the need of ‘making societies more resilient’.88 More broadly, 
the commitment to build resilience corresponds to the observation that there 
exist strong multi-dimensional links between violent conflicts, security 
anxieties, extreme natural events and multifaceted crises. 89 In this sense, 
Michael Dillon, analysing the security discourses in the war on terror, 
presciently signalled the term ‘resilience’ as indicative of the global liberal 
biopolitics project in an era of complexity.90  
While academic discussions very often read the efforts of building 
resilience as a strategy of neoliberal governance, 91 this last section proposes 
to interpret resilience approaches as peacebuilding attempts to embrace the 
particularisms of other cultures (that is, difference) and discard the 
possibility of imposing external designs. While this reading does not 
contradict the point that resilience fits well with practices of neoliberal 
governance,  it reads resilience frameworks as processes that seek to 
overcome the problem of ‘difference’ identified in earlier approaches of the 
liberal peace. In so doing, I argue, practitioners of peace are increasingly 
sharing the ethico-political sensibilities of post-liberal perspectives. This is 
because, for international institutions, the best way of building peace and 
care for others in their specific contexts seems to be the cultivation of hybrid 
and iterative processes of continual learning that include the local’s socio-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  At	   least	   since	   2008	   the	   World	   Bank	   places	   emphasis	   on	   the	   rise	   of	   new	   forms	   of	  violence	  (2008;	  2011:	  51–68).	  85	  While	  establishing	  this	  link,	  Evans	  recommended	  that	  action	  should	  take	  the	  form	  of	  ‘adaptation’	  (2008).	  Also,	  see	  Department	  for	  International	  Development	  (2011:	  4).	  86	  World	  Bank	  (2011:	  67).	  87	  World	  Bank	  (2008:	  2).	  88	  World	  Bank	  (2008:	  1).	  89	  This	   observation	   is	   accompanied	   by	   the	   rise	   of	   network	   and	   complexity	   theories	  Schmidt	  (2013a:	  174–192)	  –	  although	  this	  is	  not	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  chapter.	  	  90	  Dillon	   2007:	   14).	   For	   another	   analysis	   that	   considers	   resilience	   as	   the	   politics	   of	  complexity,	  see	  Chandler	  (2014b).	  91	  See	  fn.	  5.	  The	  point	  is	  that	  by	  putting	  too	  much	  emphasis	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  resilience	  is	  another	   neoliberal	   “tool”,	   scholars	   underappreciate	   the	   differences	   between	  contemporary	  policy	  approaches	  (resilience)	  and	  previous	  approaches	  (liberal	  peace).	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cultural practices and experiences as resources for ensuring a lasting peace. 
Below, I unravel the framework of resilience and its reinterpretation of 
difference, which builds on critical understandings of the liberal peace. 
Finally, I seek to contest counter arguments made by critics who still identify 
elements of Eurocentrism in approaches that embrace the other. The 
conclusion is that one needs to recognise the promise of resilience 
perspectives to understand more accurately current practices of 
peacebuilding. 
The rise of resilience approaches in peace debates is linked to the fact that 
international institutions have learnt from the limited success of previous 
peace processes and consequently reoriented their strategies on the 
assumption that no single model is internationally valid.92 As the World 
Bank admitted, its own report in 2011 could no longer be read as ‘a 
cookbook that prescribes recipes’ because ‘every country’s history and 
political context differ, and there are no one-size-fits-all solutions’. 93 
Similarly, for the UNDP, ‘there is no single template’, and therefore, ‘a 
unifying principle is that in every setting, approaches must be shaped by 
context’.94 Today, it has become a truism that context is important and that 
the history, politics and culture of societies has to be understood and studied 
carefully for the success of external interventions. 95  For example, it is 
believed that the failure of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq was, in 
part, due to ‘the inadequate understanding of both Iraqi culture and the 
complicated internal political relationships that existed among and within 
various Iraqi groups’.96 It is for this reason that organizations such as Armed 
Violence Monitoring Systems, Conciliation Resources, International Alert or 
Peace Direct are increasingly incorporating detailed conflict analysis and 
also understandings of local actors in their programme planning of building 
resilience.97 
As analysed in the initial section, the idea that people are different and 
that this difference – broadly framed in terms of culture – is decisive for 
developing more accurate analyses of peace was also prominent during the 
debates of the 1990s.98 However, in conflict-affected environments, culture 
was usually deemed problematic – particularly in cases in which ethnicity 
came to the fore – and the liberal peace tended to appeal to external or out-
of-context solutions to design peace. By contrast, contemporary international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  For	  an	  account	  of	   the	  advent	  of	   resilience	  as	  a	   retreat	   from	  universalistic	   solutions,	  see	  Haldrup	  and	  Rosén	  	  (2014:	  130–145).	  93	  World	  Bank	  (2011:	  247).	  94	  UNDP	  (2012:	  41).	  95	  See	  (IPI	  2009).	  96	  World	  Bank	  (2011:	  196).	  97	  Ganson	  and	  Wennmann	  (2012:	  7).	  98	  For	  an	  early	  recognition	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  context,	  see	  World	  Bank	  (1989).	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institutions, rather than copying programmes that have been successful 
elsewhere, intend to build resilience as a strategy that ‘needs to be firmly 
embedded in national policies and planning’.99 Resilient frameworks see 
local context and the participants in the conflict much more positively and 
indeed their role is key for the accomplishment of the operation: 
National ownership of the development and governance agenda is a 
bedrock principle of UNDP and many of its partners. Notwithstanding 
the crucial role of external donors and agencies, UNDP recognizes that 
the transition from fragility to durable peace and stability is primarily 
an internal process.100 
For these approaches, local ownership has become not only the end goal 
of the process, but also the means.101 Indeed, at odds with earlier frameworks 
of the liberal peace, the propensity is to adopt a self-critical position and 
admit that next time local ownership should be even more ‘real’.102 Partly, 
this is fuelled by the perception that communities learn by themselves, use 
local networks of knowledge, offer protection from dangerous threats and 
adapt to unpredictable violence. 103  But, perhaps more importantly, the 
emphasis of resilience perspectives on local ownership is sustained by the 
assumption that there exist limits to controlling, affecting or even 
understanding the particularism of the everyday from an external 
position.104 As the OECD recognises: ‘Statebuilding is first and foremost an 
endogenous process; there are therefore limits as to what the international 
community can and should do’.105 Although the critics do not recognise the 
shift towards an endogenous practice, 106  international institutions are 
increasingly assuming the constraints of orthodox policy responses and 
experimenting with innovative and non-formal approaches to take 
cognizance of every context and evaluate peace.107 The crucial point to note 
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  EC	   (2012:	   2).	   The	   assumption	   is	   that	   ‘fragility’	   and	   ‘resilience’	   are	   ‘country-­‐specific	  and	  ‘conflict-­‐specific’	  (see	  Chade	  2012:	  4).	  100	  UNDP	  (2012:	  101);	  see	  also	  UNDP	  (2010:	  xiii).	  101	  All	   international	   institutions	   analysed	   here	   –	   EU,	   OECD,	   UN,	   the	   World	   Bank	   and	  other	   international	   agencies	   –	   implicitly	   or	   explicitly	   propose	   to	   ensure	   ‘local	   or	  national	  ownership’.	  See	  further	  chapter	  5.	  102	  The	   OECD	   (2011a),	   for	   example,	   recognises	   that	   international	   institutions	   can	   do	  better	  to	  achieve	  country-­‐led	  processes	  of	  change	  (Ganson	  and	  Wennman	  2012:	  6).	  103 	  For	   Campbell,	   to	   establish	   a	   comparison,	   ‘Bosnia’s	   différance	   was	   lived	   and	  negotiated	  on	  a	  daily	  basis’	  (1998:	  212).	  104	  Kaufmann	  (2013:	  67).	  Notice	   that	   the	  critics	  of	   the	   liberal	  peace	  also	  put	  emphasis	  on	   the	   insufficiency	   of	   traditional	   frameworks	   to	   know	   other	   cultures	   and,	   therefore,	  they	   experiment	   with	   relational	   and	   iterative	   approaches.	   See,	   for	   example,	   Brigg	  (2010:	  336–342);	  Brigg	  and	  Muller	  (2009:	  137);	  Richmond	  (2009a:	  566).	  105	  OECD	  (2011b:	  11).	  106	  See	  Mac	  Ginty	  (2013).	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is that for resilience frameworks ‘difference’ exceeds the possibility of 
governing from an outside perspective108 and peace- and statebuilding are 
transformed into much more meticulous and repetitive endeavours that 
operate from within.109 
This is demonstrated if one pays attention to the shifting responsibility of 
international donors. Within a framework that prioritises locally owned 
procedures, external organisations have limited their role to acts of ‘support’, 
‘facilitation’, ‘nurturing’, ‘indirect intervention’ or ‘work in the 
background’.110 These organisations thus step back from a leading position 
and remain attentive to support the resources for peace that already exist in 
the cultural milieus of conflict-affected societies. As the UNDP explains, 
[D]espite escalating violence amongst pastoral communities in north-
eastern Kenya, the UNDP observed the pressures applied by mothers 
on their sons to assume greater roles in cattle raiding. After a 
comprehensive assessment, UNDP worked with local groups to re-
engineer prevailing attitudes by urging mothers to assume roles as 
‘ambassadors for peace’.111 
Elsewhere, the UN has also asserted that ‘women and girls are the [in]visible 
force for resilience’.112 In the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo, the international 
organisation SaferWorld also explains that its initiatives ‘help communities 
to build on the resources and skills they already have to address their security 
concerns’.113 In these situations, international actors barely help life to follow 
its course.114 Indeed, the shifting position of external actors is encapsulated 
in the motivation of ‘do[ing] no harm’ – in the sense of not making things 
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  Kraus	   (2013);	   Kaufman	   (2013).	   For	   example,	   the	   Geneva	   Declaration	   on	   Armed	  Violence	   and	   Development	   challenged	   the	   use	   of	   simple	   analytical	   classifications	  and	  policy	   responses	   in	   order	   to	   pay	   attention	   to	   ‘developing	   innovative	   techniques	   for	  collecting	  and	  generating	  data’,	  ‘in-­‐depth	  knowledge	  and	  disaggregated	  information’	  for	  studying	  and	  tackling	  different	  forms	  of	  violence	  in	  several	  contexts	  (2013).	  108 	  For	   a	   philosophical	   take	   on	   the	   notion	   that	   difference	   and	   the	   world	   exceed	  conceptual	  reach,	  see	  Connolly	  (2002).	  	  	  109	  For	   the	   OECD,	   for	   example,	   ‘When	   Technical	   Assistance	   personnel	   are	   outside	   of	  government	  structures,	  engagement	  and	  ownership	  by	  the	  partner	  country	  tend	  to	  be	  low	  and	  accountability	  diffused.	  Agreeing	  with	  national	  counterparts	  on	  the	  parameters	  for	   the	   delivery	   of	   assistance	  may	   take	   time.	   Until	   then,	   small,	   iterative	  activities	   are	  best	  to	  give	  the	  development	  partner	  time	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  context	  and	  agree	  with	  the	  partner	  country	  on	  where	  outside	  assistance	  can	  be	  most	  useful’	   (2011b:	  86,	  emphasis	  added).	  See	  also	  fn.	  64,	  75.	  110	  OECD	  (2011b:	  47).	  111	  UNDP	  (2012:	  91).	  112	  UNISDR	  (2012).	  113	  SaferWorld	  (2013).	  114	  For	  a	  radical	  reinterpretation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  planners	  in	  self-­‐organising	  societies,	  see	  Van	  Assche	  and	  Verschraegen	  (2008:	  279).	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worse – and the policy-recommendation of being aware of both the 
‘intended and unintended consequences of their interventions’.115  
However, it is important to acknowledge that while resilient approaches 
embrace locals’ attitudes and viewpoints as an attempt to overcome the 
shortcomings of the liberal peace, they do not fall into the trap of cultural 
relativism. 116  To be sure, building resilience does not imply that 
peacebuilders are giving support to the local potentially ‘illiberal’ practices 
(e.g. racist acts) or potentially exclusivist discourses (e.g. nationalist 
demands). As I argued at the beginning of the previous section, the 
alternative to a Western-led anthropology was not an approach to 
essentialise other cultures, but an effort to ‘write against culture’, to defy 
homogeneity and coherence and project an image of culture as a ‘toolkit’.117 
Along these lines, efforts at building resilience can be interpreted as 
strategies that take a constructivist view of culture as a resource to foster 
peace, like the examples of the UNDP in Kenya or SaferWorld in the Balkans 
put forward (see above). A quick glance at UNESCO’s reports can be useful 
to provide insight into the relation between a constructivist notion of culture 
and the possibility of strengthening the resilience of local communities. The 
reinterpretation of culture as a ‘complex web of meanings’, ‘acquired 
through the process of cultivation’ and ‘evolving dynamic force’, for 
example, introduces new avenues for development.118 For the organisation, 
‘culture builds resiliency by reinforcing the abilities of people to be 
innovative and creative especially in the adversity of disasters and 
conflicts’.119  
In peacebuilding practices, the efforts to build resilience are translated 
into a fruitful ‘joint endeavour’ between donors, agencies, community 
leaders and diverse members of civil society.120 For the UNDP, partnerships 
are flexible and open, diverse, overlapping, heterogeneous and 
transnational. 121  They are involved in a sensible process of ‘deep 
appreciation without pre-conceived or fixed ideas’,122 in which participants 
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  OECD	  (2010:	  3);	  see	  also	  de	  Carvalho	  et	  al.	  (2014:	  2).	  116	  Chandler	  (2014:	  14–17).	  117	  Swidler	   reinterprets	   culture	   ‘as	   a	   tool	   kit	   of	   symbols,	   stories,	   rituals,	   and	   world-­‐views,	   which	   people	   may	   use	   in	   varying	   configurations	   to	   solve	   different	   kinds	   of	  problems’	  (1986:	  273).	  118	  UNESCO	   (2010:	   2).	   Also,	   see	   how	   UNESCO	   is	   committed	   to	   diversity,	   but	   not	   the	  perpetuation	  of	  a	  particular	  and	  static	  form	  of	  diversity	  (UNESCO	  2009:	  2).	  It	  is	  useful	  to	  contrast	   UNESCO’s	   constructivist	   notion	   of	   culture	   in	   recent	   reports	   with	   the	   earlier	  attempts	  to	  appreciate	  cultures	  as	  closed	  entities	  (UNESCO	  1995).	  119	  UNESCO	  (2010:	  7).	  120	  UNDP	  (2008).	  121	  UNDP	  (2012:	  98–111).	  122	  OECD	  (2011b:	  36).	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learn and adapt and reflect upon their positions and roles.123 These policy 
practices share many assumptions with the emancipatory agenda of 
‘hybridity’, which is both a description of actual processes and a normative 
imperative.124 As Chandler argues, for these approaches, ‘intervention is 
essentially a mechanism of inter-subjective enlargement of reflexivity, 
enabling an emancipation of both intervener and those intervened upon, 
through creating possibilities for both to free themselves from the socio-
cultural constraints of their own societies and to share a pluralised ethos of 
peace’. 125  Nationals and internationals increasingly accept hybrid peace 
processes because these are more inclusive, flexible and participatory and 
they project a ‘pluralised ethos of peace’ that eschews violent dichotomies.126 
For example, building resilience as a hybrid formulation allows peace 
processes to move beyond top-down domineering approaches (i.e. liberal 
peace) and potential locally exclusivist projects (i.e. aggressive politics 
against minorities). 
However, the open, heterogeneous and empathetic partnerships between 
multiple actors that resilient frameworks propose – along the lines of critical 
understandings of liberalism – is still regarded with scepticism in the 
academic literature. 127  Sabaratnam, for example, argues critically that 
narratives of liberal and post-liberal peace carry elements of Eurocentrism 
and exclusion of other societies since they reproduce ‘the division between 
the liberal, rational, modern West and a culturally distinct space of the 
“local”’.128 In order to reverse this tendency and decolonise peace research, 
she suggests having, on the one hand, ‘an extended appreciation of the 
historical political presence of societies targeted by interventions’. On the 
other hand, inspired by the dictum of ‘writing against cultural difference’, 
she proposes a strategy that avoids ‘alienation’ and focuses on ‘the ways in 
which different people politicize various aspects of their experiences, narrate 
the terms of their situations and critically interpret the world around 
them’. 129  In other words, what she recommends is having a deeper 
understanding of context and the historico-political processes of other 
‘cultures’ in order to challenge the belief that the world can be organised in 
cultural boxes.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  For	   example,	   AusAID’s	   newly	   created	   ‘Making	   a	   Difference’	   training	   programme	  helps	  advisers	  and	  counterparts	  to	  improve	  their	  working	  relationships	  by	  reflecting	  on	  their	  behaviour	  and	  attitudes	  (Capacity.Org	  2010).	  124	  Ganson	  and	  Wennman	  (2012:	  17;	  OECD	  2011:	  25).	  125	  Chandler	  (2013c:	  24).	  126	  Nadarajah	  and	  Rampton	  (2014:	  7).	  127	  Brigg	  (2013:	  13–18);	  Mac	  Ginty	  and	  Richmond	  (2013:	  775).	  128	  Sabaratnam	  (2013:	  267).	  129	  Sabaratnam	  (2013:	  271–272).	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The critique of current peace processes in the Balkans follows a similar 
logic. Even if the hybrid projects suggested by the EU and local counterparts 
have recently aimed at building a unique and complex political system 
committed to diversity and inclusiveness (i.e. beyond ethnic enclaves),130 at 
least this is their intention, the critics in the literature request to deconstruct 
further the prevailing narratives and identities of existing groups.131 For 
them, there is always the possibility to appeal for a deeper understanding of 
context or to argue that every decision taken by whatever actor(s) is 
unavoidably misrepresenting the full diversity of human life.132 In short, 
today, critical readings accuse previous peacebuilding initiatives (and the 
critique of these initiatives) of reinforcing perilous dichotomies because they 
fail to appreciate and engage with the fugitive nature of difference.133 It 
would appear that, at least since the inclusion of culture in studies of peace, 
the tendency is to criticise others for not engaging sensitively with the needs 
and particularities of those intervened upon.134 Yet, it seems that this critical 
narrative is failing to recognise the ‘promise’ of resilience approaches.135   
The point is not to argue that, for example, the allegations of 
Eurocentrism in contemporary peacebuilding practices are not important. Or 
to suggest that resilience approaches have successfully embraced the locals’ 
worldviews in post-conflict societies. The point is that, along similar lines to 
critical understandings of the liberal peace, resilience approaches carry the 
promise of fostering hybrid, inclusive and iterative processes of 
peacebuilding that aim at embracing the particularism of every society. For 
example, heuristically, resilience approaches – although stripped from a 
radical idiom – can be read as attempts to ‘write against culture’ as such, as 
processes that deconstruct identity formations and pluralise political 
positions.136  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  EULEX	  (2009:	  6–7);	  see	  also	  Stroschein	  (2008:	  665).	  131	  Popolo	  (2011).	  132	  As	   seen	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	   this	   is	   the	   argument	   put	   forward	   by	   Campbell	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  peace	  process	  in	  Bosnia.	  While	  Campbell’s	  view	  was	  crucial	  to	  highlight	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  liberal	  peace	  in	  the	  1990s,	  contemporary	  critics	  follow	  a	  similar	  line	  of	  argument	   to	   criticise	   current	   peace	   processes.	   In	   so	   doing,	   I	   argue,	   these	   critical	  readings	   are	   underappreciating	   the	   ethico-­‐political	   sensitivities	   of	   resilience	  approaches.	  For	  example,	  see	  Lehti	  (2014:	  101).	  	  133	  Drichel	  (2008).	  134	  So,	   while	   critical	   approaches	   question	   resilience	   and	   previous	   attempts	   to	   build	  peace	  for	  not	  engaging	  sufficiently	  with	  difference,	  the	  liberal	  peace	  similarly	  included	  ‘culture’	   in	   the	   analyses	   of	   peace	   as	   a	   way	   of	   overcoming	   the	   limits	   of	   previous	  approaches,	  as	  explained	  in	  the	  initial	  section.	  	  135	  Even	   if	   Boege	   et	   al.	   critique	   peace	   interventions,	   their	   emancipatory	   proposal	  resembles	   the	   strategy	   pursued	   by	   policy-­‐makers.	   This	   reads:	   ‘to	   think	   in	   terms	   of	  hybrid	   political	   orders,	   drawing	   on	   the	   resilience	   embedded	   in	   the	   communal	   life	   of	  societies’	  (2009:	  599).	  Also,	  see	  Richmond	  and	  Mac	  Ginty	  (2013:	  779–780).	  136	  The	  UNDP,	   for	  example,	   creates	   ‘unique	  safe	   spaces	   for	   interaction	  of	  youth	  across	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This ethico-political sensibility is, as I have demonstrated, different from 
the one defended by the liberal peace.137 Although most critics argue that 
resilience is failing to deliver on its promise,138 international institutions also 
admit that their approach has its limitations and are ready to embark upon a 
longer project of deeper sensibility. 139  For the UN, building peace ‘is 
intended to be an iterative process, which can be initiated rapidly and 
successively expanded and detailed over time, with greater national 
involvement and ownership’.140 The World Bank asks for ‘time and patience’ 
for the support of institutional transformation. 141  This follows that the 
approaches of building resilience are practiced without a fixed end and 
without predicting what would resilience mean at the end of the process. As 
the OECD suggests, ‘external actors need to acknowledge that the ideal end-
“state” they aim for is but a distant prospect in many circumstances’.142 But 
an unclear end is not problematic. Since the critics advance that reaching an 
‘end-state’ would imply a failure to the promise of peace, far from resisting 
resilience, the critics secure the perpetuation of it. It would appear that both 
international policy-makers and their critics share the same sensitivity: the 
more ‘we’ fail in peace endeavours, the more there is the need to explore the 
hidden specificities of the fragile communities. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the increasing concern towards building resilient 
communities as a policy-strategy to promote peace in conflict-affected 
scenarios. It has interpreted resilience as an approach that seeks to overcome 
the shortcomings of the liberal peace processes of the 1990s. In short, while 
liberal peace privileged universal values and therefore seemed to suppress 
the different views and norms of conflict-affected societies, building 
resilience frameworks consider the socio-cultural elements of these societies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  identity-­‐based	  cleavages’	  (2012:	  71).	  The	  OECD	  wishes	  also	  to	   ‘appeal	  across	  factional	  divides’	  (2008:	  81).	  137	  See,	   Cretney	   and	   Bond	   (2014:	   18–31),	   for	   an	   example	   of	   an	   interpretation	   of	  resilience	  as	  a	  strategy	  useful	  to	  contest	  everyday	  capitalism	  	  138	  Campbell	   already	   told	   us,	   following	   Derrida,	   that	   every	   ‘decision’	   is	   necessarily	  ‘unjust’	   to	   difference,	   as	   it	   is	   a	   ‘finite	   moment’	   that	   ‘cuts’	   the	   infinite	   realm	   of	   the	  ‘undecidable’	  (1998:	  186).	  139	  One	   of	   the	   concerns	   for	   the	   OECD,	   for	   example,	   is	   to	   improve	   how	   international	  institutions	   implement	   their	   rhetoric	   better.	   As	   they	   suggest,	   the	   need	   is	   for	   ‘more	  focused	  efforts	  to	  walk	  the	  talk’	  OECD	  (2011a:	  45).	  	  140	  UNSC	  (2009:	  14).	  141	  World	  Bank	  (2011:	  193).	  142	  OECD	  (2011b:	  22).	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as positive resources to take into account. The idea is that previously ignored 
groups such as women, children, minority communities or even local 
photographers can play a decisive role in building a stable and durable 
peace.143 The challenge today seems to be, ‘how can external actors provide 
such a society with the space it needs to allow its own resilience to emerge 
and for the country to achieve sustainable peace?’ 144  In this context, 
international institutions such as the OECD, the UNDP or the World Bank 
have limited the scope for external interventions and have adopted a subtler 
role, as ‘it is crucial for development partners to step back, work in the 
background and, as appropriate, dilute their own relative role to domestic 
actors’.145 
This study has sought to argue that this contemporary manifestation of 
peacebuilding and the academic critics of the liberal peace share a similar 
predisposition to embrace difference. Heuristically, therefore, I have 
presented three perspectives: liberal peace, critics of the liberal peace and 
resilience approaches. The conclusion is that, along the lines of theoretical 
critics, building peace as resilience relies on a context-sensitive, iterative and 
hybrid process of mutual learning among diverse actors, which is 
significantly different to the top-down and domineering liberal peace. That 
is, as it is read here, while Campbell’s critique of the state-building in Bosnia 
was prescient to signal the limits of the liberal peace, in the last years 
international organisations have caught up with the critique and have also 
recognised the constraints of an externally driven peace. Even if policy-
makers do not use a post-modern idiom, their commitment toward the 
particularism of other societies is visible, for example, in their attempts to 
support local actors to build peace by using the resources they already have. 
Although the critics of liberal peace indicate that deeper context-sensitive 
analysis is needed and suggest that every attempt to build peace will 
necessarily be unfaithful to difference, 146  international institutions 
comparably admit that resilience will continuously remain ‘to come’.147 I 
contend that it is important to acknowledge the shift in policymaking to 
reinvigorate the existing (un)critical analyses of contemporary 
peacebuilding. This feeble critique is precisely the focus of the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  143	  See	  Alliance	  for	  Peacebuilding	  (2014)	  144	  Carvalho	  (2014:	  2).	  145	  OECD	  (2011:	  47);	  Carvalho	  (2014:	  4).	  146	  Campbell	  (1998:	  186);	  Drichel	  (2008:	  608–609);	  Sabaratnam	  (2013:	  270–273).	  147	  World	  Bank	  (2011:	  193);	  OECD	  (2011b:	  22).	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Chapter 4.  
Hybrid Peace and Difference: 
Vorarephilia of Critique? 
 
Introduction 
 
Alongside the policy difficulties in building a stable and durable peace in the 
former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Afghanistan and Iraq, to name 
only a few cases, scholars have come to the fore to announce the crisis of the 
liberal peace.1 From an ethical reading of peacebuilding endeavours, these 
critical views underline the problem that international policy-makers have 
ignored the political, societal and cultural heterogeneity of post-conflict 
societies and have excluded the interests of the majority of the population. A 
deeper engagement with these societies has both exposed the weaknesses of 
current peacebuilding processes and has animated an alternative way of 
thinking about peace. As Richmond argues, ‘the limitations of the liberal 
peace project have sparked new forms of peace in reaction, response, or as 
resistance, by a repoliticization of post-conflict subjects. This represents the 
inadvertent rediscovery or rebirth of post-liberal politics in infrapolitical 
terms’.2 For the critics, a post-liberal peace emerges in a hybrid process that 
is carefully and dynamically negotiated between local actors and 
international partners.3 The aim of this hybrid process is to achieve an 
‘inclusive’ (post-liberal) peace that embraces ‘difference’.4  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  critics	  of	  the	  liberal	  peace	  by	  no	  means	  comprise	  a	  homogeneous	  group.	  However,	  the	  texts	  analysed	  below	  (Belloni	  2012;	  Boege	  et	  al.	  2009;	  Brigg,	  2010;	  Brigg	  and	  Müller	  2009;	  Richmond	  2009a,	  2010a,	  2011,	  2012;	  Mac	  Ginty	  2008,	  2010;	  Roberts	  2011,	  2012)	  share	   a	   commitment	   to	   a	   locally	   engrained	  peace	   and	   argue	   that	   hybrid	   formulations	  are	  more	   respectful	   of	   local	   alterity	   than	   existing	   liberal	   practices.	   In	   this	   research	   I	  exclude	   other	   critical	   theorists	   of	   the	   liberal	   peace	  who	   focus	   on	   economic	   or	   power	  relations	   (for	  example,	   see	   Jabri,	  2007;	  Pugh,	  2005;	  Duffield,	  2007)	  because	   they	  shift	  the	   debate	   away	   from	   the	   discussions	   about	   the	   role	   of	   ‘difference’	   in	   peacebuilding	  settings.	  2	  Richmond	  (2012:	  126).	  3	  The	   distinction	   between	   liberal	   and	   critical	   understandings	   (post-­‐liberal	   or	   hybrid	  peace)	  is	  very	  often	  blurred,	  as	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  examine	  in	  this	  thesis.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  (3)	  I	  have	  argued	  how	  both	  the	  policy	  approach	  of	  building	  resilience	  and	  critical	  scholars	  similarly	  use	  elements	  of	  the	  everyday	  to	  build	  peace.	  However,	  it	  is	   important	   to	   maintain	   the	   categories	   liberal	   and	   post-­‐liberal	   because	   this	   is	   the	  framing	   used	   by	   the	   critical	   approaches	   that	   I	   analyse	   in	   the	   present	   chapter.	   For	  example,	   as	   Richmond	   (2011:	   2)	   explains,	   the	   argument	   is	   between	   ‘dogmatic	   liberal	  and	  statist	  positions	  toward	  peace	  [liberal	  peace]	  and	  a	  critical	  and	  reflective	  position	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‘Hybridity’ has largely been discussed in post-colonial studies as a 
concept that problematises the boundaries of identity and difference.5 Since 
an analysis of hybridity in toto is beyond the scope of this research, I explore 
how hybridity has been recently incorporated in peace debates. This is 
important for the present research, as hybrid peace seeks to solve the 
problem of engaging sensitively with difference that haunts the frameworks 
of the liberal peace.6 In this chapter, I shed light on the critique of the liberal 
peace in order to unpack its ethical assumptions and understand how 
critique functions. I do so from within, by analysing this critical framework in 
its own terms. This means that I will not apply or disprove their claims in 
relation to the cases of the former Yugoslavia – even if these sooner or later 
will appear in form of ‘projections’. 7  It is argued that critique has 
continuously invoked the particularism of post-war societies in order to 
signal the limitation of previous approaches and open up new possibilities 
for peace. The result is a persistent critique in which the solution appears to 
be a constant demand for a deeper exploration of other societies.   
The chapter proceeds through four sections. Firstly, it analyses Connolly’s 
work on pluralism, as it is useful to frame the ethical disposition of the critics 
of the liberal peace. Secondly, it focuses on the critical evaluation of existing 
practices of peacebuilding. As I will illustrate, the critics have emphasised 
that international policy-makers have failed to achieve sustainable peace 
because they have governed conflict-affected societies from an outside 
perspective that has overlooked valuable resources from the everyday. 
Thirdly, the chapter explores the critics’ alternative proposition. This is 
expressed as hybrid peace, which encompasses an agonistic negotiation 
between multiple actors in order to produce a locally engrained peace. 
However, as it is seen in the fourth section, hybrid peace has also been 
critically reviewed. Post-colonialist authors have identified the Eurocentric 
assumptions in the critique of the liberal peace which undermine the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  centred	  on	  social	  and	  public	  concerns	  in	  their	  everyday	  political,	  social,	  economic,	  and	  cultural	  contexts	  and	  related	  to	  the	  same	  list	  of	  prerequisites	  for	  peace	  [post-­‐liberal	  or	  hybrid	  peace].	  4 	  Richmond	   follows	   Connolly	   to	   criticise	   the	   liberal	   peace,	   which	   excludes	   or	  undermines	   difference.	   Instead,	   he	   proposes	   the	   ‘ethical’	   alternative	   of	   a	   post-­‐liberal	  peace	  that	  rests	  on	  ‘an	  ontological	  agreement	  and	  hybridity’	  that	  is	  ‘open	  to	  difference’	  (2009a:	  565).	  This	  point	   is	   important	   for	   this	   chapter,	   since	   I	  use	  Connolly’s	  ethics	   to	  unpack	  the	  critique	  of	  the	  liberal	  peace.	  5	  For	  example,	  Bhabha	  (1994);	  Hall	  (1987);	  Pieterse	  (2001).	  6	  For	   two	  overviews	  of	  hybridity	   in	  peace	  studies,	  see	  Peterson	  (2012)	  and	  Nadarajah	  and	  Rampton	  (2014).	  7	  As	   Connolly	   argues,	   ‘A	   projection	   is	   offered	   because	   thinking	   cannot	   proceed	   here	  without	  invoking,	  implicitly	  or	  explicitly,	  consciously	  or	  unconsciously,	  a	  social	  ontology	  in	   the	  very	   language	   selected	  by	   it.’	   (2002:	  66).	   In	   the	  next	   chapter,	   I	  will	   rethink	   the	  liberal	   and	   post-­‐liberal	   peace	   by	   referring	   to	   the	   political	   claims	   of	   the	   citizens	   in	  Kosovo.	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societies intervened upon. The conclusion is that the critique of the critique 
resembles a vorarephilia of critique, in which difference will always exceed 
any conceptual scope, but the autonomy of post-conflict societies seem to 
remain in limbo.   
Before I start with the analysis of the literature, it is important to place 
this chapter in the context of this thesis. I carefully focus here on hybrid 
peace (post-liberal) approaches already introduced in the previous chapter. I 
do so in order to evaluate a perspective, which promises to build peace in 
tune with the particularism of every society. Hybrid peace scholars promise 
to do so beyond the failures of international policymaking – from liberal 
peace to resilience approaches (chapter 1-3). However, the conclusion of the 
chapter – the observation that critique has continually indicated that earlier 
attempts to build peace have been unfaithful to locals interests8 – is useful to 
raise a question, which anticipates the direction of the argument: are the 
critics of liberal peacebuilding on their way to embrace difference 
consistently? In asking this question, it is my suspicion that these scholars 
hinder the political processes of conflict-affected societies, rather than 
envisaging a way forward for peace. In chapter 5, I will address the debate 
on ownership to conclude that critical approaches of liberal peace have been 
unable to respond to post-war societies satisfactorily. 
 
 
Connolly’s pluralism: taming violence and the fragility of ethics 
 
Early in his career, William Connolly was in the vanguard of left-wing critics 
who argued that the pluralist ideal – as it was codified in modern societies 
like the US – was ‘biased’ in favour of certain groups who could enact rules 
or laws and against others who were subordinated or excluded from the 
public. 9  Since the ideal imagined by Tocqueville did not fit the new 
circumstances affecting modern societies, Connolly sought to extend ‘the 
limits of politics’ and point to new areas where diverse views could also be 
included.10 The affirmation of a new pluralist ideal, which has been coined as 
the ‘new pluralism,’ 11  was developed in three different books: 
Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (2002 [1991]), 
The Ethos of Pluralization (1995) and Pluralism (2005). These books will be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  “By	  ‘local’,	  critical	  scholars	  mean,	  ‘the	  range	  of	  locally	  based	  agencies	  present	  within	  a	  conflict	   and	   post-­‐conflict	   environment,	   some	   of	   which	   are	   aimed	   at	   identifying	   and	  creating	  the	  necessary	  processes	  for	  peace,	  perhaps	  with	  or	  without	  international	  help,	  and	   framed	   in	   a	  way	   in	  which	   legitimacy	   in	   local	   and	   international	   terms	   converges’	  (Richmond	  and	  Mac	  Ginty	  2013:	  769).	  9	  Connolly	  (1969).	  10	  Connolly	  (1969:	  26).	  11	  Campbell	  and	  Schoolman	  (2008:	  9).	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considered below, with special attention on the earliest, where Connolly 
develops his ethics by presenting two paradoxes. One way to pose the first 
paradox is this: every identity necessitates differences in order to be, but 
differences are considered problematic when there is an attempt to pursue 
security in identity.12 The second can be formulated like this: having some 
ethical standards is indispensable for social life, but finding an ultimate 
ethical command that could work for ever and for all is a fantasy.13 By 
negotiating these two paradoxes, Connolly aims to subdue the politics of 
generalised resentment against difference that emerges in response to the 
condition of uncertainty, deterritorialisation and the globalisation of 
contingency of what he calls ‘the late-modern time’.14 Below I intend to 
analyse these paradoxes and in the following section, Connolly’s work on 
pluralism will be placed in relation to the contemporary critique of the 
liberal peace. 
‘The first paradox’ resides in the tense relation between identity and 
difference. For Connolly, identity is a mixture of cultural and biological 
features that is fundamentally relational.15 Identity and difference, essential 
for human beings, are mutually constitutive and the question whether it is 
possible to live with difference outside the space of identity is answered 
negatively. 16  However, they exist in a complex political relation. 
Contemporary experiences of contingency, fragility and disruption in the 
self encourage some people to deprecate differences that are at odds with the 
identities they live. This is because, in a context of existential despair, 
individuals and collectives wish to protect the certainty and coherence of 
their identities, but, in so doing, they tend to subjugate the (indispensable) 
differences that pose a challenge to the self.17 That is, the temptation to 
pursue an unambiguous identity independent from difference automatically 
implies being disrespectful towards difference: 
[T]he multiple drives to stamp truth upon those identities function to convert 
differences into otherness and otherness into scapegoats created and 
maintained to secure the appearance of a true identity. To possess a true 
identity is to be false to difference, while to be true to difference is to sacrifice 
the promise of a true identity.18 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Connolly	  (2002:	  xiv);	  He	  also	  calls	   the	  relation	  of	   identity	  difference	   ‘the	  site	  of	   two	  problems	  of	  evil’	  (x-­‐xi).	  	  13	  Connolly	  (2002:	  9–12;	  93–94).	  14	  Connolly	  (2002:	  15;	  1995:	  22).	  15	  Connolly	  (2002:	  xvii).	  16	  Connolly	  (2002:	  158).	  17	  This	   paradox	   can	   also	   be	   understood	   by	   looking	   at	   the	   ambiguities	   of	   ‘borders’.	   As	  Connolly	   argues,	   ‘boundaries	   form	   indispensable	   protections	   against	   violation	   and	  violence;	  but	  the	  divisions	  they	  sustain	  also	  carry	  cruelty	  and	  violence’	  (1995:	  163).	  	  18	  Connolly	  (2002:	  67).	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For Connolly, therefore, it is the aspiration to achieve a true or total identity 
that is problematic, for it converts difference into otherness in a process that 
is essentially violent. The stronger is the willingness to secure the identities 
of the normal individual, the society or the nation-state, the more otherness 
are produced that can be potentially assimilated, marginalised, opposed or 
condemned.19  
For example, the pursuit of a territorially coherent nation-state may 
generate ‘persecution, refugees, boat people, terrorism, ethnic cleansing’ and 
‘evil’.20 All societies privilege some identities in the process of defining 
norms and building institutions. Irremediably, at the same time, they treat 
differences as threats or deviations from the normal standards that need to 
be corrected, modified or even liquidated. 21  These struggles against 
difference do not reflect a ‘political engagement’ with the paradox, as 
Connolly advises us to practice, but an attempt to ‘suppress it’.22 So, the 
question remains; how is one to combat the longing for the completion of 
identities that cause the exclusion or elimination of their differences? This is 
to ask, is there a way to overcome the risks implicated in the politics of 
identity/difference? With this challenge in mind, Connolly introduces ‘the 
second paradox’. 
For Connolly, resolving the problems that emerge from the willingness to 
protect identity from difference requires an ethical sensibility.23  Yet the 
paradox of ethics lies between the need for frameworks that seek to contain 
violence against others and the cruelties and injustices installed in any 
attempt to do so. As he argues, ‘without a set of standards of identity and 
responsibility there is no possibility of ethical discrimination, but the 
application of any such set of historical constructions also does violence to 
those to whom it is applied’.24 Connolly uses this paradox to criticize forms 
of liberalism – as well as Marxism, secularism or other perspectives with 
universal aspirations or with presuppositions of the self.25 Because all forms 
of liberalism, he argues, organise societies by bestowing privilege to certain 
identities, norms and ideals, but fail to ‘identify the constellation of 
normal/abnormal dualities already inscribed in the culture they idealize’.26 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Connolly	  (1995:	  xxi,	  89–90).	  20	  Connolly	   (2005:	   29).	   See	   also	   Connolly’s	   discussion	   about	   territorial	   democracy	  (2002:	  198–222).	  	  	  	  21	  (Connolly,	  1995:	  88–89).	  22	  Connolly	  (1995:	  xxi).	  23	  Connolly	  (2002:	  9–12).	  24	  Connolly	  (2002:	  12).	  25	  It	   is	   important	   to	   note,	   before	   explaining	   his	   position,	   that	   he	   does	   not	   reject	  liberalism.	   It	   revises	   it	   by	   cultivating	   an	   ethics	   that	   affirm	   the	   ambiguities	   and	  contingencies	   of	   life	   (Connolly	   2002:	   83;	   Schoolman	   2008:	   19).	   For	   a	   critique	   of	  Connolly’s	  unwillingness	  to	  reject	  liberalism,	  see	  Shinko	  (2008).	  	  26	  Connolly	  (2002:	  74).	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By presupposing a model for all, these theories lack self-reflexivity and care 
for the differences they deprecate, imprison, or punish as abnormalities.27 In 
brief, they do not acknowledge that no particular form of the common life 
can be responsible for the fullness of diversity. 
By contrast, Connolly’s ethics do not stem from a transcendental 
command nor are deduced from any authority, reason or divine force. He is 
not willing to respond ‘why be ethical? Or ‘what is the epistemic ground of 
ethics’. He pursues ‘ways to cultivate care for identity and difference in a 
world already permeated by ethical proclivities and predispositions to 
identity’. 28  His ethics, therefore, are motivated from the care for the 
abundance and rich diversity of life that is constantly foreclosed by drives to 
secure identities and ethical commands.29 In other words, his sensibilities are 
governed by the readiness to appreciate the energies and fugitive 
experiences that exceed any form of identity or model for human 
organisation.30  
In order to surmount the relation of violence toward difference, 
Connolly’s highest aspiration that cannot be fulfilled by any fundamental 
framework, he negotiates (rather than suppresses or ignores) both paradoxes 
at once. He proposes to ‘cultivate the experience of contingency in identity’ 
and ‘interrogate exclusions build into [people’s] own entrenched identities’ 
with the intention of developing ‘a politics alert to a tragic gap between the 
imperatives of organization in the order it idealizes and admirable 
possibilities of life that exceed those imperatives’.31 His ethics operate at two 
levels: the individual and the community level. At the individual level, there 
is the need to cultivate the tactics of self-modification in order to negotiate 
the first paradox. This of course means to abandon the hope for a true 
identity or a life without difference. Connolly affirms contingency and the 
ambiguities that exist within the relation between identity and difference. 
This is a means to resist the resentment against the other that emanates from 
the failure to achieve the fullness of identity. 32 At the same time, the 
affirmation of contingency also opens up alternative possibilities for relating 
to the differences that could otherwise be censured, condemned.33 This leads 
to an engagement with the second paradox.  
Here, Connolly’s ethics take place at the community level and enact a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Connolly	  (2002:	  70–94).	  28	  Connolly	  (2002:	  10	  [Emphasis	  in	  the	  original]).	  29	  Connolly	  (1995:	  27,	  93).	  30	  Connolly	   (2002:	  82).	   In	  a	   recent	  book,	   this	   appreciation	  has	  become	  radicalised:	  he	  embraces	  the	  emerging	  opportunities	  that	  open	  up	  by	  appreciating	  a	  world	  of	  becoming	  (Connolly	  2011).	  31	  Connolly	  (2002:	  14).	  32	  Connolly	  (1995:	  63).	  33	  Connolly	  (2002:	  180).	  
101	  |	  C H .  4 :  H Y B R I D  P E A C E  A N D  D I F F E R E N C E  
democratic ethos, guided by the principle of contestability.34 His pluralist 
democratic position can be explained in terms of ‘a bicameral orientation to 
political life’: this means the adoption of a creed or the defense of an 
ideology or philosophy in the world, while assuming that it is contestable by 
alternative faiths. 35  This orientation demands, firstly, an element of 
humbleness in the faith one preaches because others might not share it and 
wish to question it. Secondly, it shows ‘agonistic respect and critical 
responsiveness between diverse constituencies’.36 For Connolly, the pluralist 
is alert to contest the dogmatisation of hegemonic identities and 
fundamentalisms, disturb conventional judgements, suspect about frozen 
consensus, resist against naturalisations or practices that cement contingency 
and pluralise thought. 37 Far from reducing public life into paralytic place in 
which no meaning or consensus can be advanced, a pluralist engagement 
with diversity creates new possibilities for a peaceful identification. As he 
puts it, critically rethinking dogmatic identities ‘forms an essential prelude to 
the effort to devise creative ways through which a wider variety of identities 
can negotiate less violent terms of coexistence’.38 
What is important for the present research is that Connolly’ ethics 
respond to what he calls the ‘late-modern time,’ in which struggles against 
difference abound, as seen, for example, in religious crusades, terrorism, 
cultural wars or projects of international hegemony or justice.39 Connolly’s 
thoughts thus can be situated vis-à-vis the explosion of the civil wars of the 
1990s and the ensuing external interventions to bring peace that this thesis 
problematises. Even if Connolly never addresses any particular cases,40 his 
ambition to end violence perpetrated against difference and overcome the 
limitations of hegemonic theories resonates explicitly or implicitly with 
critical understandings of liberal peace interventions. This is not to say that 
Connolly’s views have necessarily influenced critical approaches or to say 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34 	  See	   Schoolman	   (2008)	   for	   the	   relation	   between	   contestation,	   genealogy	   and	  deconstruction	   in	   Connolly’s	   work	   (2008:	   41).	   Although	   it	   is	   not	   the	   focus	   of	   this	  research,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  situate	  his	  democratic	  position	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  political	  thinkers	  who	  have	  similarly	  advanced	  agonistic	  democracy	  as	  a	  practice	  that	  opens-­‐up	  the	   care	   for	  diversity	   and	   the	   contestation	  of	  hegemonic	  points	  of	   view.	  For	   example,	  see	  Mouffe	  (1999)	  and	  Honig	  (2007).	  35	  Connolly	  (2005:	  4).	  36	  Connolly	  (1995:	  xx).	  37 	  Conolly	   (1995:	   xxiii,	   85–93).	   For	   example,	   pluralise	   ‘the	   modern	   territorial	  imagination,’	  as	  territories	  contain	  exclusive	  boundaries.	  38	  Connolly	  (1995:	  90).	  39	  Connolly	   (1995:	   193).	   For	   Connolly,	   it	   is	   this	   same	   contemporary	   era	   of	   speed	   and	  global	   contingency,	   which	   ‘forms	   a	   condition	   of	   possibility	   for	   emergence	   of	   a	   more	  generous	  pluralism’	  (1995:	  99).	  40 	  For	   instance,	   Connolly	   briefly	   discusses	   Bosnia	   as	   an	   example	   opposed	   to	   his	  sensibilities.	  Because	   in	  Bosnia	   ‘some	   identities	   insist	   upon	  universalizing	   themselves	  by	  conquering,	  assimilating,	  or	  liquidating	  their	  opponents’	  (1995:	  27).	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that his sensibilities have been assumed in peace debates.41 I contend that 
Connolly’s ethical disposition to rethink both nationalist narratives (by 
engaging with the first paradox) and universal discourses (by engaging with 
the second) is useful to frame the ethical direction developed by the critics of 
the liberal peace. 
 
 
Negotiating Connolly’s paradoxes: the critique of liberal peace 
 
The analysis of Connolly’s new pluralism is more than a prelude: it is useful 
to frame the critique of the liberal peace. This is because, in short, Connolly’s 
ethical proclivity to affirm difference aims at both curbing global resentment 
and contesting liberal problematisations of difference. Post-liberal peace 
frameworks42 emerge as ethical interpretations of the liberal peace that 
highlight its conceptual shortcomings and intend to be more respectful of the 
needs and interests of war-affected societies. 43  ‘Ethically’, as Richmond 
argues, ‘moving beyond these limitations would amount to an ontological 
commitment to care for others in their everyday contexts, based upon 
empathy, respect and the recognition of difference’.44 The rest of the present 
chapter analyses the post-liberal peace. Firstly, it focuses on the critique of 
the main assumptions of the liberal peace. Secondly, it examines the 
proposed alternative of a hybrid project that builds peace via the everyday. 
However, it is argued in the last section, hybrid peace has also been criticised 
by post-colonial critics who demand a more anti-essentialist view of 
hybridity and a deeper decolonisation of peacebuilding. 
The critics of the liberal peace flag up the problem that international 
policy-makers have failed to recognize the importance of the diverse ‘infra-
political areas’ of the conflict-affected societies intervened upon.45 Two main 
(fairly interrelated) reasons explain this inattention. The first is that 
peacebuilding proposes neoliberal strategies, security-based policies and 
human rights principles in a subtle colonial form which privileges a West-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  There	  are	  recurrent	  references	  to	  Connolly’s	  work	  in	  the	  critique	  of	  the	  liberal	  peace	  (i.e.	  Richmond	  2011:	  109;	  MacGinty	  and	  Richmond	  2013:	  764),	  but	  this	  is	  not	  to	  imply	  that	  Connolly	  guides	  the	  critics’	  normative	  positioning.	  42	  Fn.	  1.	  43	  It	  is	  important	  not	  to	  see	  this	  approach	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  liberal	  peace,	  but	  rather	  as	   a	   critical	   reappraisal.	   Indeed,	   Connolly’s	   framework	   is,	   as	   recognised	   by	   himself,	   a	  reconstituted	  liberalism	  (2002:	  93).	  44	  Richmond	  (2009a:	  566).	  45	  Richmond	   means	   by	   ‘infrapolitical	   areas’	   the	   ‘hidden	   transcripts	   of	   peacebuilding’.	  These	   are	   the	   ‘social,	   historical,	   cultural,	   political,	   and	   economic	   realities,	   in	   their	  everyday	   contexts’,	   which	   are	   ignored	   by	   liberal	   peace	   approaches	   (2011:	   198).	  Heuristically,	   I	   have	   interpreted	   this	   concept	   as	   ‘difference’,	   which	   always	   exceeds	  external	  governance	  and	  which	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  resource	  to	  foster	  peace.	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dominated world order to the detriment of the local population of non-
Western countries.46 As Mac Ginty and Richmond succinctly put it,  
peace building and state building strategy appears to confirm a 
longstanding colonial narrative that places the global North in a 
dominant, selfish and also vulnerable position. The West exercises 
structural and governmental power against the local, simultaneously 
preaching democracy, human rights and accountability and assuming 
the subaltern has little agency.47  
The second reason, the focus of this research, concerns the notion that 
‘difference’ cannot be comprehended, represented or governed from an 
externally driven perspective.48 Beatrice Pouligny, for example, after her 
extensive experience as practitioner in Central and South America, the 
Caribbean, Africa, Asia and the Balkans, has documented how the classical 
approach to peace overlooks the ‘stories written at the community level’.49 
Her studies represent, already from a reflexive methodology, a step further 
toward the comprehension of local subjectivities. Knowledgeable of local 
languages (or working closely with linguistic and anthropologist colleagues 
and local experts), she pursues formal interviews as well as informal contacts 
with diverse people in the street, in markets or in buses and pays a careful 
attention to daily life to get as close as possible to local actors’ views.50 With 
analyses from ‘below’,51 from the complexity of everyday practices that resist 
organisational structures,52 Pouligny and other critics signal the limits of the 
liberal peace approach because this focuses on state-centric and elite-
bargaining processes, formal institutions, applies one-size-fits-all 
prescriptions and uses homogenous categories to frame conflict-affected 
societies.53 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  This	  critique	  follows	  the	  point	  stated	  by	  other	  power-­‐oriented	  critics	  (see	  fn.	  1)	  –	  it	  is	  not	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  chapter.	  47	  Mac	  Ginty	  and	  Richmond	  (2013:	  773).	  Also,	  Richmond	  (2009a:	  565)	  	  48	  Boege	  et	  al.	  (2009).	  	  49	  Pouligny	  (2005:	  507).	  50	  Pouligny	  (2006:	  ix–xvii).	  51	  Pouligny	   (2006:	   ix–xvii);	  Boege	   et	   al.	   (2009:	  609);	   also,	  Richmond	  goes	   as	   far	   as	   to	  argue	   that	   ‘from	   the	   ground,	   for	  many	   of	   its	   recipients,	   the	   various	   iterations	   of	   this	  liberal	  peace	  project	  have	  taken	  on	  a	  colonial	  appearance’	  (2009c).	  52	  For	   an	   early	   critique	  of	   how	   social	   science	   lacks	   an	   analysis	   of	   how	  people	   in	   their	  everyday	  life	  individualise	  or	  reappropriate	  the	  organizational	  techniques	  of	  power	  and	  institutions,	  see	  De	  Certeau	  (1984).	  Also,	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  different	  conceptualisations	  of	  resistance	  in	  different	  fields	  and	  approaches,	  see	  Pile	  (1997:	  1–32).	  	  53	  Richmond’s	  genealogy	  of	  peace	  and	  conflict	   theory	   is	  useful	   to	  have	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  critical	  perspectives.	  He	  identifies	  that	  the	  first	  three	  generations	  of	  peace	  have	  only	  maintained	  a	  marginal	  inclusion	  of	  the	  locals	  in	  the	  processes	  of	  peace.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  fourth	   generation	   of	   peace	   or	   post-­‐liberal	   peace	   that	   I	   am	   analysing	   here	   wishes	   to	  overcome	  these	  weaknesses	  (2006;	  2010b).	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Although the critics recognize that international policy-makers are 
increasingly adopting more context-sensitive and local oriented peace 
endeavours, they regard the shift with utter suspicion.54 For them, the local 
turn is only happening rhetorically, as a tactic to improve the legitimacy of 
the international authorities, but not in practice, wherein the parameters of 
peacebuilding are established from an external perspective.55 Boege and 
colleagues, for example, argue that the recent talks of ‘local ownership’ are 
only about paying ‘lip service’ without actually taking others’ customary 
laws or rules into account. 56  Also, another charge is that international 
institutions only give support to the locals perspectives that fit their interests 
or purposes, 57 rather than dealing with a more inclusive, pluralist and 
contextual representation of conflict-affected societies. For Richmond, the 
liberal peace provides a superficial dialogue with elites or internationally 
sponsored civil society instead of allowing for the participation of the more 
complex, deeper and richer ‘local-local’.58 This is crucial because the failure 
of the liberal peace is read in these terms. As indicated by critical studies of 
the peace process in the former Yugoslavia, superficial and limited 
understandings of the locals have reproduced divisive and violent 
categories 59  and the process has been co-opted by elites or nationalist 
entrepreneurs.60 
Here, for the purpose of understanding the logic underpinning this 
argument, it might be useful to re-engage with Connolly’s ‘paradox of 
ethicality’: while some ethical standards are necessary to organize social life, 
these will inescapably exclude, relegate or undermine some views. For the 
critics, ‘the single-transferable peace package risks minimizing the space for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  For	  example,	  Brigg	  (2013:	  13–18);	  Mac	  Ginty	  (2008:	  142).	  This	  point	  makes	  reference	  to	   the	   previous	   two	   chapters.	   As	   I	   have	   argued,	   critical	   understandings	   of	   the	   liberal	  peace	   have	   underappreciated	   the	   policy	   evolution	   of	   international	   statebuilding	   in	  Kosovo	  (ch	  2)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ethical	  responsibility	  to	  support	  local	  views	  underpinning	  resilient	  approaches	  (ch	  3).	  55	  Belloni	   (2012:	   35);	  Mac	   Ginty	   and	   Richmond	   (2013:	   775);	   Richmond	   (2009a:	   565;	  2012:	  120).	  56	  Boege	  et	  al.	  (2009:	  611).	  57	  Richmond	  (2011:	  29).	  58	  Richmond	   borrows	   the	   concept	   local-­‐local	   from	   Arjun	   Appadurai	   to	   highlight	   the	  difference	   between	   the	   liberal	   engagement	   with	   the	   local	   and	   his	   ‘deeper’	  understanding	   of	   the	   local.	   So	   the	   local-­‐local	   denotes	   ‘the	   existence	   and	   diversity	   of	  communities	  and	  individuals	  that	  constitute	  political	  society	  beyond	  this	  often	  liberally	  projected	  artifice	  of	  elites	  and	  civil	   society’	   (2011:	  13–14).	  Also,	  see	  Richmond	  (2012:	  120).	  59 	  This	   is,	   for	   example,	   the	   accusation	   that	   international	   interveners	   have	  institutionalized	   ethnicity	   and	   therefore	   reproduced	   violent	   discourses	   (Devic	   2006;	  Hehir,	  2007).	  Also,	  Mac	  Ginty	  (2008:	  151).	  	  	  60	  For	   an	   analysis	   that	   highlights	   the	   co-­‐option	   of	   liberal	   peacebuilding	   by	   so-­‐called	  illiberal	  groups	  in	  Kosovo,	  see	  Franks	  and	  Richmond	  (2008).	  For	  an	  analysis	  of	  how	  civil	  society	  is	  very	  narrowly	  framed	  in	  Bosnia,	  see	  Richmond	  (2011:	  71–78).	  
105	  |	  C H .  4 :  H Y B R I D  P E A C E  A N D  D I F F E R E N C E  
organic local, traditional or indigenous contributions to peace-making’.61 The 
critique of the liberal peace points out the failure to appreciate and engage 
with difference – or the deep ‘local-local’, as Richmond puts it – in present 
practices of peacebuilding. 62  As Brigg points out, ‘currently available 
theoretical frameworks tend to be insufficient for addressing the challenges 
of cultural difference in peace and conflict studies’.63 The observation that 
difference exceeds the conceptual grasp of an outside or universal 
perspective is not only a methodological point, but also a normative 
appraisal. For the critics, as for Connolly, the challenge is to develop an 
account of peace that affirms the richness of the everyday life without 
relying upon another set of a priori principles or out-of-context institutional 
frameworks.64 This approach aspires to an ethical process of peace in tune 
with the particularism of the other.65 
However, the critical frameworks of the liberal peace do not entail the 
celebration of all the ideas or practices proposed by the locals.66 Post-war 
societies are not considered automatically unproblematic or benign, opposed 
to the domineering, interest-based and quasi-colonialist international 
interveners. For the critics, local actors can also have strong partisan feelings, 
pursue hierarchical social relations or be willing to exclude ethnic 
minorities.67 As MacGinty argues, ‘rather than a romantic defence of all 
things traditional or indigenous or the pursuit of a discourse of authenticity 
(which attaches premium to anything deemed authentic), all peace-making 
techniques and assumptions should be exposed to rigorous tests of relevance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Mac	  Ginty	  (2008:	  145).	  62	  As	  it	  will	  be	  argued	  in	  the	  last	  section,	  this	  is	  also	  the	  argument	  used	  by	  some	  scholars	  to	  criticise	  the	  critics	  of	  the	  liberal	  peace.	  That	  is,	  the	  critique	  of	  the	  critique	  is	  based	  on	  the	  same	  logic:	  difference	  always	  exceeds	  any	  approach	  that	  aims	  at	  embracing	  it.	  63	  Brigg	  (2010:	  339).	  64	  For	  Richmond	  this	  is	  the	  contradiction	  of	  peace:	  ‘it	  requires	  a	  method,	  ontology,	  and	  epistemology	  which	  is	  negotiated	  locally,	  but	  prompted	  externally	  by	  agents	  who	  must	  engage	  with	   the	  other,	  but	   cannot	  know	  one	  another	  a	  priori’	   (2011:	  10	   [emphasis	   in	  the	  original]).	  	  65	  It	   is	   important	  to	  note	  that	  beyond	  discussions	  of	  peace,	  this	  ethical	  commitment	  to	  the	  Other	  has	   long	  ago	  been	  discussed.	  A	  radical	   interpretation	  of	   this	  position	  can	  be	  found,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  Emmanuel	  Levinas,	  who	  underscores	  a	  relation	  to	  the	  “Other	  as	  other”,	  even	  if	  this	  is	  unknown,	  incalculable	  (quoted	  in	  Campbell	  1998:	  172–173).	  Also,	  Bhabha	  (1994:	  184).	  66	  Connolly	  (2002:	  14–15).	  67	  Belloni	  (2012:	  33);	  Boege	  et	  al.	  (2009:	  612);	  Mac	  Ginty	  (2008:	  149–150);	  Mac	  Ginty	  and	   Richmond	   (2013:	   770).	   It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   this	   point	   is	   very	   often	  introduced	  as	  a	  caveat	  or	  short	  insight	  in	  this	  literature.	  As	  it	  will	  be	  argued	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  this	  framing	  of	  the	  local	  as	   ‘violent’	  or	   ‘partisan’	   leads	  the	  critics	  to	  deny	  self-­‐government	   to	   the	   local	  and	   legitimize	   international	   intervention.	  Moreover,	   I	   suggest	  that	  by	  rethinking	   this	  point	  peacebuilding	  can	  be	   thought	  differently	   from	  the	   liberal	  peace	  and	  its	  critical	  understandings.	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and fitness for purpose’.68 Here, Connolly’s negotiation of the paradox of 
identity/difference clarifies the position of the critics. For instance, even if he 
is committed to diversity, he does not respect violent faiths and even 
proposes to take military or police action in these extreme cases.69 The 
problems of violence across difference in conflict-affected environments 
cannot be tamed through the means of reinforcing the existing relations 
among identity groups or upholding some sovereignty claims at the expense 
of others. For him, groups that desire territorial hegemony or national 
dominance have the same problems of exclusion and violence towards 
difference than doctrines or movements with universal ambitions.70 
By contrast, as analysed in the previous section, Connolly proposes ‘to 
enliven the awareness of contingency within established constellations of 
identity and difference’ and open up new possibilities for co-operation and 
coexistence. 71  The important point here is that Connolly’s sensibilities 
eschew both universalist and culturalist frameworks because no hegemonic 
identity or faith can show fidelity to the diversity of the human condition. 
His ethics propose to embrace difference through a ‘bicameral orientation’ 
toward political life: affirming identities or faiths and, at the same time, 
negotiating with others in an agonistic process that is never completed.72 
This pluralism is useful to frame the proposed alternative of the post-liberal 
peace: this is a hybrid project, which moves away from the liberal peace 
universal assumptions and seeks to avoid the problem of accepting 
aggressive nationalist movements. 
 
 
Hybridity: Unsettling binaries and exploring ‘infrapolitical’ resources 
 
The proponents of a post-liberal peace do not yield an alternative to the 
liberal peace, at least not in the sense of developing another set of principles 
or political institutions to foster peace. What they yield is a new way of 
thinking through the problem of undermining or eliminating difference	  
identified in earlier approaches of peace.73 Rather than originating in an 
abstract discussion, the post-liberal peace appears to be a ‘real-world 
condition’ of contemporary war-affected zones, in which local actors resist, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Mac	  Ginty	  (2008:	  149).	  69	  Connolly	   is	   very	   careful	   to	   avoid	   relativism	   and	   rather	   than	   endorsing	   existing	  relations,	  he	  proposes	  to	  pluralise	  them	  (2005:	  35,	  41).	  70	  See	  for	  example,	  Connolly’s	  brief	  discussion	  about	  conflicts	  such	  as	  Bosnia,	  Lebanon	  and	  Northern	  Ireland	  (1995:	  27);	  see	  also	  Connolly	  (2005:	  28–29).	  71	  Connolly	  (1995:	  192).	  72	  Connolly	  (2005:	  31–35).	  73	  Connolly	  (2002:	  92).	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modify, ignore, co-opt, adapt and contest liberal peace governance.74 This 
accommodation, negotiation, tension or clash between the 
international/local divide neither produces a liberal outcome of peace based 
on market economy, democratic institutions and diverse civil society nor an 
indigenous peace based on potentially exclusionary illiberal practices. 
Instead, what is emerging today is an emancipatory form of hybrid, or 
hybridized, peace.75 Differently labelled in the literature as ‘hybrid political 
orders’, ‘hybrid peace’ or ‘hybrid peace governance’ these names provide a 
new lens for thinking about contemporary cases of peacebuilding and, even 
more importantly, these interactions between multiple actors provide new 
opportunities for a more locally engrained form of peace. 76 
A good place to commence an analysis of hybrid frameworks of peace is 
to understand that these hold a positive view of the ‘infrapolitical areas of 
the conflict affected societies’.77 For critics like Richmond, the dynamic forces 
of the everyday resist external forms of governance and need to be engaged 
in order to foster an emancipatory version of peace.78 The point is not limited 
to the need to recognize that culture matters or that one needs to understand 
other cultures – for liberal forms of peace also have insisted on being 
cognisant of differences among societies.79 The point is to see that ‘culture’ is 
‘an under-recognised human heritage and resource for processing conflict 
and pursuing peace’.80 The distinction was already hinted in the previous 
chapter: while liberal peace frameworks considered culture a constraint to 
the development of peace, hybrid peace approaches take it as a valuable 
resource. These assumptions are clear when acknowledging that, for Boege 
and colleagues, the success of cases such as Somaliland or Bougainville and 
the failure of others such as East Timor depend on ‘the involvement of 
traditional actors and customary institutions’.81  Whether these cases are 
successes or failures is beside the point. What matters is that peace must 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  For	  example,	  Belloni	  (2012:	  21–22);	  Mac	  Ginty	  (2010:	  392);	  Richmond	  (2011:	  18).	  75	  Richmond	  (2010a:	  688).	   It	   is	   important	   to	  note	   that	  hybridity	   is	  usually	  seen	  as	   ‘an	  ordinary	   experience’	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   ‘everything	   is	   hybrid’.	   A	   hybrid	   framework	  therefore	   is	   ethically	   positioned	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   ‘contingency	   of	   boundaries’	  Pieterse	  (2001:	  238).	  76	  Belloni	  (2012:	  22).	  77	  See	  fn.	  45.	  78	  Richmond	  (2012,	  2009a:	  571).	  79	  For	  a	  classic	  text	  in	  which	  peace	  depends	  on	  the	  understanding	  of	  other	  cultures,	  see	  Benedict	  (1989).	  80	  Brigg	  (2010:	  341).	  Brigg	  uses	  culture	  here	  in	  broad	  terms,	  as	  a	  way	  to	  know	  human	  differences.	   This	   conceptualisation	   of	   culture	   is	   similar	   to	   Richmond’s	   ‘infrapolitical	  areas’,	   as	   the	   sphere	   where	   multiple	   resources	   for	   peace	   are	   located.	   Also,	   Belloni	  (2012:	  34).	  81	  Boege	  et	  al.	  (2009:	  606–610).	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‘invariably emerge from below’.82 
Resources for peace are not always visible at first glance. Indeed, these are 
invisible to international eyes or approaches that narrowly focus on the 
modification of formal institutions. 83  According to the critics, it is 
indispensable to pursue a ‘deeper contextualisation’ to comprehend more 
sensitively the needs and complex situations of local actors. Also it is 
important to adopt ‘ethnographic’ methods to have access to the 
opportunities for peace that emerge in the everyday struggles. 84  These 
approaches seek to appreciate how post-conflict societies already possess 
mechanisms, norms and tactics to overcome crisis or gain security.85 This of 
course challenges the role of international policy-makers, which need to 
support and be alert to these non-liberal forms of peace through innovative 
and spontaneous methods, rather than the rigid and institutionalist take-
over of the liberal peace. 86  To summarise, hybrid approaches capture 
‘creative energies’ and produce ‘pacific and enduring results’ to move away 
from the patronizing and domineering liberal project.87 
A hybrid approach, however, does not imply a naive middle ground 
option of peace between internationals and nationals. Indeed, it can be said 
that the appeal of hybridity in analysis of peace is its readiness to move 
away from the dominance of binaries, which plague liberal peace thinking.88 
This sensibility goes back to the influence of post-colonial thinkers who 
argue that ‘the hybridity angle on history unsettles the boundaries as well as 
the codes that sustain them’.89 For Richmond, hybridity represents ‘a form of 
agonism’ between local and international actors, in which there is rejection 
and acceptance, the negotiation of public and hidden transcripts, 
contextualization and deterritorialisation. 90  This implies that local and 
international frameworks are transgressed and modified to the point where 
it is no longer possible to visualise a fixed or clear – and therefore 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Boege	  et	  al.	  (2009:	  611).	  Notice	  that	  the	  notion	   ‘from	  below’	  is	  used	  first	  to	  criticise	  statebuilding	   imposed	   from	  above	  –	   like	   the	   liberal	  peace	  –	   and	   it	   is	   also	   the	   starting	  point	  for	  an	  alternative	  peace.	  83	  Richmond	  (2011:	  128).	  84	  Richmond	  (2009a:	  570–571).	  85	  MacGinty	   (2010:	   408);	   Roberts	   (2012:	   369).	   It	   is	   important	   to	   recall	   that	   this	  approach	  shares	  many	  assumptions	  with	  contemporary	  resilience	  approaches	  in	  which	  peace	   depends	   on	   promoting	   or	   supporting	   the	   resources	   that	   communities	   already	  have.	  Sometimes	  the	  critics	  even	  use	  the	  concept	  of	   ‘resilience’	  explicitly.	  For	  example,	  Voege	  et	  al.	  (2009:	  608).	  86	  Roberts	  (2012:	  372).	  87	  MacGinty	  (2010:	  407).	  Also,	  Belloni	  (2012:	  33).	  88	  Peterson	  (2012:	  12).	  89	  Pieterse	  (2001:	  234).	  90	  Richmond	  (2010a:	  685–686;	  2011:	  14–15,	  145).	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hierarchical – divide.91 This is ‘a fusion of global and local’, as Roberts 
proposes, which ‘accommodates the inevitable while pluralizing the 
possible’.92 A hybrid framework is also in a better position to capture the 
diversity and complexity of local political orders than other reductionist 
framings of post-conflict spaces. For example, these societies have a rich 
mixture of indigenous forms of rule and authority and more formal state-
related institutions, very often vestiges of colonialism or globalization.93 Or, 
to put another example, a hybrid framework is thus useful to contest 
discourses that propose to divide and confront people across identity lines, 
as it might subvert static notions of ethnicity or religion.94 
Of course, the critics do not assume that all hybrid formulations have an 
emancipatory potential.95 But, in lieu of a conclusion, the alternative that 
comes out from hybrid approaches is a form of emancipatory peace that 
promises to be ‘open to the everyday, difference, resistance, to agency, and 
the conditions of liberation, especially beneath the state’.96 It thus moves 
away from the liberal peace focus on states, institutions or norms to be 
responsible for the ‘poor, powerless, and marginalized’ in their everyday 
contexts.97 The ethical concerns held by the critics of the liberal peace is a 
more inclusive approach in which local concerns and agency are the means 
and ends of the process of peace. As Roberts argues, ‘popular peace is the 
outcome of hearing, centring and responding to everyday needs enunciated 
locally as part of the peacebuilding process, which is then enabled by global 
actors with congruent interests in stable peace’.98 This framework opens up 
the possibility for peace in tune with every society in their variance. It takes 
‘a pluralist view of difference and see[s] peace as hybrid, multiple and often 
agonistic’.99   
 
 
The critique of the critique of the liberal peace 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Richmond	   (2012:	  121).	   See	  Bhabha	   (1994:	  4)	   for	  an	   influential	   text	   that	   focuses	  on	  hybridity	   to	   overcome	   hierarchical	   divisions:	   ‘this	   interstitial	   passage	   between	   fixed	  identification	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  cultural	  hybridity	  and	  entertains	  difference	  without	  an	  assumed	  or	  imposed	  hierarchy’.	  92	  Roberts	  (2012:	  372).	  93	  Boege	  (2009:	  608).	  94	  Constantinou	  (2007).	  	  95	  For	  example,	  Peterson	  highlights	  that	  scholars	  and	  practitioners	  lack	  a	  more	  accurate	  understanding	  of	  different	   types	  of	  hybridity	  and	   the	   reactions	   to	   it	   (2012:	  19).	  For	  a	  review	  of	  diverse	  practices	  of	  hybridisation,	  which	  do	  not	  all	  have	  positive	  outcomes,	  see	  also	  Richmond	  and	  Mitchell	  (2011:	  9–10).	  96	  Richmond	  (2011:	  213–214).	  97	  Richmond	  (2009a:	  575).	  98	  Roberts	  (2011:	  2543).	  99	  Mac	  Ginty	  and	  Richmond	  (2013:	  764).	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For long and from different angles, there has been a backlash against the 
notion of hybridity in post-colonial studies debates.100 A salient critique 
suggests that discussions of hybridity tend to focus on identity and culture, 
while distracting from and silencing (if not reinforcing) the perpetuation of 
an unequal political economy and social injustices elsewhere. 101  The 
discourse of hybridity, Friedman argues, creates an ‘ideological’ dichotomy: 
‘good guys versus bad guys, essentialist, nationalist, refugees longing for 
their imagined homeland, versus hybrid cosmopolitans adeptly adapting to 
their current circumstances.’ 102  For Hutnyk, similarly, ‘the theorists of 
hybridity appear complicit in the middle-class comforts that their own 
cosmopolitan lives afford, while denying the same to others left to languish 
in the third world’.103 While the ad hominem accusations are not important 
here, Friedman, Hutnyk and other critics point to those in the third world 
who cannot be (and those who do not want to be) as hybrid, pluralist or as 
cosmopolitan as the theorists who exalt hybridity. Boundaries matter for 
those who struggle to overcome colonial legacies, globalisation pressures, 
national exclusion, post-conflict situations or the effects of capital 
accumulation. However, from the advantage point of the promises of 
hybridity, their claims about identity, territory or statehood are considered 
erratic.104 Those people are asked to emancipate from their particularistic 
views and join the experience and rightness of hybridity, in what soon 
edifices a hierarchical distinction between scholars and the people.105 Even if 
hybrid thinkers affirm difference, this appreciation is true as long as 
difference is articulated beyond boundaries, in a pluralist guise. As I will 
argue in the conclusion and in the next chapter, following this critique,  
peace-as-hybridity is a discourse that, as counter-intuitive as it may seem, 
confronts and belittles those they initially tried to defend. 
The focus now is on another critique of hybridity that comes from a 
different angle and that is helpful to understand the assumptions of critical 
scholars of liberal peace (analysed in the previous two sections). Although 
this might seem a counter-intuitive argument, it can be easily synthesised. 
The most evident shortcoming is that the critics of hybridity are suspicious 
of hybridity’s hidden essentialist traces and the asymmetrical relationship 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  For	  an	  interesting	  overview	  of	  the	  critiques	  (and	  counter-­‐critiques)	  of	  hybridity,	  see	  Pieterse	  (2001).	  101	  See,	   for	   example,	   Ahmad	   (2001);	   Friedman	   (2002);	   Hutnyk	   (2005).	   Even	   if	   I	   am	  complicit	  with	   the	   framework	   of	   these	   critics	   of	   hybridity,	   as	   I	  will	   argue	   in	   the	   next	  chapter,	   this	   research	   can	   also	   be	   accused	   of	   focusing	   on	   discourses	   of	   culture	   and	  detracting	  from	  questions	  of	  political	  economy.	  102	  Friedman	  (2002:	  29).	  103	  Hutnyk	  (2005:	  95).	  104	  Friedman	  (2002:	  25–30).	  105	  Ahmad	  (2008:	  81).	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established between the two cultures that form the hybrid – albeit these are 
in constant flux and therefore can never be considered two.106 Far from 
rejecting hybridity,107 as some of the above would suggest, these critics 
propose to further pluralise or hybridise the hybrid relations that have 
already been solidified. A principal example is offered by Anthias who is 
sceptical that ‘new hybridities’ could replace the dangerous exclusions of 
‘old cultures’. She inquires, ‘to what extent does hybridity signal the end of 
ethnicity, in the sense of struggle and contestation around the ethnic 
boundary?’108 After putting hybrid frameworks to the test of their own 
objectives (i.e. transcending cultural naturalisations), her conclusion is 
straightforward: ‘while being anti-essentialist, [hybridity] has not been able 
convincingly to move away from old notions of culture and ethnicity which 
still lie at its head.’109 I contend that this critique of hybridity has filtered in 
the current critique of the critique of liberal peacebuilding. 
It seems that the proponents of hybrid peace did not go far enough in 
their attempt to disrupt the domineering top-down perspective of the liberal 
peace and embrace difference through a bottom up peace project. The initial 
flaw identified is that the mixture of local/international fails to capture the 
complex and diverse relations among agencies existing in post-conflict 
scenarios. 110  As Nadarajah and Rampton argue, this shallow notion of 
hybridity ‘denies the deeper and more thoroughgoing hybridisation of the 
world’.111 Underlying this is the notion that hybridity implicitly assumes the 
existence of two pure and homogenous entities prior to the hybrid 
moment.112 Instead of a superficial local/international divide, hybridity can 
be conceptualised as the emergence of a ‘third space’. As Bhabha argues, ‘it 
is only when we understand that all cultural statements and systems are 
constructed in this contradictory and ambivalent [third] space of 
enunciation, that we begin to understand why hierarchical claims to the 
inherent originality or “purity” of cultures are untenable’. 113  Bhabha’s 
emphasis on the constant ambivalence and flux of cultures that cannot be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  Most	  authors	  or	  texts	  would	  fit	  under	  these	  two	  rather	  sketchy	  categories	  proposed	  here	  to	  analyse	  the	  critics	  of	  hybridity.	  For	  example,	  Anthias	  (2001)	  or,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  peace	   studies,	   see	   Nadarajah	   and	   Rampton	   (2014).	   However,	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	  article,	  it	  is	  still	  useful	  to	  differentiate	  these	  two	  forms	  of	  critique,	  as	  they	  have	  different	  effects:	   in	   short,	   while	   the	   first	   group	   seeks	   to	   move	   away	   from	   discussions	   about	  culture;	   the	   second	  proposes	   to	   adopt	   a	  more	   radical	   understanding	   of	   culture.	   For	   a	  similar	  classification	  of	  the	  critics	  of	  hybridity,	  see	  Peterson	  (2012:	  12-­‐15).	  107	  Ahmad	  (2008:	  84).	  108	  Anthias	  (2001:	  622).	  109	  Anthias	  (2001:	  622).	  110	  Charbonneau	  (2012:	  511–512);	  Mitchell	  (2011).	  111	  Nadarajah	  and	  Rampton	  (2014:	  9).	  	  112	  Peterson	  (2012:	  13).	  113	  Bhabha	  (1994:	  37).	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represented reveals that the critics of liberal peace have not been able ‘to 
think beyond narratives of originary and initial subjectivities’.114 The crucial 
point is that, if hybridity is a sensibility that helps to unsettle the violent 
boundaries that exist in the present,115 hybrid peace proposals have failed to 
undo the boundaries constructed by the liberal peace.116 
This interpretation of a more ‘radical’ or ‘anti-essentialist’ form of 
hybridity is not an esoteric intellectual exercise. Post-colonial writers use it to 
highlight that critical understandings of peace still carry ‘avatars of 
Eurocentrism’. Sabaratnam, for example, argues that the hybrid peace 
emphasis on the need to engage with the particularisms of the locals 
reproduces a static relation and hierarchical division ‘between the liberal, 
rational, modern West and a culturally distinct space of the local’. 117 For 
these authors, the problem is that by relying upon an essentialist different 
other – even if there is a positive understanding of local actors in their 
everyday contexts – hybrid discourses reify power relations when speaking 
about international actors that are powerful and the local that resists. As 
Drichel explains, they maintain ‘the original colonial [liberal] distinction in 
postcolonial [postliberal] times’.118 Even if Mac Ginty, Richmond and others 
acknowledge that local and international are ‘not discrete categories’ or 
propose an agonistic process of negotiation between multiple actors; or even 
if they incorporate Bhabha’s views to think of hybrid peace,119 other post-
colonial critics recognise these gestures as insufficient, unable to overcome 
their Eurocentric assumptions.120  
To be clear, the point I am trying to make is not that hybrid peace 
approaches cannot be accused of having an essentialist understanding of the 
local and the international. They certainly maintain this (perilous) dichotomy 
and, in some cases, the naturalisation of these categories is clearer than in 
others.121 However, the point here is that the critique directed at hybrid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  Bhabha	  (1994:	  1).	  115	  Pieterse	  (2001:	  238).	  	  116	  Recall,	  for	  a	  moment,	  Connolly’s	  paradox	  here.	  Connolly’s	  ethical	  position	  was	  to	  find	  ways	   to	   cultivate	   care	   for	   identity	   and	   difference	   while	   assuming	   that	   every	   ethical	  gesture	  will	  conceal	  some	  possibilities.	  While	  hybridity	  offers	  the	  possibility	  to	  cultivate	  an	  appreciation	  of	  difference	  that	  questions	  boundaries	  of	  exclusion,	  it	  has	  to	  assume	  its	  failure:	  it	  will	  also	  be	  exceeded	  by	  ‘the	  abundance	  of	  life’	  (2002:	  10).	  117	  Sabaratnam	  (2013:	  267).	  118	  Drichel	  (2008).	  119	  Belloni	  (2012:	  23);	  Mac	  Ginty	  (2010:	  392);	  Richmond,	  for	  example,	  argues	  that	  ‘what	  Bhaba	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  ‘in-­‐between	  space’	  represents	  the	  emergence	  of	  hybrid	  forms	  of	  peace’	  (2011:	  128).	  120	  Sabaratnam	  (2013:	  267–268);	  Nadarajah	  and	  Rampton	  (2014:	  9–12).	  121	  For	   example,	   some	   authors	   define	   hybrid	   peace	   with	   clearly	   identifiable	   actors.	  Therefore	   undermining	   the	   original	   notion	   of	   ‘hybridity’	   that	   problematises	   binary	  positions.	  See,	   for	  example,	  Roberts’	  proposal	   for	  peace:	   ‘a	  popular	  peace	  designed	  by	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peace has a very similar rationale to the previous critique of the liberal peace. 
That is, so to speak, the same premises the authors of peace-as-hybridity 
used to dismiss the liberal peace have been placed against them: principally, 
the elusive reality of conflict-affected zones cannot be captured within an 
essentialist framework. For the (post-colonial) critics of hybridity, hybrid 
peace has failed to engage with the particularism of others societies in a 
sensitive approach that genuinely overcomes hierarchical relations. In its 
place, it seems that post-colonial critics are pushing peacebuilding toward an 
even deeper understanding of the particularism of post-war societies, with 
the challenge in mind of doing so ‘beyond Western ways of knowing 
culture’.122 As Chandler observes, for the critics ‘the alternative is not that of 
emancipatory social transformation but of the speculative and passive search 
for different, non-liberal forms of knowledge or of knowing’.123  
Indeed, Sabaratnam’s alternative scheme to liberal and post-liberal peace 
confirms the point. After detecting avatars of Eurocentrism in the critique of 
the liberal peace, she proposes a ‘decolonising critique’ through ‘an extended 
appreciation of the historical political presence of societies targeted by 
interventions, and of forms of rule, power and resistance that existed in the 
territories concerned’.124 How different this ‘extended appreciation’ is to the 
proposals of other critical approaches is unclear. But her attempt to embrace 
the other without fixing or essentialising – and therefore colonising – is 
useful to understand the nature of critique in discussions about 
peacebuilding. To conclude, the logic of this critique assumes that every 
attempt to build peace in tune with the other will inescapably fail and 
reinforce hierarchical relations. 125  This is because difference cannot be 
exhausted by any particular form of ethics, as Connolly’s paradox of ethics 
indicates. Hence, one should not be surprised by the appearance of new 
critics who wish to further decolonise peacebuilding ‘beyond’ the previous 
attempts to be responsible for post-conflict societies. Drichel, for example, 
illustrates the point. He is concern is: ‘how can postcolonialism continue to 
embrace “the other” without simultaneously recycling stereotypes?’ 126 
Following the ethics of Levinas and Derrida his answer is to deconstruct the 
postcolonialist forms of representation that have arrested and fixated the 
Other and subsumed its singularity to abstract categories or concepts. His 
solution promises a step further that goes ‘post-the other’ in order to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  local	   societies,	   furnished	   externally	   by	   international	   society	   and	   mobilised	   internally	  through	  formal	  and	  informal	  institutions’	  (2012:	  368).	  	  122	  Brigg	  and	  Muller	  (2009:	  138).	  	  123	  Chandler	  	  (2010a:	  153).	  124	  Sabaratnam	  (2013:	  271).	  125	  As	   it	   is	   argued	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   in	   debates	   about	   peace,	   at	   least	   since	  Campbell	  (1998),	  critics	  have	  repetitively	  made	  this	  claim.	  126	  Drichel	  (2008:	  588).	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overcome the colonialist traces of previous theories.127 While Drichel claims 
to theorise ‘beyond’ existing perspectives, it may well be that he is only 
reproducing a critique that is self-devouring. Because if pluralism escapes 
the framing of any ethical approach that wishes to embrace it, the ‘new 
pluralism’ will soon be ‘old’ for the critics of tomorrow. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the core assumptions of the critique of liberal 
peace. I have initially framed the critics’ ethical concerns through a reading 
of Connolly’s work on pluralism and thereafter I have analysed their critique 
of contemporary peacebuilding processes. In short, the critics of the liberal 
peace have emphasised the international policy-makers inability to 
understand and appreciate the ‘infra-political areas’ of conflict-affected 
societies. As an alternative, these authors have proposed a hybrid peace 
approach that is context sensitive and that it carefully negotiates between the 
domineering nature of an externally driven approach and the possible 
exclusivist local practices. For Belloni, for example, ‘an inclusive 
conversation between local and international actors could open the space for 
the emergence of a postliberal peace centred on a detailed understanding of 
the local culture, a respect for alterity, and provisions for the welfare and 
everyday needs of the population’.128 However, for some authors, hybrid 
peace still reproduces a hierarchical distinction between the rational and 
peaceful international actors and the culturally static potentially violent 
locals.129 I have concluded that critique always comes from the notion that 
difference exceeds any approach that seeks to be responsible for it. This is 
the fundamental assumption that drives critique in peacebuilding debates. In 
this regard, the challenge of responding ethically to the call of the other will 
continuously remain. To use Drichel’s question again, ‘how can 
postcolonialism continue to embrace “the other” without simultaneously 
recycling stereotypes?’ 
The repetition of this question is neither gratuitous, nor pleonastic. I want 
to use this question as a prelude to the last chapter. This is because, like 
Drichel, I am also motivated by the challenge of ‘embracing the other 
without recycling stereotypes’, even if I have a different answer. I do not 
intend to go beyond Drichel and imagine, for example, a post-post-the other. 
Actually, my intention is not to ‘save’ the other, but engage with it to see 
what has been missing in the formulation of the critique of liberal peace 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  Drichel	  (588:	  602).	  128	  Belloni	  (2012:	  33).	  129	  For	  example,	  Sabaratnam	  (2013:	  267).	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frameworks. It is at this moment, when it is important to no longer talk in 
the abstract and recall the face-to-face encounters with the Kosovars placed 
at the beginning of the thesis. In Kosovo, Alban, an artist from Pristina, told 
me: ‘I am an Albanian. But independently of the group I belong, I want Kosovo to be 
a sovereign state’. Milos, who is in charge of an NGO in Gracanica, had a 
different opinion: ‘I prefer Kosovo to remain as part of Serbia, not only because I 
am a Serb, but because I want protection for the Serbian community and the 
religious and historical heritage in Kosovo’. These two claims are not necessarily 
representative of Kosovars, but their honesty and clarity are important to 
heuristically rethink critique in peace studies. It appears to be that, as 
Friedman argues, ‘it may be hybrid-for-us but in the street or the village, 
things are very different’.130 The two competing claims about sovereignty – 
that were terribly important for the two Kosovars presented here – seem 
difficult to grasp for a critique that prioritizes hybridity. For the critics, the 
solution is never there, it needs to be further cultivated and thoughtfully 
investigated through a hybrid process of mutual learning. I argue that 
perhaps if life turns into a ‘universal soup’, as Pieterse put it,131 then the 
Kosovars’ dreams of sovereignty will not matter any more. But until then, 
boundaries will still be important for the people in Kosovo. Since Kosovars 
do not ‘struggle to become hybrid’, their claims appear to be inferior, 
pathological, old-fashioned or potentially violent under the eyes of current 
forms of critique.132 The next chapter focuses on a debate about ‘national 
ownership’ – that a priori seems to support the Kosovars demands of self-
government – to indicate that peacebuilding and critique might need to shift 
gears to engage seriously with the Other. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  Friedman	  (2002:	  28).	  131	  Pieterse	  (2001:	  236).	  132	  For	  a	  similar	  critique	  of	  hybridity,	  see	  Ahmad	  (2001:	  77–81).	  He	  puts	  it	  this	  way:	  ‘the	  assumption	   that	   the	   hybrid	   has	   the	   truest	   eye	   has	   a	   strong	   whiff	   of	   the	   triumphant,	  post-­‐enlightenment	   meta-­‐narrative	   of	   modernity	   in	   which	   the	   non-­‐West	   is	   civilised	  through	  colonialism’.	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Chapter 5. 
Limiting Ownership in Post-Conflict 
Situations:  Protecting Unequal Humans? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous four chapters, I have traced the shifts and expansions of 
dominant discourses of liberal peacebuilding since the end of the Cold War. 
Schematically, top-down liberal peace frameworks – understood as 
processes of post-conflict democratisation in the immediate post-Cold War 
era and as efforts to nurture appropriate social standards through institution 
building towards the end of the decade – have evolved throughout the 2000s 
into bottom-up approaches. Now, external organisations have adopted a 
secondary role to strengthening the resilience of post-war societies. It has 
been argued that policy-oriented resilience approaches have co-evolved with 
academic critiques of the liberal peace (I have focused on ‘hybrid peace’ 
frameworks), as both share a sensitivity to develop initiatives respectful of 
the political and societal context of conflict-affected populations. 
It is in this sense that, for policy-oriented works as well as theoretical 
based critiques of the top-down approaches of the 1990s, peacebuilding is 
increasingly conceived as a hybrid and reflective process between 
internationals and national actors. This hybrid process seeks to carefully and 
iteratively work upon the particular needs and preferences of post-war 
societies. As they are read in this research, therefore, the last twenty years 
reflect the disillusionment with universal models of peacebuilding that have 
given rise to peacebuilding projects that engage more sympathetically with 
those intervened upon. Yet after this analysis the main concern of this thesis 
remains: the tendency to embrace difference has failed to engage meaningfully with 
post-conflict societies and it has done little to resolve the political concerns of these 
populations.  
This chapter seeks to engage this hypothesis and recapture the analysis 
carried out in previous chapters through giving an example of (and 
contesting) a wide consensus in the literature, which has rarely been 
problematised. The example will be the debate about “national” or “local 
ownership”, which was introduced in policy frameworks in the late 1990s.1 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  OECD	  (1996).	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The term has widely been understood in the literature as follows: ‘the extent 
to which domestic actors control both the design and implementation of 
political processes’, which is essential because, the wisdom goes, ‘any peace 
process not embraced by those who have to live with it is likely to fail’.2 The 
concept is celebrated for practical reasons but also for its ethical aspiration to 
transform current externally dominated practices and ‘criticise a paternalistic 
attitude of donor countries toward local actors’.3 Yet even if the practical and 
ethical importance of ownership is seldom disputed, there is a wide 
consensus too that ownership is not realised in practice. Indeed, the puzzle 
in the literature is how to operationalise this concept in post-conflict 
scenarios. As two commentators wrote: the challenge is that ‘the 
international rhetoric of “local ownership” must be made substantially more 
real’.4  
What is intriguing is that even if there are policy reports and academic 
critiques continuously highlighting that local ownership ought to be 
fulfilled, these calls almost never include de facto self-determination. This is 
intriguing because, as Chesterman notes, in its broadest sense, ownership 
means self-determination.5 Rather than understanding it as akin to self-
determination, though, studies define it as ‘a shorthand way of describing 
the relationship between different local and international actors’.6 Within 
this narrower definition, in which self-determination is not contemplated, 
the major concern is to ensure that international donors act with 
‘responsibility’.7 Reich, for example, who calls ‘literal’ or ‘full’ ‘ownership’ an 
‘unfulfillable goal’, wishes to improve the nature of the relationship between 
donors and recipients by introducing the notion of ‘learning sites’.8 For 
Donais, similarly, ‘local ownership’ is ‘a delicate, complex, and often shifting 
balancing act, in which the division of responsibilities between outsider and 
insider is constantly calibrated and adjusted as a means to advancing the 
peace process’.9 Krogstad rightly notes that the literature has mainly focused 
on the dilemmas faced by donors, but, instead of giving support to self-
government, he focuses on the cases in which local authorities ask for an 
international supervision of their country. For him, there is no longer a 
conflictive relation between international and local, “coloniser” and 
“colonised”, because sometimes receivers are the ones ‘inviting the coloniser 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Donais	  (2009a:	  3).	  3	  Reich	  (2006:	  7).	  See	  also	  OECD	  (2011a:	  45).	  4	  Ganson	  and	  Wennmann	  (2012:	  6).	  	  5	  Chesterman	  (2007:	  20).	  6	  Martin	  and	  Moser	  (2012:	  3).	  7	  Martin	  and	  Moser	  (2012:	  24).	  8	  Reich	  (2006:	  4).	  9	  Donais	  (2009:	  21).	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back’.10 To this, I add, what if they do not invite him? Or what if they do not 
even have the prerogative to make the invitation? 
This chapter explores the tension between an increasing demand for 
transferring ownership to the local population and the also explicit 
assumption that self-determination and self-government have to be avoided 
in post-conflict situations. The tension, the fact that ownership and self-
government have opposed connotations within contemporary frameworks 
of peacebuilding, is important to be questioned because in the literature this 
position is not contradictory: it is not presented as a tension. Indeed, it seems 
that the possible ambiguity of wanting more ownership but less self-
government has disappeared, it has been “solved”. The purpose, of course, is 
not to say that ownership ought to be self-government. The aim of this 
chapter is to interrogate how ownership has come to be understood in both 
the academic literature and in policy reports as a ‘learning’ relation or 
‘cultural exchange’ between donors and recipients, in which self-government 
is no longer an issue demanding a response. The example of how national 
ownership has been conceptualised in the literature relies on the preceding 
analysis. The purpose of using this example is to push the analysis towards a 
conclusion. It is argued that the concept of ownership, as it has been 
interpreted by the discourses of peacebuilding analysed here, has been of 
little value to post-conflict societies and, furthermore, it has denied their 
moral autonomy. 11 This denial, disguised by a discourse that promises to 
embrace difference, puts the equality of intervened populations into a state 
of permanent displacement. 
This chapter is divided into three parts that correspond to three 
approaches analysed throughout this thesis: liberal peace, building resilience 
and hybrid peace approaches. The first section focuses on how ownership 
was initially conceived in policy reports at the end of the 1990s with a brief 
example of how it was operationalised in Bosnia. It soon became clear in 
both policy and academic debates that the promotion of ownership was not 
in contradiction with deferring self-government. The second section explores 
the growing emphasis on local ownership, which is becoming both means 
and end of the process. However, as it will be demonstrated by engaging 
with the case of Kosovo, this greater commitment has not implied that the 
locals could take full control of the state. Finally, the third section deals with 
the academic critique of current peacebuilding missions. These authors seek 
to resolve the dilemmas of ownership by rethinking peace beyond existing 
dichotomies – such as, for example, the divide between international and 
local – and essentialist representations of politics to foster a more locally 
engrained peace. Yet critical frameworks also fail to engage meaningfully 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Krogstad	  (2014:	  1).	  11	  In	  tension	  with	  the	  international	   framing	  of	  ownership,	  Kosovars,	   for	  example,	  have	  pursued	  ‘ownership	  as	  self-­‐determination’	  (see	  chapter	  2).	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with post-conflict societies. It is argued that their promise of emancipation, 
which downgrades the capacity of post-conflict societies to think and choose 
for themselves, is of little relevance for the current concerns of the people in 
the name of which critics have sought to renovate peacebuilding. 
 
 
Liberal peace and the dilemmas of national ownership 
 
In 1996, reflecting on the experience of the last five decades of international 
development, the OECD published a report to set a new strategy for the 21st 
century. ‘Success will depend upon’, it argued, ‘an approach that recognises 
diversity among countries and societies and that respects local ownership of 
the development process’.12 The concept of ‘national’ or ‘local ownership’ 
soon became a mantra for international organisations.13 From the UN to the 
World Bank, there was the belief that there were no universally applicable 
strategies for development and for this reason developing people ought to be 
in the driver’s seat of economic and political reforms that had to respect the 
specific socio-cultural context of every society. As one of the World Bank 
reports stressed: ‘action must also take place with local leadership and 
ownership reflecting local realities. There is no simple, universal blueprint’.14 
In post-war scenarios, ownership was considered more burdensome because 
groups were generally divided and there were periodic relapses of violence. 
But nevertheless ownership was also increasingly seen as an important 
variable for achieving efficiency, legitimacy and context-sensitive solutions 
throughout the peacebuilding operation.15 Chesterman explains that after the 
hands-on and very intrusive policy approaches supervising Kosovo and East 
Timor, the UN shifted the focus towards a ‘light footprint approach’ in 
Afghanistan, where ownership and involvement of the Afghan Transitional 
Administration were central concerns. 16  A UN official expressed his 
willingness to correct the overbearing outlook of previous intervention 
practices in these terms: ‘we are protecting a peace process from the hubris 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  (OECD	  1996:	  9).	  	  13	  CIDA	   (2002);	   Stiglitz	   (1998a;	   1998b:	   16–18);	   UNDP	   (2001:	   20–30);	   World	   Bank	  (2000:	   8–9;	   2001:	   191–192).	   Similar	   to	   the	   wording	   of	   the	   OECD,	   these	   reports	  considered	   that	   ‘national	   ownership’	   was	   one	   of	   the	   ‘principles	   of	   effective	  development’.	   The	   Canada	   International	   Development	   Agency	   wrote:	   ‘development	  strategies,	  if	  they	  are	  to	  be	  sustainable,	  must	  be	  developed	  by	  recipient	  countries	  –	  their	  governments	   and	   people	   –	   and	   they	   must	   reflect	   their	   priorities,	   rather	   than	   the	  priorities	  of	  donors’	  (CIDA	  2002:	  4).	  14	  World	  Bank	  (2001:	  vi).	  15	  See	  the	  lessons	  learned	  from	  USAID’s	  experience	  in	  promoting	  social	  reconciliation	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  populations	  (Kumar	  1999:	  9).	  16	  Chesterman	  (2002:	  4–8).	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of the international liberal agenda as promoted by donors’.17 Ownership thus 
was introduced as a politically correct concept, which also provided more 
efficient results with regard to humanitarian assistance because it widened 
the scope of acceptance among the local population. Local inhabitants were 
no longer framed as passive receivers or victims, but as key actors that could 
actively interact with international partners to develop context-sensitive 
solutions.18 
However, the rise of ownership in the broader context of post-conflict 
democratisation projects at the end of the 1990s contained a potential 
inconsistency. This is because the commitment to reflect the priorities of the 
local population – rather than those of external agencies – and devolve 
responsibility to the nationals appeared at a moment when there was the 
suspicion that democratisation could disturb the efficiency of peacebuilding 
missions.19 As Jack Snyder summarises: ‘the transition to democratic politics 
is meanwhile creating fertile conditions for nationalism and ethnic conflict, 
which not only raises the costs of the transition but may also redirect 
popular political participation into a lengthy antidemocratic detour.’20 It is 
against this assumption that I seek to highlight the inherent tension haunting 
‘national ownership’.  
That is, by proposing ownership as self-government, they would have 
infringed the widespread assumption shared by academics and policy-
makers at the end of the 1990s that democracy was a destabilizing factor in 
post-war societies. 21 Nevertheless, according to international administrators, 
there was no such contradiction. As I shall demonstrate, local ownership 
turned from a problem for post-conflict democratisation endeavours into the 
solution for this democracy paradox: being both able to resolve the dangers 
of democracy, which could lead to conflict, and of interventions, which 
could be reminiscent of colonialism. That is, ‘local ownership’ was presented 
as a step forward strategy in all fronts: on the one hand, the concept 
appeared saved from the risks related to democratising conflict-affected 
environments because it ensured an international presence that could 
promote or enhance ownership. On the other, it freed international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Quoted	  in	  Chesterman	  (2002:	  4).	  18	  Pouligny	  (2009:	  5).	  19	  See	  chapter	  1.	  After	  the	  experiences	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  peacebuilding	  of	  the	  early	  1990s,	  the	   main	   assumption	   was	   that	   rapid	   elections	   after	   the	   peace	   settlement	   would	  reproduce	  the	  divisive	  lines	  of	  the	  war	  contributing	  to	  the	  further	  destabilisation	  of	  the	  country	   (Carothers	   2002;	   Mansfield	   and	   Snyder	   1995;	   Paris	   2004:	   151–178;	   Snyder	  2000).	  20	  Snyder	  was	   optimistic	   that	   democratic	   governments	  were	   stable,	   but	   his	   point	  was	  that	  countries	  experiencing	  democratisation	  heighten	  the	  risk	  of	  war	  (2000:	  20).	  21	  For	   an	   account	   of	   the	   ambiguity	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘ownership’	   as	   it	   is	   applied	   in	  practice,	  see	  Chesterman	  (2007:	  20).	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administrators from a neo-colonial approach and it remained positively 
attached to a respect for diversity. 
Let me illustrate how international agencies could dodge the tension 
between being sceptical about granting self-government and still promoting 
national ownership with a brief example from Bosnia. In 1999 the High 
Representative, Wolfang Petritsh, stated that the UN was undertaking a new 
approach, which he referred to as ‘ownership’. For him, this new approach 
meant that the responsibility for the peace process and implementation of 
the Dayton Agreement lay with the Bosnian electorate and its elected 
leaders.22 However, as Chandler observes, while Petritsch was defending 
ownership, at the same time, he was discriminating in favour of the leaders 
he preferred and was convinced that Bosnians were not yet ready to make 
the “appropriate” (read here non-nationalistic) democratic choices.23 Almost 
paradoxically, the UN affirmed its commitment to encouraging local 
ownership after its ruling administration had been prolonged indefinitely 
and the High Representative had adopted further substantial powers in a 
meeting in Bonn only two years earlier. The point here is not that Petritsh 
was hypocritical, but to understand that for the High Representative the 
approach of ‘ownership’ did not imply ‘self-government’ and it was 
certainly not contradictory with further international assistance. With the 
benefit of hindsight, it seems obvious to say that, even if international policy-
makers have increasingly transferred responsibilities to the local population, 
the process of ownership initiated by Petritsch has continuously limited self-
government supposing that the Bosnians are not capable of taking 
autonomous actions.24 
The more policy-oriented literature in the first decade of the 21st century 
has also conceived local ownership in similar ways: as a strategy which, on 
the one hand, represents a step forward for avoiding the too intrusive 
practices of early intervention and, on the other, it has to be limited. 25 For 
these scholars thus there is the need to support and respect local interests 
and practices in order to allegedly renovate internationally driven 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Petritsch	  (1999).	  23	  Chandler	   (2000:	   201–202).	   Also,	   for	   a	   similar	   critique,	   see	   Hughes	   and	   Pupavac	  (2005:	  882).	  24	  For	  critiques	  along	  these	  lines,	  see	  Chandler	  (2000:	  194;	  2005);	  Pupavac	  (2004:	  391–394).	   Both	   authors	   argue	   that	   the	   apparent	   contradiction	   between	   denying	   self-­‐government	  and	  promoting	  ownership	  it	  is	  not	  a	  contradiction	  according	  to	  the	  lens	  of	  international	   policy-­‐makers.	   This	   is	   because	   there	   has	   been	   a	   redefinition	   of	   the	  traditional	  meaning	  of	   democracy	   and	   citizens’	   political	   rights:	   now	   these	   come	   to	  be	  understood	   as	   processes	   that	   can	   be	   enhanced	   or	   empowered	   to	   meet	   international	  standards	  (Chandler	  2000:	  162–163;	  2010c;	  Pupavac	  2004:	  393).	  	  25	  I	   focus	   on	   this	   section	   on	  what	   one	   could	   refer	   to	   as	   ‘policy-­‐oriented’	   scholars	   that	  have	  engaged	  with	  ownership:	  Chesterman	  (2007);	  Nathan	   (2007);	  Scheye	  and	  Peake	  (2005);	  Pouligny	  (2009);	  Reich	  (2006);	  Tschirgi	  (2004).	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statebuilding projects.26 Nonetheless, much like the perspective taken by 
international administrations, they also think that the delicate realities of 
post-conflict situations place some constraints on the transfer of ownership. 
Scheye and Peake, for example, summarise the process by introducing the 
following paradox: ‘the need to ensure that reform is “locally owned,” 
coupled with the awareness that the actions of often the same “local owners” 
necessitated the intervention of the international community in the first 
place’. 27 The paradox sustains the idea that ownership needs to be carefully 
enhanced to avoid giving authority back to those that fought the war. In this 
fashion, Chesterman tells not to forget that ‘operations have tended to be 
undertaken precisely because of the malevolence or incapacity of existing 
governance structures’. 28  Furthermore, Narten takes as given that 
‘international assistance’ is a requirement in order to avoid the risk of ‘falling 
back into violence and chaos’.29 
These authors contend, as a starting point of their argument, that the 
autonomy of post-conflict societies is unquestionably problematic and thus 
some degree of external interference is mandatory. The hypothesis is that 
without an international presence, “they” will fail again or, at least, “they” 
will be much worse.30 On this assumption, local ownership is then framed as 
a set of dilemmas that are resolved through a delicate process of negotiation 
or cooperation between internationals and nationals. As Scheye and Peake 
put it: ‘the dilemma is how to chaperone a process that incorporates “local 
ownership,” but that does not permit either international actors or the 
compromised “local owners” to dictate programming choices’. 31 
Comparably, Narten proposes ‘a field-based emphasis on gradual (co)-
ownership between external and local actors’ in order to, for example, 
reduce more effectively the power of ‘local spoilers.’32  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  For	   example,	   as	   Nathan	   argues,	   ‘What	   is	   required	   is	   not	   local	   support	   for	   donor	  programmes	   and	   projects	   but	   rather	   donor	   support	   for	   programmes	   and	   projects	  initiated	   by	   local	   actors.	   The	   question	   for	   donor	   governments	   is	   not	   “how	   can	   we	  undertake	   Security	   Sector	   Reforms	   in	   partner	   countries?”	   but	   “how	   can	   we	   support	  local	   actors	   who	   want	   to	   undertake	   SSR	   in	   partner	   countries?”’	   (2007:	   4).	   Also,	   see	  Pouligny	  (2009:	  22);	  Tschirgi	  (2004:	  16).	  27	  Scheye	  and	  Peake	  (2005:	  259).	  28	  Chesterman	  (2007:	  7).	  29	  Narten	  (2009:	  252).	  30	  Arguing	   against	   those	   scholars	  who	  oppose	   the	  need	  of	   external	   interference,	   Paris	  argues,	  first,	  that	  ‘let	  them	  fail’	  is	  not	  option	  and,	  second,	  that	  less	  intrusive	  operations	  have	   not	   yielded	   better	   results.	   His	   conclusion	   is	   that	   ‘most	   host	   countries	   would	  probably	   be	  much	  worse	   off	   if	   not	   for	   the	   assistance	   they	   received’	   (Paris	   2009:	   98–108).	  31	  Scheye	  and	  Peake	  (2005:	  259).	  32	  Narten	  (2009:	  278).	  Analysing	   the	  case	   in	  Kosovo,	  Narten	  considers	  Vetëvendosje	  a	  potential	   spoiler	   group.	   For	   him,	   the	   solution	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   spoilers	  would	   be	   to	  ‘invest	  more	  in	  educational	  projects	  for	  the	  general	  public’	  (2009:	  275,	  279).	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Since the early 2000s, along the very same lines of these academic 
commentators, international organisations have accepted that the process of 
successfully transferring authority depends on international administrators 
developing the structural conditions that make national ownership 
‘efficient’.33 In 2005, in a manual for conflict resolution and peacebuilding, 
the OECD wrote: ‘in all peace-building interventions particular emphasis 
should be given to national ownership of the process. Work may need to be 
done to ensure that it is truly representative and not perpetuating existing 
divisions in society’. 34 This statement needs a careful attention. While the 
OECD does not specify why the ‘existing divisions in society’ are ‘not 
representative’, it nevertheless assumes that there is the need to work on 
building favourable ‘country conditions’ and ‘institutional capacity’ to 
achieve that ownership is ‘truly representative’. For the OECD, therefore, 
“ownership” does not imply the right to autonomously own or choose, but it 
is subordinated to prerequisites or amendments that internationals allocate 
and that indicate how ownership ought to be. 
Within this framework, questions about the right to self-determination or 
direct voting mechanisms such as referenda are left aside until the adequate 
conditions are settled. Chesterman argues conclusively that ‘ownership is 
certainly the intended end of such operations, but almost by definition it is 
not the means’. 35  How much time will be needed for the end of the 
operation, he does not say. But his conclusion serves to reaffirm that the 
literature has reached a consensus on the fact that the transfer of ownership 
does not mean transferring self-government, at least, not yet. 36  The 
assumption that post-war societies are not yet ready and, therefore, in need 
of international interference, is indicative of the conceptualization of 
ownership that is dominant since its initial formulations: rather than framing 
it as a democratic right to self-determination that populations have or do not 
have,37 it has been formulated as a process that can be enhanced or built 
from a co-ownership perspective. In the next section, I focus on 
contemporary policy approaches that seek to make ownership more real, 
without however considering self-determination. Granting full sovereignty 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  UNDP	  (2010a:	  23).	  For	  example,	  the	  Utstein	  group	  advises	  that	  a	  ‘simple	  commitment	  to	   local	   ownership’	   without	   preconditions	   can	   be	   ‘fatal	   to	   hopes	   of	   successful	  peacebuilding’.	  Instead,	  ‘there	  needs	  to	  be	  very	  careful	  research	  about	  the	  identity	  and	  background	   of	   project	   partners,	   and	   recognition	   that	   it	   will	   be	   best	   to	   attempt	   to	  increase	   the	   degree	   of	   local	   ownership	   slowly	   and	   carefully	   as	   experience	   offers	   a	  growing	  basis	  of	  trust.	  Otherwise,	  local	  ownership	  risks	  being	  a	  code	  for	  working	  with	  the	  most	  powerful	  and	  most	  opportunistic	  sectors	  of	  society’	  (Smith	  2004:	  26–27).	  34	  OECD	  (2005:	  4,	  7).	  	  35	  Chesterman	  (2007:	  7).	  36	  For	  some	  more	  examples	  on	  this	  consensus,	  see	  the	  contributors	  to	  the	  volume	  edited	  by	  Ebnöther	  and	  Fluri	  (2005).	  	  37	  For	  a	  defence	  of	  self-­‐determination	  as	  a	  principle,	  see	  Philpott	  (1995).	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to the people still remains too great a step for the contemporary project of 
global governance.38 
 
 
Building resilience to make ownership more “real” 
 
By the end of the 2000s, international organisations have progressively put a 
greater emphasis on the requirement that the local takes command of post-
conflict situations. Nowhere has this tendency been more apparent than in 
recent policy reports that have focused on building peace as resilience.39 
‘Time and again, it has been noted that if there is one overriding lesson for 
the achievement of development results – and for the sustainability of such – 
it is the importance of national ownership’, stated the UNDP.40 A quick 
glance at contemporary reports is enough to identify systematic efforts to 
transfer responsibilities to the local, while respecting the specificity of each 
context. As the UN argues, ‘peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and 
tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national 
ownership’.41 The OECD has a similar position: ‘it is absolutely necessary to 
give the state space to establish itself and to ensure that local ownership 
leads to locally grown institutions’.42 
One of the crucial differences regarding previous approaches is that 
international organisations seek to make ownership more real. That is, in 
contrast to the previous approach in which ownership was the end that 
justified other means, now ownership is understood to be both the means 
and the end of the peacebuilding process. 43  In this vein, international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  The	   attempts	   of	   limiting	   ownership	   run	   in	   parallel	   with	   the	   reconceptualization	   of	  sovereignty	   as	   a	   joint-­‐endeavour	   in	   International	   Relations	   (i.e.	   Lake	   2003;	   Ghani,	  Lockhart	  and	  Carnahan	  2005).	  39	  I	   refer	   to	   contemporary	   policy	   frameworks	   of	   peacebuilding	   as	   ‘building	   resilience	  approaches’.	  This	   is	  to	   indicate	  a	  policy	  shift	   that	  seeks	  to	  move	  from	  a	  top-­‐down	  to	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  hybrid	  endeavour,	  which	  is	  intended	  to	  be	  more	  respectful	  to	  the	  values	  and	  interests	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  societies.	  In	  chapter	  2	  I	  have	  illustrated	  this	  tendency	  through	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  international	  missions	  in	  Kosovo:	  from	  UNMIK	  to	  EULEX.	  In	  chapter	  3	  I	  have	  engaged	  with	  the	  policy	  literature	  to	  argue	  that	  international	  organisations	  and	  critical	  frameworks	  of	  the	  liberal	  peace	  share	  similar	  assumptions.	  40 	  UNDP	   (2010a:	   45).	   For	   another	   example	   see	   the	   International	   Dialogue	   on	  Peacebuilding	   and	   Statebuilding,	   integrated	   by	   developing	   states	   and	   partners.	   Its	  members	  have	  agreed	  to	  ‘change	  the	  policy	  and	  practice	  of	  engagement’:	  ‘As	  part	  of	  the	  “New	  Deal”	  we	  commit	  to	  focus	  on	  new	  ways	  of	  engaging,	  to	  support	  inclusive	  country-­‐led	  and	  country-­‐owned	  transitions	  out	  of	  fragility	  based	  on	  a	  country-­‐led	  fragility’	  (IDPS	  2011).	  41	  UN	  (2010:	  6).	  42	  OECD	  (2008:	  101;	  2011a:	  23–25)	  43	  See	   Chesterman’s	   quote	   above.	   Recently,	   the	   OECD	   specifies	   that	   ‘statebuilding	   is	  primarily	   a	   domestic	   process	   that	   involves	   local	   actors,	  which	  means	   that	   the	   role	   of	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agencies have limited their role to a mere assistance, support or facilitation 
of the locally owned process of developing resilience to violence and 
unpredictable crisis of any sort.44 In being both the means and the end of the 
project of peace, peacebuilders have sought to solve more proficiently the 
dilemmas of local ownership (either too intrusive international partners or 
too powerful local spoilers) of previous governance missions. Now, 
achieving local ownership requires international partners to become more 
self-reflexive throughout the process, aware of their limits and culturally 
biased assumptions, and more open to the socio-cultural backgrounds of 
other societies. At the same time, however, their role as facilitators is 
considered to be still important to ensure that the process is all 
encompassing and respectful of the preferences of minorities. It always 
appears that further work needs to be carried out to ‘walk the talk’ and 
guarantee ‘genuine national ownership’.45 Predicated on the belief that there 
can be ever-greater culturally sensitive policies and more inclusive 
measures, international administrators legitimise the prolongation of the 
process of transferring local ownership under international auspices.  
The result is that energies to foster national ownership within 
contemporary policymaking frameworks are not translated into processes of 
de facto self-government. Rather than giving full autonomy or ownership to 
the local, local ownership has turned into a long-term emancipatory process 
in which autonomy is, at the same time, enhanced and supervised – without 
these positions being contradictory. Schmidt goes a step further to argue 
that, within current practices of internationally supervised democratisation 
processes, populations come to ‘acknowledge’ and ‘fulfil’ their ‘lack of 
autonomy’. 46  However counter-intuitive this claim may sound, EULEX 
approach in the statebuilding project in Kosovo seems to be translating this 
idea into practice. 
From its inaugural report, the EULEX Mission (2008–present) has stressed 
that ‘there would be total ownership of the reform process by the relevant 
Kosovo institutions’.47 Its commitment towards effectively operationalising 
local ownership seems clear in this statement: 
The EULEX Programmatic Approach is based on a rigorous adherence 
to the principle of ‘local ownership’. In practice this has meant that the 
final responsibility for translating each recommendation into a MMA 
Action has rested with the relevant institutions of Kosovo’s rule of law. 
In this way, the EULEX programmatic approach is designed to help 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  international	  actors	  is	  necessarily	  limited’	  (2011:	  20).	  44	  OECD	  (2010;	  2011b);	  UNDP	  (2012).	  See	  chapter	  3	   for	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  resilience	  building	  frameworks.	  45	  For	  example,	  OECD	  (2011a:	  45);	  UNDP	  (2012:	  101).	  46	  Schmidt	  (2013b:	  14).	  Also,	  Chandler	  (2013a:	  66–67).	  47	  EULEX	  (2009:	  9).	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Kosovo’s rule of law bodies to make the changes themselves, rather 
than rely upon an international presence to do it for them.48 
The willingness to transfer responsibility and leadership to the Kosovars is 
purposely different from the intrusive strategy led by the UN administration 
during the immediate post-war period. However, EULEX’s predisposition to 
promote ownership is belied by the important fact that it entered into force 
just before the Kosovo Assembly declared the independence of the country 
in February 2008.49 This implies that EULEX, which operates under UN 
Resolution 1244 and does not recognise Kosovo’s independence, 50  is 
enhancing ownership to a population that is not sovereign. But under 
EULEX approach this is no longer problematic: it understands ownership as 
if there were no longer a conflictive binary or opposition between 
international supervision and local leadership. That is, ownership has turned 
into a process that has unsettled any tension between international 
(potentially neo-colonial) and local sovereignty (potentially problematic).51 
Within this framing, in which sovereignty is a priori eclipsed as an 
immediate possibility, ever more genuine local ownership can indeed 
become the means of a cooperative process of peacebuilding that has an 
unclear end.52 Although the dilemmas of ownership may be “solved”, the 
discourse of promoting ownership seems to constraint the political agency of 
the Kosovars who, to paraphrase Schmidt, own and fulfil their lack of 
autonomy. 
The problem of granting ownership to some degree and discarding self-
determination and full self-government from the equation is that this process 
is going against the preferences of the immense majority of the Kosovars. 
The calls for self-determination are not new. These have been on the agenda 
at least since the summer of 1990, when the majority of members of the 
Assembly voted to declare Kosovo a Republic within the Yugoslav 
Federation.53 It is very likely therefore that, since the possibility of self-
government is left out of EULEX’s schema, international policy-makers are 
doing little to resolve the concerns of the majority of the Kosovars. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  EULEX	  (2010:	  6).	  49 	  As	   discussed	   above,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Bosnia,	   talks	   about	   ‘ownership’	   were	   also	  introduced	  after	  the	  UN	  mission	  acquired	  further	  regulatory	  powers.	  50	  It	  is	  important	  to	  add	  that,	  as	  seen	  in	  chapter	  2,	  the	  literature	  emphasises	  that	  there	  are	   many	   international	   pressures	   –divided	   Security	   Council	   and	   divided	   EU	   –	   and	  domestic	   constraints	  –	  pressures	   from	  Serbia	  and	   territorials	  disputes	   in	   the	  north	  of	  Kosovo	  –	  that	  make	  it	  difficult	  for	  EULEX	  to	  recognise	  Kosovo	  as	  an	  independent	  state	  (see,	   for	   example,	   Greiçevci	   2012;	   Papadimitriou	   and	   Petrov	   2012;	   Weller	   2008).	  However,	  the	  point	  here	  is	  to	  highlight	  that	  EULEX	  framework	  of	  statebuilding	  intends	  to	  support	  ownership	  without	  transferring	  self-­‐government	  to	  the	  Kosovars.	  51	  See	  chapter	  3	  and	  4	  for	  how	  hybridity	  seeks	  to	  undo	  the	  binary	  between	  international	  and	  national	  actors.	  	  52	  See	  Krogstad	  (2014)	  for	  an	  interpretation,	  which	  undoes	  this	  binary.	  53	  IICK	  (2000:	  43–44).	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efforts to respect and support the preferences and priorities of the locals, 
explicit in contemporary policy texts, become vacuous if these do not include 
or respond to their principal plea. 54  To be clear, the conclusion drawn here 
is not that Kosovo ought to be independent. What I seek to understand is the 
meaning and implications of a strategy that promotes ownership and seeks 
to respect the local sensitivities but still places firm restrictions regarding 
self-government.55 It is important to reflect upon the notion of “transferring 
ownership within the confines of an international mission” because, at least 
in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo, this approach seems to be frustrating one 
of the citizens’ central agenda. 
Let me finish this section with a brief remark that introduces the 
conclusion of this chapter. In a discussion about ‘tolerance’, Zizek argues 
that, in liberal democracies, there are limits on tolerance: ‘We can go on 
making our small choices, “reinventing ourselves”, on condition that these 
choices do not disturb the social and ideological balance’.56 This description 
could be applied to Kosovo, and to debates about ownership more broadly, 
since tolerance has been granted on the condition that it does not mean self-
government. However, when Zizek is developing the lines of his argument, 
he refers to the impossibility in contemporary democracies to introduce 
radical changes in the political and economic system. Against this constraint, 
his text is a ‘plea for Leninist intolerance’. He wants to ‘repeat, in present 
worldwide conditions, the Leninist gesture of reinventing the revolutionary 
project’. And he adds: ‘This simply means that we obtain the right to think 
again’.57 In the context of Kosovo, the freedom of choice of its citizens has 
been constrained to higher levels. Kosovars have not been restricted from 
carrying on any revolutionary project, as the one Zizek is proposing. What 
has been foreclosed throughout the statebuilding process is the possibility 
that Kosovars could govern themselves, like any other sovereign state.58 
Believing that post-conflict societies are fragile, ready to kill each other again 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  For	   instance,	   it	   is	  unsurprising	   that	   citizen	  satisfaction	  with	   the	  work	  of	  EULEX	  has	  been	   very	   low	   (below	   30%	   most	   of	   the	   periods)	   and	   EULEX	   police	   even	   lower,	  regardless	  of	  ethnicity	  (IPOL	  2012:	  15–17).	  55	  This	  point	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  this	  research.	  For	  instance,	  the	  deferral	  of	  decisions	  seems	  to	  be	  respectful	  of	  alterity	  (Campbell	  1998),	  and	  this	  sensibility	  seems	  to	  inform	  current	  understandings	  of	  national	  ownership.	  56	  Zizek	  (2002:	  542).	  See	  also	  Furedi	  (2011:12),	  who	  observes	  that	  ‘liberalism	  exists	  in	  an	   uneasy	   relation	   with	   censorious	   and	   intolerant	   attitudes	   towards	   those	   causing	  moral	  outrage’.	  57	  Zizek	  (2002:	  548).	  58	  Liberal	   scholars	   frequently	   place	   limits	   on	   tolerance.	   Bhikhu	   Parekh,	   for	   example,	  argues	   that	   hate	   speech	   cannot	   be	   tolerated	   in	   a	   liberal	   democracy	   (2006).	   Although	  conceptually	   the	   point	   might	   be	   similar,	   I	   contend	   that	   Kosovar’s	   claim	   of	   self-­‐government	  cannot	  be	  compared	  to	  the	  discussions	  about	  hate	  speech	  or	  racism,	  which	  reveals	  how	  low	  the	  bar	  on	  tolerance	  has	  been	  placed	  in	  post-­‐war	  situations.	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and in need of a deep therapeutic intervention to build their resilience,59 
international administrators have undermined their moral and political 
autonomy.60 
In conclusion, international peacebuilders have aimed to solve the 
dilemmas of local ownership by introducing peacebuilding processes that 
are own and led by local actors, in which the international and local are no 
longer opposed binaries. However, this solution also entails that 
international administrators still supervise the process, albeit less directly. 
This is justified given that post-war populations cannot yet make the right 
choices for themselves and ownership could still be more inclusive. 61 But, 
until this is realised, these processes suspend the autonomy of post-conflict 
societies and seem to be questioning the equality between these people and 
the rest of states, who can solve their problems in the political sphere. The 
last section seeks to expand on this conclusion by engaging with academic 
critical frameworks of peacebuilding, which presumably take the lead in 
caring for and tolerating the views of the local population. 
 
 
Hybrid peace: Embracing difference at the cost of equality?  
 
The critics of liberal peacebuilding62 highlight two main problems regarding 
how ownership is operationalized, which explain the unsatisfactory 
outcomes of current peacebuilding missions. Firstly, these authors point out 
that international policy concerns related to ‘local ownership’ are only a 
rhetorical shift that is not realised in practice, where international and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  fragility	  of	  post-­‐war	  states	  has	  been	  exaggerated	  in	  a	  paternalistic	  fashion.	   See	   Pupavac	   for	   an	   analysis	   of	   how	   humanitarian	   responses	   have	  overemphasised	   the	   level	   of	   ‘trauma’	   and	   ‘psychological	   suffering’	   leading	   to	   the	  ‘pathologisation’	  of	  war-­‐affected	  societies	  (2001:	  358–364).	  60	  As	   Furedi	   argues,	   ‘widespread	   scepticism	   about	   people’s	   capacity	   to	   respond	   to	  dangerous	   ideas	  with	  maturity	   indicates	   that	  society	   finds	   it	  difficult	   to	   take	  seriously	  the	  value	  of	  moral	  autonomy’	  (2011:	  126).	  61	  For	   instance,	  Martin	  and	  Moser	  wish	  to	  “solve”	   the	  problem	  of	  ownership	   in	  Bosnia	  and	  Kosovo	  by	  the	  means	  of	  never	  transferring	  self-­‐government:	  ‘base	  the	  international	  presence	   around	   a	   perpetually	   renewable	   contract,	   in	   which	   international	   actors	  recognise,	   reassess	   and	   continuously	   reconfigure	   their	   responsibility	   in	   Kosovo	   in	  conjunction	  with	  local	  actors’	  (2012:	  24).	  62	  By	  critics	  of	  liberal	  peace,	  I	  refer	  to	  scholars	  who	  contest	  the	  universal	  assumptions	  of	  the	   earlier	   peacebuilding	   endeavours	   and	   that	   seek	   to	   build	   a	  more	   context-­‐sensitive	  project	   of	   peace	   by	   embracing	   the	   needs	   and	   values	   of	   post-­‐conflict	   societies.	   See	  chapter	   2	   for	   an	   analysis	   of	   these	   critical	   perspectives	   in	   the	   context	   of	  Kosovo	   since	  1999.	   In	   chapter	   3,	   I	   have	   analysed	   their	   assumptions	   and	  put	   them	   in	  dialogue	  with	  building	   resilience	   approaches.	   In	   chapter	   4,	   I	   have	   analysed	   their	   ethical	  presuppositions.	  Here,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  their	  critique	  of	  processes	  of	  promoting	  national	  ownership.	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national actors still maintain asymmetrical power relations. 63  Even if 
contemporary policy-makers specify that they are willing to place local 
actors on the driver’s seat, the critics nevertheless identify and censure the 
(liberal) elephant in the room. It is worth quoting Timothy Donais, who has 
extensively reviewed issues of local ownership,64 at length: 
While the basic premise of peacebuilding, as Necla Tschirgi has 
suggested, is that peace cannot be imposed by external forces, military 
or otherwise, but must rather be nurtured through patient, flexible 
strategies carefully calibrated to the domestic political context, the 
empirical record suggests that peacebuilding in practice more closely 
resembles an externally driven exercise in both state building and social 
engineering. Local ownership of governance, in other words, is 
accepted in theory but rarely practiced.65 
Donais straightforwardly criticises externally driven approaches of peace, 
which he identifies in the practice of international interventions despite their 
rhetoric. He suggests that the challenge is to build bridges between theory 
and practice, to develop strategies more sensitive to local contexts. Along 
these lines, Pouligny asserts that missions will fail unless internationals take 
a more ‘modest, flexible, patient and unobtrusive’ role that facilitates that 
local actors could lead the process.66 
Secondly, critical scholars are wary of how ownership is being promoted. 
The main idea is that international administrators have relied on a narrow 
and ‘self-referential vision of civil society’ – one that is based, for example, 
on liberal NGO’s – and have undermined the plurality of views and 
possibilities that can be found in the everyday of conflict-affected zones.67 
The consequence is that war-prone entrepreneurs, nationalist groups or 
other local ‘spoilers’, which do not represent the majority of the population, 
have co-opted ownership and dominated post-war political transitions. 68 For 
the critics, Kosovo is a paradigmatic case in which international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  For	  Mac	   Ginty	   and	   Richmond	   ‘local	   ownership’,	   like	   ‘partnership’	   or	   ‘participation’,	  are	  merely	  ‘buzz	  phrases’	  to	  gain	  legitimacy	  and	  local	  concern	  (2013:	  775).	  Notice	  that	  international	   administrators	   and	   policy-­‐oriented	   academics	   also	   share	   the	   point	   that	  ownership	  has	  not	  been	  translated	  into	  practice	  when	  they	  assess	  some	  negative	  results	  of	   earlier	   international	   interventions	   (Chesterman	   2007:	   17;	   Nathan	   2007:	   1;	   Reich	  2006:	  14–15).	  64	  Donais	  (2008;	  2009a;	  2009b).	  65	  Donais	  (2009a:	  4).	  66	  Pouligny	  (2005:	  608).	  67	  Belloni	   (2001:	   175–178).	   The	   argument	   goes	   that	   a	   deeper	   engagement	   with	   civil	  society	  would	  challenge	  a	  top-­‐down	  version	  of	  peace	  and	  would	  overturn	  the	  risks	  that	  unrepresentative	   groups	   could	   co-­‐opt	   the	   conflict-­‐resolution	   process	   (Pouligny	   2005;	  Orjuela	  2003).	  68 	  Donais	   argues	   that,	   besides	   capacity	   building,	   work	   shall	   be	   done	   to	   promote	  ‘capacity	  disabling’	  of	  some	  groups	  or	  some	  practices.	  This	  means	  that	  there	  ought	  to	  be	  ‘efforts	  to	  disable,	  marginalize,	  or	  co-­‐opt	  those	  domestic	  political	  power	  structures	  that	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  the	  effective	  establishment	  of	  new	  institutions’	  (2009:	  16).	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administrators have become complicit in reinforcing a divided society where 
nationalist views persist. It is argued that UNMIK policies (i.e. the 
decentralisation of power to municipalities designed by the Ahtisaari’s Plan) 
have institutionalised ‘ethnicity’ and legitimised a polarised civil society 
dominated by ‘ethnic’ thinking in which reconciliation among groups is far 
from tangible.69 Almost consensually, these authors appeal for a reduction of 
the salience of ethnicity in order to foster an all-encompassing peace process 
that could be owned by the nationals. The aim is to be respectful of diversity 
without reifying nationalist positions.70 
Against these two flaws underlined above, critical frameworks seek to 
renovate the actual promotion of ownership. The way forward is to involve a 
great variety of actors, with a specific attention for the powerless, in a truly 
inclusive peace endeavour. Richmond writes: 
Reforming the liberal peace model … requires an engagement with not 
just the currently fashionable and controversial issues of local 
ownership or local participation, but the far deeper ‘local-local’ (i.e. 
what lies beneath the veneer of internationally sponsored local actors 
and NGOs constituting a ‘civil’ as opposed to ‘uncivil’ society), which 
allows for genuine self-government, self-determination, democracy and 
human rights.71 
The notion of the ‘local-local’ deserves special attention.72 For Richmond, 
building peace in the plural – attuned to the culture and needs of every 
society and that is distinct from the democratic peace idealised by the liberal 
gaze – ought to be pursued by engaging with the ‘local-local’ and its critical 
agency. However, he argues, the challenge is that this deeper level is 
‘hermeneutic, diverse, fluid, transnational and transversal’ and cannot be 
represented, analysed or governed from an external perspective. On this 
assumption, peacebuilding requires a plural, flexible and open 
understanding of difference, which does not essentialise or reduce difference 
to existing (Western-informed) forms of representation.73 
The critics emancipatory call for peacebuilding – ‘hybrid peace’ – is 
driven by this attempt to engage with the local beyond ‘ethnocentric ways of 
knowing culture’, as Brigg puts it.74 As a critical reappraisal of the liberal 
peace, hybrid approaches seek to foster a context-sensitive peacebuilding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Hehir	   (2006:	   205–207);	   Franks	   and	   Richmond	   (2008:	   94).	   These	   critiques	   of	   the	  statebuilding	  process	  in	  Kosovo	  have	  been	  analysed	  in	  detail	  in	  chapter	  2.	  70	  For	   example,	   see	   Devic	   (2006:	   270);	   Simonsen	   (2005:	   298);	   Franks	   and	   Richmond	  (2008:	  98–99).	  71	  Richmond	  (2011:	  10).	  72 	  Mac	   Ginty	   and	   Richmond	   defines	   it	   as	   ‘the	   local	   that	   cannot	   be	   described	   as	  subscribing	  to	  liberal	  and	  neoliberal	  rationalities’	  (2013:	  774–775).	  73	  Richmond	  (2011:	  13–14).	  See	  also	  Mac	  Ginty	  and	  Richmond	  (2013:	  764).	  74 	  Brigg	   (2010:	   336–341).	   For	   a	   similar	   point	   in	   the	   broader	   context	   of	   IR,	   see	  Inayatullah	  and	  Blaney	  (2004:	  14–16).	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process, which avoids that it is dominated either by domineering policy-
advisors or co-opted by unrepresentative local leaders. Hybridity is thus 
seen as a corrective framework for both international practitioners and 
nationalist entrepreneurs’, who conceptualise identity as static, homogenous 
and essentialist and thus undermine multiple forms of being and doing.75 
There is confidence that a reflexive and agonistic conversation between 
multiple actors opens up new possibilities for cultivating a peace project that 
embraces difference. 76  As Richmond argues: ‘peace-building would be 
reframed as a process that reconstructs the everyday according to how its 
subjects need and want to live, where rights and needs are both contextually 
and internationally negotiated and enabled’.77 It is through this reflexive 
process and ‘cultural exchange’ between diverse international and local 
actors that critical proposals for peacebuilding seek to overcome the traps 
regarding the transfer of local ownership: ‘merging top-down with bottom-
up approaches in creative and culturally sensitive ways is also likely to 
enhance a sense among local populations of the legitimacy of the broader 
peacebuilding process’.78 In proposals for hybrid peace, the dilemmas of 
ownership are being resolved by engaging in a constructive and agonistic 
process that corrects invasive international attitudes and potentially 
pernicious local values or ideas. 
These critical perspectives are very similar to contemporary policy 
approaches of peacebuilding, which have already sought to abandon the 
top-down and intrusive projects of the late 1990s in order to facilitate and 
enhance a real process of ownership that is inclusive of diverse views. 
Although proposals for hybrid peace promise an even greater appreciation 
of the dynamics and resources of the everyday and a more sensitive 
engagement with the local (or the “local-local”), the process of transferring 
local ownership has not been translated into local self-government either. 
Therefore, these critical views do not represent a step forward compared 
with current governance approaches: they are still being “intolerant” to post-
conflict societies if ‘tolerance’ is, as Furedi argues, ‘a positive orientation 
towards creating the conditions where people can develop their autonomy 
through the freedom to make choices’.79 Furedi starts from the assumption 
that people are autonomous subjects engaging in the world. Instead, very 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Mac	  Ginty	  (2010:	  397).	  76	  As	   seen	   in	   chapter	   4,	   the	   process	   of	   embracing	   difference	   has	   no	   end,	   since	   every	  attempt	  to	  be	  respectful	  with	  post-­‐conflict	  societies	   is	  necessarily	  reductionist	  of	  their	  singularity	  (i.e.	  Campbell	  1998,	  Drichel	  2008).	  This	  has	  been	  the	  underlying	  assumption	  informing	   contemporary	   forms	   of	   ‘critique’	   and	   ‘the	   turn	   to	   the	   local’.	   However,	   this	  implies,	   as	   Koddenbrock	   observes,	   ‘that	   the	   critique	   of	   intervention	   becomes	   ever	  smaller	  and	  empiricist’	  (2014:	  15).	  77	  Richmond	  (2012:	  125).	  78	  Donais	  (2009a:	  19–20).	  79	  Furedi	  (2011:	  22).	  	  
132	  |	  C H .  5 :  L I M I T I N G  O W N E R S H I P  I N  P O S T - C O N F L I C T  S I T U A T I O N S  
similar to policy frameworks, scholars who defend hybrid peace consider the 
‘autonomy’ and ‘freedom to make choices’ the problem to be corrected 
through a process of hybridisation that transcends the dichotomy of 
international “colonials” and local “spoilers”. 
The negative implication is that these critical perspectives, in wanting to 
hybridise the process of peacebuilding in an effort to respect and appreciate 
the pluralism of post-war societies, eschew or belittle the autonomous 
demands openly voiced by different local actors. The willingness to build 
peace beyond current forms of political representation and identification 
gives little meaning to the present struggles faced by these societies. For 
example, Richmond argues that the promise of a ‘post-liberal peace’ goes 
‘beyond mere rationalism and sovereignty’, beyond ‘state institutions’ or 
‘territorial’ constraints in order to aspire to true ‘democracy and self-
determination’. 80 But this promise is of little value for current concerns of 
most of the people in post-conflict societies who want sovereignty, territory 
and state institutions (e.g. Bosnia and Kosovo). Wishing to build peace 
beyond the dominant constellations of identity and difference, as William 
Connolly would say, 81 these frameworks disregard the preferences and 
political positions that make sense for the local population.  
I do not want to close this chapter without introducing a final remark 
because one important question lingers: why have contemporary liberal 
peacebuilding discourses energetically celebrated (the “real” implementation 
of) the concept of ‘national ownership’ and yet it has rarely been translated 
into full ‘self-government’? While this question cannot be exhausted in a 
single remark, I seek to provide an answer that engages retrospectively with 
the whole thesis. The point is not to say that hybrid approaches – similar to 
liberal peace frameworks – are hypocritical or cynical in the sense that they 
promise one thing (ownership and tolerance to difference) and do another 
(hybrid project which defers self-government).82 I do not think that, for 
example, Mitchell and Richmond are cynical when they defend self-
determination and yet they criticise local groups like Vetëvendosje in 
Kosovo. 83  The same goes for peacebuilders who uphold the value of 
ownership but only to some degree.84 It is not cynicism what is at stake here, 
but dominant understandings that make possible to think of ownership 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Richmond	  (2011:	  130).	  81	  Connolly	  (1995:	  xiv).	  82	  The	  cynicism	  of	   international	  donors	  has	  been	  a	  common	  assumption	   in	  the	  critical	  literature.	  For	  instance,	  the	  belief	  that	  local	  ownership	  is	  ‘empty	  rhetorical’	  implies	  that	  they	  are	  at	  least	  suspicious	  of	  being	  cynical	  (Donais	  2009:	  18).	  83	  Richmond	  and	  Mitchell	  (2011:	  335–340).	  84	  In	   my	   interviews	   in	   Kosovo	   with	   members	   of	   international	   organisations	   such	   as	  UNMIK	  or	  OSCE,	   it	  was	   clear	   that	   the	   intentions	  of	   their	   actions	  were	   in	   concordance	  with	  their	  views.	  I	  did	  not	  suspect	  either	  of	  any	  hidden	  malevolent	  agenda.	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detached from the possibility of self-government. As John Heathershaw 
argues, rather than framing peacebuilding as a ‘cynical construct’, we shall 
focus on the ethical assumptions that sustain current frameworks of the 
liberal peace. He continues: ‘peacebuilding’s world is one of bifurcated time, 
space and ethics: them and us, then and now, bad and good. It is a world 
divided between the ‘enemy-other’ (of the past, fundamentalist ethics and 
ethnic identity) and an ‘ideal-other’ (of the future, rationalist ethics and civic 
identity)’.85 
The conceptualisation of a hierarchically ‘bifurcated world’ has 
dominated peacebuilding discourses since the mid-1990s:86 on top of the 
ladder, there are peaceful, tolerant to diversity, civic, rational, cosmopolitan 
peacebuilders and Western societies. At an inferior level, there are war-
prone, intolerant, ethnic and irrational post-conflict populations. As I have 
argued in chapter 1, the notion of a bifurcated world, the divide between 
Western and non-Western societies, appeared after the disillusionment 
related with the failure to achieve peace in war-affected societies. The fact 
that democratisation rarely worked for non-Western societies led to the 
conclusion that these peoples were (culturally) different. Since then, to put it 
sketchily here, peacebuilding frameworks have increasingly moved away 
from universal assumptions to focus and fix the subjective constraints that 
made these people fail. Having understood the ‘universal assumptions’ to be 
the source of the persistent crises of peacebuilding projects, both academics 
and policy-makers have instead sought to embrace difference 
conversationally with the aim of cultivating a form of peace that is unique to 
the needs of every society.87 
However, within a framework that maintains the notion of a bifurcated 
world, it is difficult to take the claims about self-determination and self-
government of post-conflict societies seriously.88 In Kosovo, for example, 
scholars have usually read the struggle about sovereignty and the demands 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  Heathershaw	  (2008:	  603).	  86	  At	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  decade	  of	  1990s,	   frameworks	  of	  peace	  were	  predominantly	  considered	   of	   a	   universal	   nature	   and,	   therefore,	   the	   difference	   between	   societies	  was	  framed	   as	   one	   between	   democracies	   and	   non-­‐democracies	   (Boutros-­‐Ghali	   1992;	  Fukuyama	  1989;	  Huntington	  1991;	  Rummel	  1995;	  Russett	  1993).	  87 	  David	   Scott	   reads	   the	   shift	   toward	   embracing	   culture	   as	   indicative	   of	   a	   post-­‐ideological	   turn:	   ‘a	   post-­‐ideological	   conception	   of	   democratic	   pluralism	   and	  cosmopolitan	   idiom	   in	   which	   the	   otherness	   of	   the	   West’s	   Others,	   once	   a	   source	   of	  defensive	   anxiety	   and	   the	   object	   of	   truth-­‐determining	   investigations,	   [can]	   now	   be	  understood	  conversationally,	  antiessentially,	  ironically,	  as	  mere	  difference’	  (Scott	  2003:	  111	  Emphasis	  in	  original).	  See	  also	  Jacoby	  (1999:	  33).	  	  88 	  The	   position	   of	   prudence	   in	   regards	   to	   granting	   self-­‐governance	   may	   be	  contextualised	  within	   the	  widespread	   ‘distrust	  of	  state	  sovereignty’	   that	   informs	  most	  of	   contemporary	   theories	   of	   International	   Relations.	   See	   Bickerton,	   Cunliffe	   and	  Gourevitch	  (2007:	  2–8).	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of self-determination with great scepticism. 89  The rise of nationalist 
movements such as Vetëvendosje are viewed with disdain and fear that a 
sovereign Kosovo would be dominated by Kosovo-Albanians who silence 
minority communities.90 Visoka, for example, explains how in Kosovo local 
resistance and bottom-up initiatives have ‘the potential to revitalise political 
life’ and ‘safeguard the pluralist nature of public affairs’. However, having 
Vetëvendosje in mind, he argues that ‘local resistance, while promoting 
nationalist ideology and denying ethnic differences and pluralism in society, 
often results in exclusionary practices that risk affecting the subalterns who 
belong to minority and vulnerable communities’.91 Visoka makes clear that 
bottom-up projects have to be selective and is biased in favour of those who 
are diverse, hybrid and cosmopolitan and wary of those who, for example, 
reclaim security, territory or self-government. 92  In short, within 
contemporary peacebuilding frameworks that celebrate difference, there is 
still a constant reluctance to engage with ‘the people whose choices – their 
difference –‘, as Zizek puts it, ‘do make a difference’.93 
For contemporary frameworks of the liberal peace, the Other is not taken 
as the sovereign equal, but as the different whose peace ought to be 
approached through a careful conversation and reflexive process of 
cooperation among multiple actors. Within this bifurcated world that 
structures peacebuilding on the meta-level, the demand on those intervened 
upon is to constantly destabilize their identity to accommodate difference. It 
is not hard to see that questions of self-government and sovereignty, which 
cannot be thought of without a more or less stable notion of identity and 
difference (i.e. the local and the international), are increasingly seen as non-
possibilities: they even become conceptually and politically “nonexistent”, 
no longer disputed. In lieu of a conclusion, it is argued that the cost of a 
discursive shift, which has sought to move away from universal approaches 
(considered intrusive and disrespectful of diversity) to emphasise difference, 
may be the difficulty to consider post-conflict populations as equals. On the 
assumption that these people are inferior,94 the approaches analysed here 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  See	  the	  quote	  in	  fn	  33.	  It	  is	  quite	  obvious	  the	  belief	  in	  a	  hierarchically	  divided	  world	  in	  Narten’s	  account.	  He	  interprets	  the	  claims	  of	  independence	  made	  by	  the	  Kosovars	  as	  a	  problem	  of	  non-­‐education	   in	  which	   the	   solution	   is	   to	   invest	   in	  education	   in	  a	  process	  facilitated	  by	  international	  organisations.	  	  90	  McKinna	  (2012a);	  Richmond	  and	  Mitchell	  (2011:	  335);	  Visoka	  (2011:	  110–115).	  	  91	  Vizoka	  (2011:	  124).	  92	  As	  Richmond	  argues:	   ‘Peacebuilding	  should	  begin	  from	  the	  local,	  the	  everyday,	  from	  the	   bottom	   up,	   and	   wary	   of	   any	   problem-­‐solving	   metanarratives	   relating	   to	   power,	  security,	   sovereignty,	   status,	   or	   territory,	   or	   even	   emancipation,	   which	   involve	   the	  claims	  to	  know	  on	  behalf	  of	  others,	  to	  govern	  on	  behalf	  of	  others	  or	  to	  defer	  agency	  and	  self-­‐determination’	  (2011:	  122).	  93	  Zizek	  (2002:542).	  94	  See	   Friedman	   for	   a	   critique	   of	   the	   hierarchical	   assumptions	   underpinning	   hybrid	  approaches	  (2002).	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(liberal peace, building resilience or hybrid peace) have promoted ownership 
while adjourning self-government. This has been problematic, for instance, 
in the former Yugoslavia, where self-government has clearly been one of the 
central concerns of the local population. Yet different peacebuilding 
frameworks have considered that international assistance has been necessary 
to cultivate an emancipatory peace that is inclusive and plural, in which 
conflictive positions would disappear. Wanting to protect difference 
infinitely, the discourse of peacebuilding hides a paternalistic view of post-
conflict societies that denies their equality and condemns them to appreciate 
and enjoy their differences in a process in which self-government is 
continuously deferred. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the tension between the growing commitment to 
promote national ownership and the reluctance to grant self-government to 
war-affected populations. With the purpose of repacking the previous 
analysis, I have analysed how ‘local ownership’ has been understood by the 
three approaches analysed throughout this research. Firstly, for liberal peace 
frameworks, ownership was introduced at the end of the 1990s both as a 
mechanism for bettering the results of previous missions and a politically 
correct concept to improve the practices and relations between interveners 
and intervened upon. However, the notion of ownership appeared at a time 
in which there was a great scepticism with democratic processes and thus it 
had to be postponed until certain social and political conditions were met. In 
its inception, therefore, ownership can be considered little more than 
window dressing that allowed post-war societies to implement policies that 
had been engineered by donors. Secondly, contemporary (building peace as 
resilience) policy frameworks have intended to correct the gap between an 
alleged theoretical commitment to ownership and the practice of the 
operations. In the last few years, local ownership has become both means 
and the apparent end of the mission (even if this outcome is constantly 
adjourned) and the role of peacebuilders is secondary in order to facilitate a 
mutual learning and cooperative process of peace. 
However, it has been argued that their role as mere “facilitators” is still 
considered imperative in war-affected situations. Even if ownership has 
become a sine qua non principle for any peace process, this has not been 
translated into self-determination or self-government. The problem has been 
identified when the citizens in states like Bosnia or Kosovo, who have 
reclaimed self-government, have been constrained on the assumption that 
they are not prepared to take sovereign decisions. In this sense, I have 
argued that the promotion of ownership has undermined the moral and 
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political autonomy of post-war societies. As a minimum, it has existed in 
constant tension with the pleas and interests of the (majority of the) people. 
This chapter has also analysed academic critical views of the liberal peace. 
Hybrid peace frameworks seek to resolve the problems of ownership – 
international domineering attitudes and local potentially violent preferences 
– by cultivating a process of agonistic relation between multiple self-
reflexive actors. Yet it has been argued that their attempt to hypothesise 
beyond the existing forms of representation – as a means to solve the 
divisive tensions that exist in the present – seem to offer little value to 
conflict-affected people. In plain English, while critical frameworks project 
an inclusive peace process in which statehood, territory or security are no 
longer relevant, 95  meanwhile, before this promise of peace is fulfilled, 
sovereignty, territory and security are the wants of post-war populations. 
Along similar lines to policy approaches, therefore, hybrid peace 
perspectives have belittled the priorities of local actors that are not 
considered plural, emancipatory, hybrid or open to difference, and have 
legitimised further international assistance. The analysis of these views, 
adding to the findings of the previous chapters, has led me to the conclusion 
that, within the frameworks of peacebuilding that have increasingly 
embraced difference, the equality of post-war peoples has been degraded.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  See,	   for	   instance,	   Richmond’s	   promise	   of	   peace:	   ‘A	   deterritorialised,	   non-­‐sovereign	  polity	   would	   be	   the	   outcome	   of	   incorporating	   the	   everyday	   as	   a	   key	   priority	   of	  peacebuilding	  in	  desecuritised	  form,	  maximising	  critical	  agency	  rather	  than	  the	  national	  interest	  of	  the	  state	  or	  interests	  of	  donors	  (2011:	  138–139).	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Conclusion 
 
 
This research started with the narrative of my face-to-face encounter with 
people from Kosovo. In the field trip, at least among the people I talked to, I 
identified a problem of two competing visions of sovereignty and a large 
desire to move forward through the possibility of governing themselves. The 
literature on peacebuilding, though, seems to have explained the tensions in 
Kosovo very differently. International policy-makers and academics have 
focused on an ethnic clash and the social and subjective malaise of the 
Kosovar population that has to be contained and supervised by an 
international supervision process. For them, the problem has to be resolved 
by cultivating tolerance among people, educating their views and 
developing a managerial process that could be respectful of diversity and 
could overcome the nationalist dreams of Kosovar society. The critical 
question posed by the literature that has justified an open-ended 
international crisis management operation in Kosovo has been: what if 
democracy and self-government allows Kosovars to fulfil their “ethnic” 
aspirations?  
The research has pivoted around the misfit between my interpretation of 
the problems affecting the Kosovars and my reading of the different 
international framings of the politics in Kosovo. This misfit is relevant 
because the uneasiness of the Kosovars regarding international supervision 
chimes with the experiences of other affected societies that have been subject 
to supervision measures. In the literature, a “local turn” has proved 
significant, guided by an ethical fervour to cultivate a peace process that 
affirms, protects and pluralises the particularism of these societies. Yet my 
hypothesis at the beginning of this research has been that this tendency to 
embrace difference seems to have failed to engage meaningfully with post-conflict 
societies and it has done little to resolve the political concerns of these people. 
This thesis has interpreted how dominant discourses of international 
peacebuilding (in policy-making and academic critique) have moved away 
from universal assumptions of peace, prevalent at the beginning of 1990s, 
and have co-evolved throughout the 2000s towards a commitment to 
cultivating a hybrid process that is context-sensitive and respectful of the 
needs of post-war societies. As it has been argued in chapter 1, this shift was 
nurtured in the mid-1990s, when processes of democratisation failed to 
facilitate sustainable peace following wars which seemed to be conceptually 
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different from previous conflicts.1 Countries emerging from war were said to 
lack the appropriate social conditions for democracy to flourish. The 
emphasis on barbarism, cruelties, irrationality and the newness of these wars 
– as opposed to the wars fought for interests and rights – made it 
increasingly difficult to defend universal blueprints. By the end of the 
decade, critiquing democratisation through resort to ‘the record of 
experience’, Carothers observed that very few of the peace-building 
operations had succeeded to promote democracy, concluding that ‘it is time 
to recognise that the transition paradigm has outlived its usefulness and to 
look for a better lens’.2 
Since the late 1990s, then, following the critique of peace-as-
democratisation processes, international administrators have experimented 
with processes of therapeutic institutionalisation that attempt to fix and 
rectify the deficient subjective constructs of post-war societies.3  The work of 
Douglass North, analysed at the start of this research, was useful to 
conceptualise the tendency to adjust formal rules that could correct the 
informal constraints of underdeveloped or war-affected societies. In chapter 
2, I have analysed how this focus on institutions sought to promote 
peacebuilding in Kosovo by managing the ‘ethnic’ desires of the Kosovars. I 
have argued that, on the assumption that Kosovo might relapse into “ethnic” 
violence if left alone, international supervision has been prolonged 
continuously with further managerialist mechanisms.  As a conclusion, I 
have sought to undo the “ethnic dilemma” by rethinking the tensions in 
Kosovo within a national-democratic framework, as people who discuss and 
disagree over the sovereignty of the country. This explanatory framing is 
interesting not because it reveals that the majority of Kosovars desire 
independence from Serbia, of course, but because it suggests that the link 
between ethnicity and politics is a specifically international framing of the 
problem, which has led to an indefinite deferral of self-government, as it is 
apparent since EULEX commenced its technical mission in 2008. 
Today, peacebuilders, who currently experiment with cautious and 
context-sensitive peace projects that are owned and led by local actors, 
increasingly share post-structuralist sensibilities, as I have argued in chapter 
3. In this sense, David Campbell’s critique of liberalism at the end of the 
1990s has been useful to understand contemporary approaches of 
peacebuilding. For example, his ethos to strive for a promise of democracy 
and justice for the Other that will permanently remain ‘to come’,4 echoes the 
policy strategy of building resilience without an end-goal for peace. Whereas 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  ‘new	  wars’:	  Kaldor	  (1999);	  Kalyvas	  (2001);	  Snow	  (1996).	  2	  Carothers	  (2002:	  6–9).	  3	  North	  (1990).	  4	  Campbell	  (1998:	  192).	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Campbell sought to undo the narratives that had concealed ‘the complex and 
contested nature of Bosnian life’,5 policy-makers are adopting minimal and 
constructive roles in the peace process to ensure that societies build upon the 
resources they already have. Projects of mutual learning, iterative actions 
and self-reflexivity seem to invoke openness to context and a clear 
willingness to overcome the limits of the liberal peace. 
Academic critiques of the liberal peace find themselves in disarray with 
the tendency of policy-makers to embark in a project of ‘relational 
sensibility’ with post-war societies.6 As argued in chapter 4, contemporary 
critics argue that the policy shift is only rhetorical and, therefore, have 
emphasised the need to understand and appreciate further the ‘infra-
political areas’ of conflict-affected societies. 7  A deeper appreciation of 
context will lead to a hybrid or post-liberal peace. As Belloni writes, ‘an 
inclusive conversation between local and international actors could open the 
space for the emergence of a postliberal peace centred on a detailed 
understanding of the local culture, a respect for alterity, and provisions for 
the welfare and everyday needs of the population’.8 However, I have argued 
that the logic of these critical arguments assume that every attempt to build 
peace will inescapably fail and reinforce hierarchical relations.9 As such, 
critique has become an endless plea for further hybridisation. The suggested 
image of a vorarephilia of critique captures an endless process of a self-
devouring critique whose only way forward seems to be to go ‘local’.10 
Chapter 5 has re-engaged with the previous analysis through an example: 
the conceptualisation of national ownership. While this concept would seem 
to be relevant for addressing the demands of self-government articulated by 
the Kosovars, it has been reinterpreted instead as a process in which self-
government is not contemplated. For contemporary advocates of local 
ownership, it has turned into a process of careful and mutual apprenticeship 
in which there is no longer a tension between the presence of international 
actors (potentially neo-colonialist) and sovereignty (potentially problematic).  
Today, self-government seems no longer a question to be posed for current 
frameworks of global governance. By formulating this question – how has 
ownership been understood as a hybrid process in which self-governance is 
no longer a goal or an anxiety? – I have highlighted that discourses of 
peacebuilding might need to shift gears. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Campbell	  (1998:	  114).	  6	  Brigg	  (2013).	  7	  See,	   for	   example,	   Richmond,	  whose	   views	   have	   been	   analysed	   through	  much	   of	   this	  work.	  8	  Belloni	  (2012:	  33).	  9	  Campbell	  (1998);	  Connolly	  (2002).	  10	  See	  Koddenbrock’s	  analysis	  of	  contemporary	  forms	  of	  critique	  in	  IR	  (2014).	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The sensibility to embrace difference in an indefinite process of 
hybridisation has failed to address meaningfully the problems and concerns 
of post-conflict societies. The conclusion of this research is that, drawing on 
the assumption that these societies are incapable of undertaking sovereign 
acts, the discourses of peacebuilding have legitimised a permanent role for 
external agencies that, seeking to strive for a deep appreciation of difference, 
have continuously questioned the political and human equality of post-
conflict populations in a hierarchically-ordered world. 
After the analysis of this research, it seems that the political autonomy of 
the people is one of the key problems of our times. To be sure, I would feel 
much more comfortable to discuss and disagree with the projects of 
(autonomous) people in the world than problematising their autonomy to 
the level in which they cannot speak or they cannot be comprehended. 
Today, “we” fear the people and democracy in processes of statebuilding 
and the remedy has been the cultivation of emancipatory processes of self-
reflexivity and mutual learning. In the context of debates about 
peacebuilding, this thesis has been critical of the shift towards embracing 
difference that has deferred the possibility of self-determination. 
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